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Abstract 
This thesis investigates how bank regulations and institutional reforms shape bank 
competition, credit supply, and loan contracts design in the context of Chinese banking 
market. The first chapter compares the theoretical foundations and empirical performances of 
commonly applied bank competition measures under China‟s binding interest rate regulations. 
The second chapter investigates if informational monopolies resulting from relationship 
lending and bank market concentration allow for rent extraction through collateral. The third 
chapter evaluates the effects of collateral law reform on firms‟ access to finance and credit 
transactions among firms. 
 
Chapter 1: Measuring bank competition under binding interest rate regulation: The 
case of China.  
Co-authored with Adrian van Rixtel and Michiel van Leuvensteijn. Shorter version published 
at Applied Economics, vol 48 (49), p.4699-4718, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2016.1164818 
(April, 2016). Earlier versions of this chapter are published as Bank for International 
Settlements Working Paper (No.422/2013) and Banco de España Working Paper 
(No.1404/2014).  
Many empirical studies suggest that financial reform promoted bank competition in most 
mature and emerging economies. However, some earlier studies that adopted conventional 
approaches to measure competition have concluded that bank competition in China declined 
during the past decade, despite progressive reforms implemented since the 1980s. In this 
chapter, we show theoretically and empirically that this apparent contradiction is the result of 
flawed measurement. Conventional indicators such as the Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse 
H-statistic fail to measure competition in Chinese loan markets properly due to the system of 
interest rate regulation. By contrast, the Profit Elasticity (PE) approach that was introduced in 
Boone (2008) as Relative Profit Differences (RPD) does not suffer from these shortcomings. 
Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks operating in China during 
1996-2008, we show that competition actually increased in the past decade when the PE 
indicator is used.  
 
Chapter 2: Do banks extract informational rents through collateral?  
Co-authored with Adrian van Rixtel and Honglin Wang. Published as Bank for International 
Settlements Working Paper (No.522/2015), Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research 
Working Paper (No.01/2016), Bank of Finland (BOFIT) Discussion Paper (No.5/2016), and 
Banco de España Working Paper (No.1616/2016). Selected as Featured Article by Banco de 
España, 2016.  
This chapter investigates if informational monopolies resulting from relationship lending and 
bank market concentration allow for rent extraction through collateral. Our identification 
strategy hinges on the notion that informational equalization shocks (such as equity IPOs) 
erode rent seeking opportunities, while competing theories do not rely on information 
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asymmetries among lenders. Using a unique hand-collected database of 9,288 bank loans 
obtained by 649 listed Chinese firms, we find that collateral incidence is positively associated 
with relationship intensity and bank market concentration, while this effect is moderated for 
post-IPO loans. We also demonstrate important cross-sectional variation among borrowing 
firms: after IPO, rent extraction through collateral is moderated for less risky firms, but 
intensified for risky firms. These findings are not driven by alternative theories including: 
shifts in firm risk around IPO; heterogeneous dynamics of risk shifting around IPO; and 
concurrent lending and corporate bond underwriting. We further demonstrate that our results 
are not sensitive to: endogeneity of IPO or relationship lending; unobserved time-invariant 
firm risks; alternative samples; and the endogeneity of loan contract terms. Our study 
complements the findings in other studies that banks extract rents by charging higher lending 
rates from their informational monopolies (Hale and Santos, 2009; Schenone, 2009). 
Furthermore, we provide the first loan-level evidence on the determinants of collateral in 
Chinese bank lending markets.  
 
Chapter 3: Collateral and the disruption of firms as non-financial intermediaries: 
Evidence from Chinese Property Law.  
 
Forthcoming as Bank of Finland (BOFIT) Discussion Paper and Banco de España Working 
Paper. 
 
This chapter investigates the effects of collateral law reform on access to external finance and 
trade credit. By allowing large classes of movable assets to be used as collateral, the Chinese 
Property Law reform transformed firms‟ role as non-financial intermediaries. We find after 
the legal reform, firms relied on trade credit financing substituted to more short-term bank 
credit, and the providers of trade credit reduced significantly their provision of trade credit. In 
particular, the Property Law has disrupted the practice in which firms redistribute short-term 
bank credit via trade credit. Instead, the providers of trade credit started to accumulate more 
fixed asset investment, which in turn allowed for more long-term borrowing from banks. Our 
findings are not driven by confounding factors such as liquidity drain due to financial crisis 
or other contemporary reforms. This study highlights the importance of looking at credit 
transactions between firms when investigating the effect of collateral laws.
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Measuring bank competition under binding interest rate 
regulation: the case of China 
 
 
1. Introduction  
There is a continuing debate on which empirical approaches may be the most suitable for 
measuring competition in specific banking systems. This discussion has assumed growing 
weight in the bank competition literature, underpinning the rather unsatisfactory observation 
that the currently available empirical toolkit frequently yields contradictory and inconclusive 
results for specific countries. For example, one study concludes that “… well-known 
indicators of bank competition often give conflicting predictions of competitive behaviour 
across countries, within countries, and over time” and that the “… determination of 
competition may differ depending on the measure chosen to assess it” (Carbó Valverde et al., 
2009, p. 132).  
In the light of this discussion, the Chinese banking sector offers an interesting test 
case. First, Chinese banking has been reshaped profoundly by financial reform. During the 
past 30 years, the banking landscape in China moved from a government controlled 
monolithic structure to a pluralistic system comprising various groups of market-oriented 
banks. The question arises how different measures assess the development of competitive 
conditions under these fundamental changes. Second, relatively few econometric analyses 
have concentrated explicitly on bank competition in China. These have applied conventional 
measures such as the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (Yuan, 2006; Fu, 2009) or the Lerner index 
(Fungáčová et al., 2012; Soedarmono et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2014). These studies concluded 
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in general that competition in the Chinese banking sector followed a decreasing trend, despite 
the comprehensive process of financial reform. This is a rather counterintuitive result and in 
contrast to the results of a large body of research which indicates that deregulation fostered 
competitive conditions in many emerging market economies (Claessens, 2009).  
This paper contributes to the literature on bank competition by arguing that 
conventional measures of competition like the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic1 and the Lerner 
index may not assess bank competition in China correctly, mainly due to the existence of 
interest rate regulations. Instead, we argue that the Profit Elasticity (PE) indicator may be 
better suited to investigate competitive conditions in Chinese loan markets. The PE indicator, 
whose theoretical foundation is the concept of Relative Profit Differences (RPD), is based on 
the notion that competition rewards efficiency. In other words, in a more competitive market, 
firms are punished more harshly (in terms of profits) for being inefficient (Boone et al., 2007; 
Boone, 2008; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011 and 2013). Boone et al. (2007) demonstrates that 
the PE indicator is more robust from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view when 
compared with conventional measures. We show that the theoretical foundation of the PE 
indicator allows for a correct measurement of competition under both binding deposit and 
lending rate regulation, hence it is particularly suitable to assess competitive conditions in 
regulated markets such as Chinese loan markets (See Appendix C for theoretical proofs).   
As in previous studies, our empirical results for the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index 
show declining competition, and this conclusion holds for alternative specifications. In 
contrast, the PE indicator shows improving competition in Chinese loan markets over time, 
especially after 2001, with some retreat in the final years of our sample. Moreover, we are 
fairly able to explain the specific pattern of the development of competition. Our results for 
the PE indicator are in line with the development of various indicators of financial reform. 
Finally, the findings for the PE indicator are robust for several alternative specifications and 
pass various robustness tests. All in all, we see our a priori theoretical objections to the 
conventional measures as appropriate gauges to assess Chinese banking competition 
validated by the empirical results.  
                                                             
1 See Bikker et al. (2012) for further discussion on the shortcomings of Panzar-Rosse H-statistic in the empirical literature. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives background 
information on the structure of Chinese banking. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the 
literature on bank competition in China and sets out our main hypotheses. Section 4 presents 
the methodological framework of the standard and elasticity-adjusted Lerner indices and the 
PE indicator. Section 5 shows our data and sample characteristics. Section 6 compares the 
empirical results for the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index and the PE indicator and presents a 
detailed interpretation of the results from the PE indicator, including their relationship with 
various financial reform indicators. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Chinese banking sector 
China‟s financial system has undergone a comprehensive process of reform during the past 30 
years, of which one of the main objectives was to improve competition and efficiency in the 
banking sector.2 In this section, we provide insights in the main elements of Chinese banking 
which are relevant for our analyses. A timeline of selective reforms is summarized in Table 1. 
 
2.1. Market structure 
The development of a commercial banking system in China and the entrance of important 
new players were made possible by the promulgation of the Commercial Bank Law in May 
1995 (Fu and Heffernan, 2009). The commercialization of the Chinese banking sector was 
triggered by mounting problems at the four state-owned banks which experienced a 
significant deterioration of their asset quality in the early 1990s and were converted into 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). In addition, 12 so-called joint-stock commercial 
banks (JSCBs3) and more than 100 city commercial banks (CCBs4) were established under 
                                                             
2 According to the CBRC, financial reform in China can be classified in three major stages (1978-1993, 1994-2002, 
2003-present); see Liu (2009). Clear overviews in English are presented in Allen et al. (2005) and Matthews and Zhang 
(2010). 
3 The JSCBs initially offered banking services only regionally, but later they were allowed to operate freely nationwide, 
competing with the SOCBs for large firms and with the CCBs for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
4
 CCBs offer commercial banking services to small and medium-sized enterprises and households in the main cities or in 
certain provinces, but have been expanding to larger companies that would normally do business with the SOCBs and JSCBs. 
The requirement for CCBs to operate only within the cities‟ own administrative districts was lifted from 2007 onwards, 
allowing them to compete in larger geographical areas. 
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the Commercial Bank Law.  
Hence, since the mid-1990s, three main groups of Chinese commercial banks – 
SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs – have become active in Chinese loan markets. Arguably, this 
expansion of the number of providers of credit may have promoted competitive conditions in 
these markets. In fact, as is shown in Table 2, the market share of the SOCBs has declined 
significantly. While their average annual market shares of total assets and loans during 
1996-2001 were 86% and 88%, respectively, these shares dropped to 72% and 71%, 
respectively, during 2002-2008.5 These declines in market shares have been mirrored in 
considerable increases in those of especially the JSCBs, and of the CCBs as well. 
Competition may also have benefited from the growing role of foreign banks. An 
important catalyst here was China‟s accession to the WTO in 2001 (see Table 1). Under the 
conditions of WTO membership, the activities of foreign banks were liberalized profoundly. 
The foreign liberalization of Chinese banking resulted in a sharp increase in the number of 
foreign players. Table 2 shows that the market shares of foreign banks in total assets and 
loans increased during 1996-2008, but remained below 1%.  
 
2.2. Deregulation of credit controls and interest rates 
An important reform affecting Chinese loan markets was the replacement of the People‟s 
Bank of China‟s (PBC) binding credit plan system with an indicative non-binding credit 
target, effective from 1 January 1998, with this target serving only as a reference for 
commercial banks (see Table 1). Until then, the PBC had controlled the lending of SOCBs 
through binding credit quotas, which set the lower limit for new loans to be made annually 
and stipulated their allocation to specific sectors (Wong and Wong, 2001). Hence, since 1998, 
in principle Chinese banks have become free to lend according to commercial considerations, 
with the formal abolishment of policy loans that were provided in compliance with state 
directives or planning targets instead of on the basis of proper credit assessments. This 
change in policy has been hailed by Chinese monetary authorities as an important step in 
                                                             
5 We present the data for the full sample of 1996-2008 and the two subsamples that we use (1996-2001 and 2002-2008), 
with 2001 being the year of China‟s entry into the WTO.  
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transforming the credit culture of Chinese banks.  
Notwithstanding the significance of the abolishment of the credit plan system, there 
are clear signs of continuing quantitative controls on bank credit, which potentially may 
affect the lending policies of banks in China. Various observers emphasize the use by the 
PBC of quantitative instruments aimed at controlling credit growth, despite the 
discontinuation of the binding credit plan system (Fukumoto et al., 2010; Huang and Wang, 
2011; He and Wang, 2012; Ma et al., 2011). These include yearly aggregate target levels for 
new loans and the use of so-called window guidance to influence the development of bank 
lending. The latter policy can be described as a form of moral suasion aimed at controlling 
the sectoral direction of lending, although in practice this guidance also may have affected the 
amount of lending (Okazaki, 2007).6  
The reform of the credit control system has been followed – in terms of degree of 
deregulation – by interest rate liberalization, resulting in relatively liberalized bank interest 
rates in 2004, when the deposit rate floor and the lending rate ceiling were eliminated for the 
major banks.7 At the same time, the PBC maintained its control of the deposit rate ceiling 
and lending rate floor, although in practice, the latter was probably not binding. In fact, 
during December 2004 and December 2008, only between 19% and 29% of all loans were 
made at the floor lending rate, suggesting that most loan rates were higher. In contrast, 
empirical research has suggested that the ceiling on deposit rates has been binding, which put 
them at levels below equilibrium (Feyzioğlu et al., 2009; He and Wang, 2012; Ma et al., 
2011).  
 
3. Empirical literature on bank competition in China 
The theoretical literature on the measurement of competition is generally categorized into two 
major streams, namely the “Structure Conduct Performance” (SCP) approach and the 
non-structural approaches promoted within the so-called New Empirical Industrial 
                                                             
6 Moreover, as we shall discuss in more detail in section 3 and especially in section 6, the PBC re-introduced credit quotas 
for individual banks in 2007 in order to curb lending activities. 
7 The PBC started to widen the floating band on banks‟ interest rates from 1998 onwards, after it liberalized interbank 
interest rates. Hence commercial banks got more discretion in setting loan rates (PBC, 2005; Feyzioğlu et al., 2009). 
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Organization (NEIO) literature. The former approach includes concentration indicators as 
proxies for competition, such as the “Hirschman-Herfindahl Index” (HHI) and concentration 
ratio (CRn) that measures the market shares of the n largest banks. The latter approaches 
include the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987), the 
(elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index (Genesove and Mullin, 1998) and a relatively recent 
method known as the Profit Elasticity (PE) model or the “Boone” indicator (Boone, 2008).  
Only a few studies have investigated explicitly and in-depth competition in the 
Chinese banking sector by using some of the above mentioned indicators, while others 
discuss it on the sidelines and often adopt more descriptive approaches. One of the first to 
address this issue was Wong and Wong (2001). It adopts the structural approach and 
calculates concentration indicators (HHI) which show high degrees of concentration that may 
inhibit competition during the 1990s, and acknowledges that reforms stipulated under the 
conditions for China‟s WTO accession helped to create a more competitive banking system.  
Turning to non-structural approaches, Yuan (2006), using the Panzar-Rosse method, 
investigates bank competition in China during 1996–2000, just before the country joined the 
WTO in 2001. The paper concludes that the banking system in China was already close to a 
state of perfect competition before foreign banks began to enter Chinese banking more 
extensively. Fu (2009) looks at competition in Chinese commercial banking, also by using the 
Panzar-Rosse method. Based on a sample of 76 banks for the period 1997–2006, it is 
concluded that China‟s overall banking market was perfectly competitive in 2001, but 
featured monopolistic competition thereafter until 2006. Thus, the paper supports the 
conclusion of Yuan (2006) that the Chinese banking sector was close to a state of perfect 
competition before China joined the WTO and that WTO membership might not promote 
overall bank competition further. Bikker and Spierdijk (2008), as part of an investigation of 
101 countries with the Panzar-Rosse model, also measure competition in Chinese banking 
and have results suggesting perfect competition. However, they warn that these results should 
be interpreted with great caution due to the limitations of the Panzar-Rosse model for China.  
A few studies apply the Lerner index to Chinese banking. Fungáčová et al. (2012) 
find that competition in the Chinese banking industry declined, based on a sample of 76 
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banks during 2002–2011. They also find that competition differs depending on the type of 
banks, with foreign banks being the most competitive. Also Soedarmono et al. (2013) report 
lower competition in Chinese banking over time, as part of an investigation of 11 Asian 
banking systems for 1994–2009 (for China covering 103 banks). Fu et al. (2014) analyze 14 
Asian banking systems for the period 2003-2010 and also come to the conclusion that 
competition in the Chinese banking sector decreased over time despite financial deregulation. 
All these studies report Lerner indices for China that lie predominantly between 0.25 and 0.4 
for 2002–2008. Ho (2010) uses the Lerner index to analyze deregulation and competition in 
the banking sector of Hong Kong. 
The studies that measure competition using the non-structural approach (Panzar–Ross 
method and Lerner index) predominantly report that competitive conditions have worsened 
over time despite continuing financial deregulations in business scope, geographic expansion, 
foreign entrance and administrative controls in price and quantity. This is in contrast to the 
considerable empirical evidence that deregulation fostered competitive conditions in banking 
markets around the globe (Claessens, 2009). We postulate that to some extent prior result of 
deteriorating competition could be due to a flawed method to measure bank competition in an 
economy where strict price and quantitative controls are being practiced. In light of the recent 
theoretical advance by Boone (2008), we revisit the competitive status of Chinese banking 
markets using the PE indicator, which will be discussed in the next section. Given the 
discussion of financial reform in Section 2, we suggest that competitive conditions should 
have improved over the years, particularly so after China‟s accession to the WTO in 2001. 
Under the conditions of WTO membership, the activities of foreign banks were liberalized 
profoundly (for an overview see Table 1).8 The foreign liberalization of Chinese banking 
resulted in a sharp increase in the number of foreign players, from 4 banks in 1996 to 26 
banks in 2008, although their market share remained low. Despite this low share, the 
importance of foreign banks in promoting competitive condition should not be 
underestimated. Various studies suggest that both the threat of foreign entry and its actual 
realization forced Chinese banks to respond in terms of improving their business models and 
                                                             
8 For example, foreign banks were allowed to provide foreign currency services to Chinese residents and were permitted 
greater freedom in local currency operations as well. Furthermore, the participation of foreign investors in Chinese banks 
was promoted, with foreigners being allowed to take equity stakes of up to 25%. 
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efficiency and hence the overall degree of market competition (He and Fan, 2004; Leung and 
Chan, 2006). Some observers claim that foreign banks have snatched significant market 
shares in key cities from their Chinese competitors (Xu and Lin, 2007), and have penetrated 
into other parts of China through equity partnerships or less institutionalized forms of 
cooperation with Chinese banks (He and Fan, 2004; Leung and Chan, 2006). Xu (2011) 
further provides empirical evidence that foreign bank entry has been supportive of developing 
a more competitive banking industry.  
Taking all these considerations into account, we postulate our first hypothesis as 
follows: 
Hypothesis I: Competitive conditions improved significantly after WTO accession in 2001. 
As discussed in Section 2, another significant step was taken in October 2004, with 
the removal of the lending rate ceiling and the deposit rate floor, while the lending rate floor 
was reduced to a specific range versus the benchmark rates. Although these steps were 
important milestones in the process of financial reform in China, we believe that a priori their 
impact on competitive conditions in Chinese loan markets may have been mixed.  
First, it may have been the case that the removal of the lending rate ceiling 
out-weighted the effect of the reduction in the lending rate floor and allowed inefficient banks 
to increase lending rates above the previously existing binding ceiling. In fact, after the 
reform, the percentage of loans priced above the reference rate increased sharply, from 
around 50% in 2004 to 60% in 2005, suggesting that lending rate ceilings were binding 
before the reform.9 This increase allowed banks potentially to expand price-cost margins, 
which would suggest a deterioration in competition, as the relationship between performance 
and efficiency would have become weaker.  
Second, the removal of the deposit rate floor in October 2004 may not have improved 
competitive conditions significantly as well, as various studies have documented that the 
deposit rate ceiling was binding, and not the deposit rate floor (see section 2).  
Third, we demonstrate theoretically (Appendix C) that removing the lending rate 
                                                             
9 The PBC provides only summary data on the percentage of loans issued around the reference rates from December 2004 
onwards. Therefore, we lack sufficient data to formally test how binding the lending rate ceiling was prior to that date.  
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ceiling and the deposit rate floor most probably would not lead to a significant improvement 
in competitive conditions. In contrast, we have shown that competition most likely will 
improve by removing the deposit rate ceiling and lending rate floor. However, these two 
major aspects remained unchanged in the 2004 partial interest rate reform.  
Moreover, the Chinese supervisory authorities strengthened various aspects of their 
regulatory policies in 2004, in addition to the interest rate reforms. An overview of these 
measures is presented in Table 1 and we shall discuss them in more detail in section 6. These 
policy actions represented a certain degree of re-regulation, which may have contributed to a 
decline in competition. They were followed by several other policy steps in subsequent years 
– such as the re-introduction of credit quotas in 2007 – which resulted in an overall increase 
in financial repression in China, as measured by the financial repression index introduced in 
Huang and Wang (2011) (see section 6).  
Overall, we postulate our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis II: Competitive conditions deteriorated after 2004. 
 
 4. Methodology 
In this section, we discuss the methodological frameworks of the conventional Lerner and 
elasticity-adjusted Lerner indices and the Profit Elasticity (PE) indicator.  
 
4.1. Lerner and elasticity-adjusted Lerner indices 
4.1.1. Lerner index  
The Lerner index reflects firms‟ ability to set prices over marginal costs. Fierce competition 
will lower its level, as firms reduce prices towards marginal costs. In the extreme case of 
perfect competition, the Lerner index will be reduced to zero, while with monopoly it will 
reach one. The traditional Lerner index has been applied widely in empirical competition 
literature (Fernández de Guevara et al., 2007; Berger et al., 2009). However, to the best of 
our knowledge, only Fungáčová et al. (2012) conducted an in-depth analysis based on this 
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measure for Chinese banking markets during the post-WTO accession period. Our approach 
differs in the sense that we do not focus on bank competition in general but instead 
concentrate on competition in loan markets. Hence, we define the Lerner index as:  
 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 =
𝑝𝑖𝑡−𝑚𝑐 𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑡
                                                                   (1)                                                                                                               
 
where pit denotes the price of a loan for bank i at time t, which is defined as total interest 
income divided by total loans, while mcilt are marginal costs of loans.  
In order to calculate marginal costs of loans, we first estimate a Translog Cost 
Function (TCF) using individual bank observations (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). This 
function assumes that the technology of an individual bank can be described by one 
multiproduct production function. Our TCF has the following form: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 0 +  𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 +  ℎ𝑑ℎ
𝐻−1
ℎ=1 +  𝛿𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐾
𝑗=1 +   𝜖𝑗𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑗=1   (2)  
 
where the dependent variable cit reflects the production costs of bank i (i = 1, .., N ) in year t 
(t = 1, .., T ). dt are year dummies and dh are bank type dummies (h = SOCB, JSCB, CCB).
10  
The explanatory variables xikt represent three groups of variables (k = 1, .., K ). The 
first group consists of (K1) bank output components, such as loans, securities and other 
services (proxied by other income). The second group consists of (K2) input prices, such as 
wage rates, deposit rates (as price of funding) and the price of other expenses (proxied as the 
ratio of other expenses to fixed assets). The third group consists of (K - K1 - K2) control 
variables, e.g., the equity ratio. In line with Berger and Mester (1997), the equity ratio 
corrects for differences in loan portfolio risk across banks (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
                                                             
10 In this section, we assume that cost functions for each bank type are similar, as only the constant term is allowed to vary 
across bank groups through bank type dummies. The alternative approach is to assume different cost functions for each bank 
type by allowing bank type dummies to interact with independent variables. We follow this approach in Appendix D as an 
additional robustness test. 
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is the error term. 
The marginal costs of loans are obtained by differentiating the TCF (Equation 2) with 
respect to loans, namely: 
 
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑡 =
𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
 𝛿1 + 2𝜖1𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜖1𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑘=1…𝐾;𝑘≠𝑙                                (3)                                                             
 
Once marginal costs of loans are obtained, an individual bank‟s Lerner index is 
calculated according to Equation (1). The yearly Lerner index Lt is then the average of the 
individual Lit for each year t, and the subsample Lerner index Lsubsample is the average of the 
individual bank‟s Lerner indices for each subsample. The subsamples are the periods of 
pre-WTO (1996-2001), post-WTO (2002-2008), and two samples divided by the 2004 
interest rate reform, i.e. pre-reform (2002-2004) and post-reform (2005-2008).  
 
4.1.2. Elasticity-adjusted Lerner index 
The traditional Lerner index cannot distinguish markets that have high margins due to 
inelastic demand from markets that have high margins because they are less competitive or 
perhaps collusive (Corts, 1999, p.31). To overcome this problem, the elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner index has been developed (Genesove and Mullin, 1998; Corts, 1999; Wolfram, 1999; 
Van Leuvensteijn, 2008). More precisely, this measure normalizes the Lerner index for the 
price elasticity of demand. 
We estimate the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index following Angelini and Cetorelli 
(2003). We provide only a very brief introduction of this indicator, since it is rather standard 
in the literature. Bank i solves the following profit-maximizing problem: 
 
max𝑞𝑖  = 𝑝 𝑄 𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖                                                 (4)                                                                                               
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where 𝑄 =  𝑞𝑖𝑖  is the total amount of bank loans in loan markets and qi is the loan 
provided by bank i. 𝐶(𝑞𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖) is the cost function of bank i, and wi represents the vector of 
factor input prices. The corresponding first-order condition is:  
 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝐶
′ 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖 −
𝑖
𝜀
                                                         (5)                                                                                                                  
 
where Θi is the conjectural elasticity of total industry output with respect to the output of 
bank i, and ε is the market semi-price elasticity of demand, namely 𝑖 =
𝑑𝑄 𝑑 𝑞𝑖
𝑄 𝑞𝑖 
 and 
𝜀 =
𝑑𝑄 𝑑𝑝 
𝑄
. In a perfectly competitive market, 𝑖  equals zero for all banks, while in a 
monopoly market 𝑖  equals one. The separate identification of these two elasticities requires 
the simultaneous estimation of a supply and demand equation (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003). 
Appelbaum (1982) suggests that it is sufficient to estimate the ratio  =
𝑖

 if the goal 
is to evaluate the industry‟s overall degree of market power.11 The elasticity-adjusted Lerner 
index will then be defined as  𝐿 =

𝑝
 , where p is the average price of loans. Market power 
depends on both the elasticity of demand and the degree of competition, measured by 
conjectural variation.  
To identify λ and the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, we estimate simultaneously the 
Translog Cost Function (TCF) and the supply equation, imposing cross-equation restrictions. 
The TCF and marginal costs of loans are defined the same way as Equations (2) and (3), 
respectively. Substituting the marginal costs Equation (3) into the supply Equation (5), we 
obtain:  
 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 =
𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
 𝛿1 + 2𝜖1𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜖1𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑘=1…𝐾;𝑘≠𝑙  +  𝑡𝑑𝑡𝑡=1…𝑇−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (6)                            
                                                             
11 As a robustness test, we estimated in Appendix D (D.1) explicitly the conjectural variation parameter as a direct measure 
of competition.  
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where dt is a year dummy and εit is the error term.   
To access the evolution of bank competition, we perform two types of regressions: 
yearly estimates and subsample estimates. The yearly elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is then 
derived as  𝐿𝑡 =
𝑡
𝑝𝑡
 , where pt is the yearly average loan rate. To obtain subsample estimates 
of the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, we regress simultaneously Equations (2) and (6), 
replacing year dummies dt with subsample dummies in both equations. The subsample 
elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is then defined as 𝐿𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 =
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑝𝑠𝑢 𝑏𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
 , where 
𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒  is the average loan rate for each subsample. The estimation is carried out with 
three-stage least squares (3SLS). To control for endogeneity of the cost and quantity variables, 
we employ one-period lagged variables as instruments; therefore the results are available 
starting from 1997. 
 
4.2. The Profit Elasticity (PE) model  
The PE indicator, developed in a broad set of theoretical models (Boone, 2000, 2001 and 
2008; Boone et al., 2007; Boone and Van Leuvensteijn, 2010), is the empirical 
operationalization of the Relative Profit Differences (RPD) concept proposed by Boone 
(2008). It is based on the notion, first, that more efficient firms (that is, firms with lower 
marginal costs) gain higher market shares or profits and, second, that this effect is stronger 
the higher competition in that market is (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). Boone (2008) shows 
that there is a continuous and monotonically increasing relationship between RPD and the 
level of competition. This property is the main advantage of RPD over traditional measures 
such as the HHI and Lerner index (or price-cost margin (PCM) approaches). Another 
advantage is that RPD and the PE indicator are not dependent on assumptions about the type 
of competitive model, such as whether this is Bertrand or Cournot competition. The RPD 
provides a solid theoretical foundation for the PE indicator. 
We first derive the theoretical concept of RPD. Following Boone (2008), and 
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replacing “firms” with “banks”, we consider a banking industry where each bank i produces 
one product qi (or portfolio of banking products), which faces a demand curve of the form, 
 
𝑝 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑞𝑗≠𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑞𝑖 − 𝑑  𝑞𝑗𝑗≠𝑖                                               (7)                                                                                             
 
and has constant marginal costs 𝑚𝑐𝑖 . This bank maximises profits 𝜋𝑖 =  𝑝𝑖 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖 𝑞𝑖by 
choosing the optimal output level 𝑞𝑖 . We assume that 𝑎 > 𝑚𝑐𝑖  and 0 < 𝑑 ≤ 𝑏 . The 
first-order condition for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium can then be written as: 
 
𝑎 − 2𝑏𝑞𝑖 − 𝑑  𝑞𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖 = 0                                               (8)                                                                                              
 
When N banks produce positive output levels, we can solve the N first-order 
conditions, yielding: 
 
𝑞𝑖 𝑚𝑐𝑖 =
 2𝑏 𝑑 −1 𝑎− 2𝑏 𝑑 +𝑁−1 𝑚𝑐 𝑖+ 𝑚𝑐 𝑗𝑗
 2𝑏+𝑑 𝑁−1   2𝑏 𝑑 −1 
                                       (9)                                                                              
 
We define profits πi as variable profits excluding entry costs ε. Hence, a bank enters 
the banking industry if, and only if, 𝜋𝑖 ≥ 𝜀 in equilibrium. Note that Equation (9) provides a 
relationship between output and marginal costs. It follows from 𝜋𝑖 𝑚𝑐𝑖 =  𝑝𝑖 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖 𝑞𝑖 
that profits depend on marginal costs in a quadratic way, i.e. 
 
𝜋𝑖 𝑚𝑐𝑖 =
 2𝑏 𝑑 −1 𝑎− 2𝑏 𝑑 +𝑁−1 𝑚𝑐 𝑖+ 𝑚𝑐 𝑗𝑗
  2𝑏+𝑑 𝑁−1   2𝑏 𝑑 −1  
 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖                              (10)                                                          
 
The theoretical concept RPD is then defined as 𝑅𝑃𝐷 =
𝜋 𝑚𝑐 ∗∗ −𝜋 𝑚𝑐  
𝜋 𝑚𝑐 ∗ −𝜋 𝑚𝑐  
 for any three 
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firms with𝑚𝑐∗∗ < 𝑚𝑐∗ < 𝑚𝑐. In this market, competition can increase in two ways. First, 
competition increases when the produced services of the various banks become closer 
substitutes, that is, d increases (keeping d below b). Second, competition increases when 
entry costs ε decline. Boone (2008) proves that RPD is an increasing function of interaction 
among existing firms (
𝑑𝑅𝑃𝐷
𝑑𝑑
> 0) and a decreasing function of entry costs (
𝑑𝑅𝑃𝐷
𝑑𝜀
< 0). In 
other words, RPD increases when competition intensifies, i.e. fiercer competition increases 
(decreases) profits of more efficient firms by larger (smaller) amounts than those of less 
efficient firms. Hence, competition rewards efficiency, a concept that can be traced back to 
Demsetz‟s (1973) efficiency structure hypothesis. 
Boone (2008) demonstrates how RPD can measure the level and evolution of 
competition in practice. Firms are first ranked by their efficiency level. Subsequently, RPD of 
firm i are normalized by calculating its relative profit difference against the profits of the 
most and the least efficient firms. This procedure yields a normalized RPD curve as a 
function of normalized relative efficiency differences. The level of competition is then 
represented by the area under the normalized RPD curve. Since changes in competition move 
all points on the RPD curve monotonically, shifts in this curve measure the evolution in 
competition.  
Although this procedure is mathematically elegant, it is computationally intensive, as 
it requires the ranking of firms by efficiency levels (i.e. marginal costs) for each year. 
Conversely, most empirical studies that adopt Boone‟s work regress the logarithm of profits 
on the logarithm of marginal costs to capture the essence of RPD. They refer to the estimated 
elasticity of profits with regard to marginal costs, i.e. 
𝑑𝑙𝑛  𝜋 
𝑑𝑙𝑛  𝑚𝑐  
 , as the PE indicator or Boone 
indicator (Boone et al., 2007; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011 and 2013; Schaeck and Cihák, 
2010; Delis, 2012; Tabak et al., 2012). This indicator is in theory negative, reflecting the fact 
that higher marginal costs are associated with lower profits. In addition, its value should be 
lower the more competitive market conditions are. The PE indicator is based on the same 
theoretical foundation as RPD, as they both capture the central idea that less efficient firms 
are punished more in more competitive markets. Boone et al. (2007) conduct simulations for 
the PE indicator and find that changes in competition are correctly identified with this 
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measure. Unlike the computationally intensive RPD, the PE indicator has the advantage that 
it can be easily estimated in practice and has a rather straightforward interpretation. We 
therefore employ the PE indicator to measure competition in Section 6.  
We note that the PE indicator model, like every other model, is a simplification of 
reality (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). First, efficient banks may choose to translate lower 
costs either into higher profits or into lower output prices in order to gain market share. Our 
approach assumes that banks in China compete on efficiency in order to predominantly 
increase profits and not to expand market share, given quantitative restrictions in the form of 
explicit lending quotas and informal window guidance (see section 2). Even when some 
banks would choose to increase profits by lowering their price and increasing their market 
share, the PE indicator would also measure this effect. Still, we assume that this behavior 
does not diverge too strongly across banks. Second, the PE indicator model ignores 
differences in bank product quality and design, as well as the attractiveness of innovations. 
We assume that banks are forced over time to provide quality levels that are more or less 
similar. By the same token, we presume that banks have to follow the innovations of their 
peers. Hence, like many other model-based measures, the PE indicator focuses on one 
important relationship (that between efficiency and profits), thereby disregarding other 
aspects. All in all, the PE indicator may be applied in relatively homogeneous product 
markets where product innovation and differences in quality do not matter too much. 
Therefore, we focus only on competition in loan markets and not on overall bank competition 
in China.  
Taking into account that we believe that the PE indicator is the most suitable measure 
to assess competitive conditions in Chinese lending markets, we reformulate our two 
hypotheses that we presented in section 3 as follows:  
HI: Competitive conditions improved significantly after WTO accession in 2001, with: 
H0: βpre-WTO> βpost-WTO and H1: βpre-WTO <= βpost-WTO (recall β is negative). 
HII: Competitive conditions deteriorated after 2004, with:  
H0: βpre-reform < βpost-reform and H1: βpre-reform >= βpost-reform. 
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5. Data 
The main data source of our analysis is BankScope. We collect Chinese banks‟ balance sheet 
data running from 1996 to 2008. This 13-year period is selected to capture various banking 
sector reforms, including those related to WTO accession, and to facilitate comparison of our 
results with those of other papers using the Lerner index. Whenever BankScope does not 
provide sufficient information, we use various issues of the Almanac of China‟s Finance and 
Banking, China Statistical Yearbook and individual banks‟ annual reports to double-check 
and fill in missing data.  
We focus on state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCBs), city commercial banks (CCBs) and foreign banks (FOREIGN).12 To exclude 
irrelevant and unreliable observations, banks are incorporated in our sample only if they 
fulfill the condition that total assets, loans, deposits, equity and other non-interest income 
should be positive. We lose 43 observations after applying this criterion, mainly due to 
negative non-interest income. At the end, we are left with 714 observations covering 
1996-2008. Our sample includes extensive information on 127 banks, including all four 
SOCBs, all 13 JSCBs, 28 foreign banks13 and 82 CCBs. Table 8 in Appendix A summarizes 
the distribution of the observations. Table 3 describes the variables used in the translog cost 
estimations, such as costs, loans, securities and other services, each expressed as a share of 
total assets, income or funding. Costs are defined as the sum of interest expenses, personnel 
expenses and other expenses.  
 
                                                             
12 There are other types of financial institutions in China, such as trust and investment corporations, rural commercial banks, 
savings banks, co-operative banks, investment banks and policy banks. We exclude these institutions from our investigation 
for several reasons. Firstly, in the 1990s, trust and investment corporations were important financial institutions that operated 
similarly to commercial banks (Hong and Yan, 1997). However, in the late 1990s, they experienced significant problems and 
most of them were taken over by commercial banks. Since the primary focus of this paper is to assess bank competition 
during 1996-2008, we believe it is safe to exclude trust and investment corporations from our analysis. Secondly, most of the 
other banks that are not included in our investigation capture only very small portions of Chinese lending markets and/or 
were established with different objectives from commercial banks. Thirdly, there are significant data limitations for 
especially the large number of small banks that are excluded from the sample. 
13 Banks with more than 50% foreign ownership are classified as foreign banks. We only include foreign banks that provide 
separate balance sheet data to the PBC. This means that several banks headquartered in Hong Kong SAR and which are 
classified as foreign banks by the CBRC, but do not provide separate balance sheet data for their operations in mainland 
China, are excluded from our sample.  
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6. Results14 
6.1. Empirical results: Lerner and elasticity-adjusted Lerner indices. 
We summarize the results for the traditional Lerner index and elasticity-adjusted Lerner index 
in Table 4. Panel A reports yearly estimates. They suggest a general increasing level of bank 
competition up to around 2002 and a decreasing trend afterwards, with the lowest level of 
competition registered for both indices in 2007. Moreover, the traditional Lerner index 
indicates a lower level of competition than the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index for most years. 
Furthermore, the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is significantly different from zero or one 
for all years, rejecting the null hypothesis that Chinese loan markets are in a state of either 
perfect competition or monopoly. 
Panel B and Panel C report subsample results. In Panel B, the sample is divided by the 
WTO accession in 2001. The results indicate that the Pre-WTO (1996-2001) 
elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is 0.249 and increases to 0.342 for the Post-WTO period 
(2002-2008). In Panel C, we further divide the Post-WTO sample into two subsamples, using 
the year 2004 with the interest rate reforms as the break-year. The Pre-Reform period 
(2002-2004) has an elasticity-adjusted Lerner index of 0.245; it increases to 0.357 for the 
Post-Reform period (2005-2008). We find similar results for the traditional Lerner index.  
We conduct Chi-squared Wald tests to determine if competitive conditions 
experienced structural changes among the subsamples. Our results are summarized in the last 
rows of Table 4. We focus on the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index. The null hypothesis that 
the Pre-WTO elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is larger or equal than the one for the 
Post-WTO period is rejected at 1%, indicating a higher level of competition for the former 
period relative to the latter period. When we divide our estimations into three subsamples, we 
find that competitive conditions remain unchanged between the Pre-WTO and Pre-Reform 
periods (H0: Elasticity Adj Lerner Pre-WTO>=Elasticity Adj Lerner Pre-Reform cannot be 
rejected), while deteriorating significantly for the Post-Reform period (H0: Elasticity Adj 
Lerner Pre-Reform>=Elasticity Adj Lerner Post-Reform and H0: Elasticity Adj Lerner 
Pre-WTO>=Elasticity Adj Lerner Post-Reform are rejected), marking the latter period as the 
                                                             
14 The results for the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic are reported in Appendix E.  
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least competitive period of all.  
Combining these results, we conclude that competition such as measured by the 
(elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index was the highest for the Pre-WTO period (1996-2001) and 
deteriorated markedly for the Post-WTO period (2002-2008), most significantly for the 
Post-Reform period (2005-2008). We conducted various robustness tests including alternative 
ways to calculate marginal costs and estimating directly the conjectural variation variable 
(Uchida and Tsutsui, 2005). These tests all yielded similar results.15   
Our findings are supported by Soedarmono et al. (2013) and Fungáčová et al. (2012), 
which also document a general decreasing trend of bank competition in China during 
2002-2008, based on the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index and traditional Lerner index, 
respectively. The latter study obtains an average Lerner index of 0.378 for this period, while 
our elasticity-adjusted Lerner index and traditional Lerner indices for the same period are 
0.342 and 0.375, respectively. Comparison with results from studies for other countries show 
that the values obtained for China are relatively high: Berger et al. (2009) find an average 
Lerner index of 0.22 for 23 industrial countries calculated over the period 1999-2005, while 
Carbó Valverde et al. (2009) obtain a mean of 0.16 for the European Union during 1995-2001. 
At the same time, our estimates for the pre-WTO period are around 0.25, indicating that 
competition in Chinese loan markets was not that much lower than that in developed 
economies during those years. The post-WTO period, however, is significantly less 
competitive for China than for the other countries.   
 
6.2. Empirical results: Profit Elasticity (PE) indicator. 
Similarly to the Lerner index, the empirical estimation of the PE indicator starts with the 
estimation of marginal costs. In this section, we improve the marginal cost estimation by 
assuming different Translog Cost Functions (TCF) for each bank type.16 More specifically, 
we estimate one separate TCF for the SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and the foreign banks 
                                                             
15 These results are reported in Appendix D.  
16 Estimating marginal costs from homogenous Translog Cost Function does not change our results. See Appendix D.  
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(FOREIGN), which should improve the accuracy of the estimation of marginal costs.17 
Given the estimated marginal costs, we are now able to estimate the PE indicator. For China, 
we use the relationship between the marginal costs of individual banks and their profits: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 +  𝛽𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 𝑑𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡                                (11)                                                        
 
where 𝜋𝑖𝑙𝑡  stands for profits derived from loans, 𝑑𝑡  is a time dummy, 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑡  denotes 
marginal costs, i refers to bank i, l to output type “loans”, and t to year t; 𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡  is the error 
term. This provides us with the coefficient 𝛽𝑡 , i.e. the PE indicator (as is given by 𝑃𝐸 =
𝑑𝑙𝑛  𝜋𝑖 
𝑑𝑙𝑛  𝑚𝑐 𝑖 
). 𝛽𝑡  is negative in theory, reflecting that higher marginal costs reduce profits for all 
banks.18 Moreover, the more competitive the market, the lower the value of 𝛽𝑡 . In other 
words, banks are punished more harshly for being inefficient in more competitive markets. 
Note that the indicator 𝛽𝑡is time-dependent. Profits derived from loans are defined as: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑡                                                        (12)                                                                                                     
 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑡  denotes the total amount of loans and 𝑝𝑖𝑡  is the loan interest rate calculated as 
interest income over loans.  
We expect higher profits to go hand in hand with lower marginal costs, but since our 
definition of profits is a function of marginal costs, there may be an endogeneity problem. To 
correct for this, we employ lagged marginal costs as instrument variable and investigate 
various alternative estimation techniques. 
We follow the strategy set out by Angrist and Pischke (2009) and first test whether the 
instrumental variables are weak. For this purpose, we employ Angrist-Pischke (AP) 
                                                             
17 The estimation of the TCF is reported in Appendix B (Table 11). 
18 In practice, a positive βt is possible (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011), which could be the result of extreme collusion, market 
regulation or banks competing on quality (Tabak et al., 2012).   
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F-statistics to test for weak identification of individual endogenous regressors. The AP 
first-stage F-statistics indicate that a particular endogenous regressor is weakly identified if 
the null hypothesis is rejected.19 Table 5 reports that nearly all instrumental variables used 
are strong with F-test values above 16.38, with the exception of the instrumental variables for 
1997, 1998, 2002 and 2003, indicating for these years weak instrumental variables.  
Because the instrumental variables for some years have weak properties, we use only 
just-identified instruments as they are median-unbiased and not subject to the weak 
instrumental variable critique. Furthermore, following the suggestion of Angrist and Pischke 
(2009), we check the two-stage least squares (2SLS) results with estimates from Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), as the latter results are less biased. LIML can be 
seen as a “combinatory estimation” technique where the ordinary least square (OLS) and 
2SLS estimations are combined and the weights for the two estimations are determined by the 
data (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, for further explanation). We use as instrument variables 
one-year lagged values of marginal costs and kernel-based heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) variance estimations. The bandwidth in the estimation is set 
at two periods, and the Newey-West kernel is applied. The results of 2SLS and LIML are 
very similar, in fact almost identical, and therefore we only present the results with LIML.20  
To assess the evolution of bank competition, we first estimate the yearly PE indicator 
based on Equation (11). Table 5 reports the results. The estimation results for the years 1996 
-1999 are based on a small sample and should therefore be interpreted with caution. The 
estimations for the subsamples and whole sample estimates are panel estimates and are 
therefore more reliable. The yearly PE indicators are significantly different from zero for 
most of the sample years, except for the 1997-2000 period. Competition increased sharply 
during 2001-2003 and then declined up to 2005. It then intensified again, followed by a 
slightly decreasing level of competition in 2007 and 2008. In general, the development of the 
yearly PE indicator suggests that competitive conditions in Chinese loan markets improved, 
especially after WTO accession in 2001.21 Admittedly, the insignificant results for the early 
                                                             
19 The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at 10% (maximal LIML size) is 16.38 (Stock et al., 2002). 
20 Results with 2SLS are available upon request. 
21 Delis (2012) estimates worldwide bank competition with the PE indicator, including China for a sample covering 
1988-2005 and using market shares as performance indicator. Our values are not that different from the values reported for 
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years in our sample could be caused by the small number of observations for those years, in 
which case the results could be influenced strongly by outliers. Therefore, we estimate the PE 
indicator for subsamples to avoid small-sample bias.   
We estimate one PE indicator for each subsample and test whether competition 
changed significantly after WTO accession and after the 2004 interest rate reforms. These 
point estimates can be interpreted as averages of yearly estimates over their respective sample 
periods, weighted by the number of observations in each year. Estimations are based on the 
following equation: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡                                         (13)                                                                        
 
where Trend is a time trend.22  
Table 6 reports the results. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics are significant at the 
1% level for the whole sample and for each subsample, rejecting the null hypothesis that the 
model is unidentified. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic is larger than 16.38 for each 
sample, suggesting that the estimations do not suffer from weak identification. Both test 
statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. All PE indicators have the 
correct sign (negative) and are significant at the 1% level, except for the pre-WTO period.  
Column (1) of Panel A shows that the PE indicator for the whole sample is -2.388 
(significant at 1%). For subsamples, we find that the PE indicator for the pre-WTO period is 
-1.514 (see Column 2), but is statistically insignificant. Competitive conditions improve 
significantly for the Post-WTO period (2002-2008), such as indicated by a value of the PE 
indicator of -3.750*** (Column 3). Next, following our approach for the Lerner index 
estimations, we divide the Post-WTO period into two subperiods: Pre-Reform (2002-2004) 
and Post-Reform (2005-2008). Columns (4) and (5) suggest that the Pre-Reform period is the 
most competitive period (PE indicator of -5.094***), while competitive conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
China in that study, especially those reported for 2002-2004. 
22 Using year dummies instead of a time trend generates similar results for all estimations reported in this paper. Results are 
available upon request.  
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deteriorated in the Post-Reform period (PE indicator of -3.027***). Our estimates are in 
general less negative than those of Delis (2012), which could be related to our use of profits 
as performance indicator instead of market shares. In general, the correlation between 
marginal costs and profits may be higher than the correlation between marginal costs and 
market shares. 
In Panel B, we conduct formal tests on structural changes. We compare the differences 
in PE indicators among the various subsamples. Column (1) shows that the difference 
between the PE indicator for the Pre-WTO period and the one for the Post-WTO period is 
2.056, which is significantly larger than zero (chi2 test statistics is 3.61**). This result 
confirms Hypothesis I that competitive conditions improved after WTO accession, as the PE 
indicator for the Post-WTO period is significantly lower than for the Pre-WTO period. 
Columns (2) and (4) show that both Pre-Reform and Post-Reform periods are more 
competitive than the pre-WTO period, with a difference between the PE indicators of 3.58 
(chi2:5.89***) and 1.513 (chi2: 1.99*), respectively. Column (3) compares the changes in 
competition before and after the 2004 interest rate reform. In line with Hypothesis II, 
competitive conditions deteriorated after 2004, as indicated by a positive difference between 
the PE indicators of 2.067 (chi2: 3.22**). Some caution with the interpretation of this result is 
appropriate, because after 2004 the Chinese banking sector was reregulated, as we discuss 
below using the Financial Repression Index of Huang and Wang (2011). 
Finally, our estimates of the yearly PE indicators and of the PE indicators for the 
whole samples and subsamples (point estimates) are robust to different estimation methods 
and different specifications of the PE indicator.23  
 
6.3. Interpretation results PE indicator 
The key in understanding why the results for the PE indicator are so different from the 
(elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index lies in the system of interest rate regulation in China. We 
show in Appendix C that the Lerner index yields biased results under binding interest rate 
regulation, while RPD does not. Whether and to what extent interest rate regulation is binding 
                                                             
23 These robustness tests are presented in Appendix D.  
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is an empirical question, which definitely requires more attention in the literature on 
measuring bank competition. The empirical literature on binding interest rate regulation in the 
context of China is rather small. However, the general consensus is that: a) the lending rate 
floor was considered to be non-binding in practice (He and Wang, 2012; see Sections 2 and 3); 
b) the deposit rate ceiling was binding (Feyzioğlu et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2011; He and Wang, 
2012;24 PBC, 2009; Yi, 2009); and c)  the lending rate ceiling was most likely binding 
during the pre-WTO period (Yi, 2009).  
In this respect, the binding deposit rate ceiling may bias the Lerner index through the 
reallocation of output and profits among lenders. This reallocation effect (Boone et al., 2007) 
relates to the fact that more intensive competition due to more aggressive conduct will 
reallocate output and profits from less efficient banks to more efficient banks. As more 
efficient banks usually have higher PCMs than less efficient banks, the PCM for the whole 
market, which is an (output) weighted average of individual banks‟ PCMs, actually may 
increase in response to more intense competition. The increase in the market PCM (or 
aggregate Lerner index) would be interpreted as a decline in competition, while actually it 
has increased. Boone et al. (2007) show that the reallocation effect is particularly strong in 
concentrated markets. In fact, Chinese loan markets are highly concentrated, with during 
2001-2008 the four SOCBs having an average annual market share of around 71%. The 
binding deposit rate ceiling was particularly important after 2004, when real deposit rates 
reached negative values, reducing the reliability of measuring competition with the 
(elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index for this period. Moreover, the binding lending rate ceiling 
during the pre-WTO period could have resulted in an over-estimation of competition with the 
Lerner index.25 In contrast, the PE indicator does not suffer from these shortcomings. 
Turning to the specific results we obtained with the PE indicator estimations, we find 
generally positive and insignificant values for the PE indicator for the early years of our 
sample, suggesting that during 1997-2000 a negative relationship between efficiency 
                                                             
24 He and Wang (2012, p. 34): “… Using the regression results, we can then estimate the equilibrium interest rate by 
subtracting the effects of financial repression from the observed real interest rate: the equilibrium deposit rate in China was 
estimated at 4.7% in 2005. This estimated equilibrium deposit rate is significantly higher than the observed real deposit rate 
of 1.6% in 2005, which means that the deposit-rate ceiling must have been binding in China.” 
25 See Appendix C and Salvo (2010). 
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(marginal costs) and profits could not be established (see Table 5). This indicates that during 
the years when Chinese banking markets were still heavily regulated, there was no reward for 
being more competitive than one‟s competitors. Actually, this finding is similar to the results 
for Japan during the 1990s in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011), which showed positive (and 
significant) values for the PE indicator. During those years, market shares in Japanese loan 
markets were more or less guaranteed under the so-called “convoy system” and competitive 
forces were largely absent. 
Subsequently, we start to find negative and highly significant values for the PE 
indicator for Chinese loan markets from 2001 onwards, indicating that, as loan markets 
became more competitive, more efficient banks started to generate more profits than less 
efficient banks. The PE indicator improved further until 2003, when it reached its lowest 
value of –6.3 (e.g. highest level of competition). From an international perspective, this value 
is comparable to the most competitive yearly results obtained for several mature economies 
(Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). 
Then, after 2003, competitive conditions in Chinese loan markets declined (but still 
with negative and, except for one year, highly significant results), which was the most notable 
in 2004, 2007 and 2008. We believe that various policy measures and a certain degree of 
prudential re-regulation may be responsible for this pattern of slightly declining competition 
(for an overview see Table 1). Perhaps the most important policy change was the interest rate 
liberalization of 2004, when the PBC removed the lending rate ceiling and deposit rate floor, 
but maintained the lending rate floor and deposit rate ceiling. The policy move implied that 
Chinese banks benefited from a more or less guaranteed minimum interest rate spread (due to 
the remaining floor on the lending rate and ceiling on deposit rate), while they faced no 
restrictions with respect to its potential maximum width (García-Herrero et al., 2005). As a 
result, the negative correlation between inefficiency (higher marginal costs) and profitability 
may have been weakened after the reform, because inefficient banks will not be punished as 
harshly with this guaranteed interest rate spread being in place. The PE indicator is able to 
pick up this effect by showing a decline in competition after the partial interest rate 
liberalization in 2004.  
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Apart from the interest rate reforms, various other policy measures and a certain 
degree of re-regulation adopted during the 2004-2008 period may also have contributed to the 
deterioration of competition that we find. In 2004, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) adopted new capital adequacy requirements, including the requirement 
to fully provision their non-performing loans and maintain at least 8% of aggregate capital 
adequacy, that banks should meet by 2007 (Podpiera, 2006). Further in 2004, the CBRC 
strengthened other parts of its regulatory policies, including its on-site examinations and 
monitoring of large exposures, and introduced risk-based supervision for the CCBs. 
Regulation was tightened regarding non-performing loans (NPLs), with a view to reducing 
banks‟ NPL ratios (Liu, 2009). The combined impact of these measures may have affected 
competitive conditions in Chinese loan markets. In addition, the People‟s Bank of China, 
worried by a possible overheating of the Chinese economy, re-introduced credit quotas in the 
fall of 2007 that aimed to mitigate bank lending growth (Fukumoto et al., 2010). These 
lending restrictions were kept in place until the fall of 2008 and can be characterized as a 
major step of re-regulation, as they re-instated elements of the old credit plan system.  
The element of re-regulation is picked up nicely by the financial repression index 
(FREP) developed for China in Huang and Wang (2011) (see Figure 1, left-hand panel). It is 
based on six financial repression variables, including two interest rates, two loan market 
share variables, reserve requirements and capital account controls. During the years of our 
sample – 1996-2008 – the index declines, suggesting less financial repression for all years 
except for 2004, 2007 and 2008, when it increases. After its first rise in 2004, indicating 
stronger financial repression, it fell to its lowest level ever in 2006, before strongly increasing 
in 2007, followed by a further pick-up in 2008. The yearly results of the PE indicator, which 
is depicted for illustrative purposes in Figure 1 (left-hand panel), closely follow the pattern of 
the financial repression index. The generally increasing re-regulation in the latter part of our 
sample may be reflected in the rather sharply increasing deposits to loans ratio from 2004 
onwards (Figure 2, right-hand panel). Possibly, tightened loan controls and other regulatory 
steps forced banks to reduce the growth of their loans relative to that of their deposits.
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Figure1. Interpretation results PE indicator and financial repression 
 
Given the strong similarity between the pattern of the PE indicator and the financial 
repression index, we are interested in how this relation looks for other financial liberalization 
indices. To this end, we employ two additional indicators of financial reform: the overall 
financial liberalization indices (Fin_Lib Index) and interest rate liberalization indices (Int_Lib 
Index) developed by Abiad et al. (2010).26 The former index measures the overall degree of 
financial liberalization, with values ranging from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating a more 
liberalized financial system. The latter index, which takes the values 0, 1, 2 or 3, indicates 
fully repressed, partially repressed, partially liberalized and fully liberalized interest rates, 
respectively.  
In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis, we calculate the pair-wise 
correlation coefficients between the three indices of financial reform and the same three 
measures of competition that we used. The results are reported in Table 7. Should financial 
reform promote competition, one would expect positive correlations between the financial 
repression index and the competition measures. In contrast, one would expect negative 
correlations between the two other financial liberalization indices and the competition 
measures if financial reform promotes competition. Since financial reform may affect 
                                                             
26 The values of these indicators are shown in Appendix A, Table 9. 
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banking behavior with a time lag, we use one-period lagged values of the three indices.27  
In case a more liberalized financial system is associated with more intense 
competition, the correlations of the PE indicator show the expected sign with all three indices 
(positive for the financial repression index and negative for the two others). The correlations 
are also highly significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the correlations of the other measures 
that are significant all have the opposite sign, suggesting that increased liberalization is 
associated with weaker competition.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks operating in China during 
1996-2008, we show that competition actually increased in the past decade when the Profit 
Elasticity (PE) measure introduced by Boone et al. (2007) and Boone (2008) is used as 
indicator of competition. We find that the period after China‟s entry into the WTO in 2001 
was characterized by significantly more competitive loan markets than before. This stands in 
contrast to the results that we obtain by calculating the conventional and elasticity-adjusted 
Lerner indices.28 We doubt the latter findings, as they may be distorted by various factors, 
including restrictions on market shares and interest rates. Our results for both the PE indicator 
and other measures are robust for a large number of alternative specifications and estimation 
methods. All in all, our analysis suggests that bank lending markets in China have been more 
competitive than previously assumed. Another major empirical finding that we report is that 
significant improvements in competition in Chinese loan markets moved in parallel with 
progress in financial reform. This result is much in line with those obtained for other 
emerging economies. Furthermore, our analysis of the interest rate reforms implemented in 
2004 shows that removing the lending rate ceilings was especially beneficial for the 
inefficient banks, as suggested by the reduction in competition that we find using the PE 
indicator.   
                                                             
27 We also employed the current values of the financial reform indices to account for the possibility that banks may 
anticipate financial reform measures and adjust their competitive strategies accordingly. The results are similar to the ones 
we report here.   
28 We find a similar result for the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic. See Appendix E.  
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Theoretically, we have shown that the theoretical foundation of the PE indicator (or 
Boone‟s RPD model) is not biased due to interest rate regulation (see Appendix C). This 
makes the PE indicator a much better measure to gauge competition in loan markets that are 
subjected to interest rate regulation than conventional approaches. This is a very general 
insight that can be useful for investigations of competitive conditions in banking markets in 
countries where binding regulation of interest rates is a distinctive characteristic. More 
generally, our findings indicate that the bank competition literature may wish to focus more 
explicitly on the potential biases in competition measures that result from the existence of 
binding price regulation. Finally, the policy implication of our analysis is that foreign entry or 
the threat of foreign entry is an effective way to increase competition in loan markets. 
 
  
37 
 
References 
Abiad, A., Detragiache, E., Tressel, T., 2010. A new database of financial reforms. IMF Staff 
Papers 57(2), 281-302. 
Allen, F., Qian, J., Qian, M., 2005. Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of 
Financial Economics 77(1), 57-116. 
Altunbas, Y., Liu, M., Molyneux, P., Seth, R., 2000. Efficiency and risk in Japanese banking. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 1605-1628. 
Angelini, P., Cetorelli, N., 2003. The effects of regulatory reform on competition in the 
banking industry.  Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 35(5), 663-684. 
Angrist, J., Pischke, J.S., 2009. Mostly harmless econometrics. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton and Oxford. 
Appelbaum, E., 1982. The estimation of the degree of oligopoly. Journal of Econometrics 19, 
287-299.  
Berger, A., Klapper, L., Turk-Ariss, R., 2009. Bank competition and financial stability. 
Journal of Financial Services Research 35(2), 99-118.  
Berger, A., Mester, L., 1997. Inside the black box: What explains differences in the 
efficiencies of financial institutions? Journal of Banking and Finance 21(7), 895–947. 
Bikker, J., Spierdijk, L., 2008. How banking competition changed over time. Working Paper 
167, De Nederlandsche Bank.  
Bikker, J., Shaffer, S., Spierdijk, L., 2012. Assessing competition with the Panzar-Rosse 
Model: The role of scales, costs, and equilibrium. Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (4) 
1025-1044.  
Boone, J., 2000.  Competition. Discussion Paper Series 2636, CEPR. 
Boone, J., 2001. Intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate. International Journal 
of Industrial Organization 19(5), 705–726. 
Boone, J., Van Ours, J., Van Der Wiel, H., 2007. How (not) to measure competition. Tilburg 
Law and Economics Center (TILEC) Discussion Paper No.2007-014, Tilburg University.  
Boone, J., 2008. A new way to measure competition. Economic Journal 118, 1245 -1261. 
38 
 
Boone, J., Van Leuvensteijn, M., 2010. Measuring competition using the profit elasticity: 
American sugar industry, 1890-1914. Discussion Paper Series No.8159, CEPR.  
Bresnahan, T., 1982. The oligopoly solution concept is identified. Economics Letters 10, 
87–92.  
Carbó Valverde, S., Humphrey, D., Maudos, J., Molyneux, P., 2009. Cross-country 
comparisons of competition and pricing power in European banking. Journal of International 
Money and Finance 28(1), 115-134.  
Claessens, S., 2009. Competition in the financial sector: Overview of competition policies. 
The World Bank Research Observer 24(1), 83-118. 
Corts, K., 1999. Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power. Journal of 
Econometrics 88, 227-250. 
Delis, M., 2012. Bank competition, financial reform and institutions: The importance of 
being developed. Journal of Development Economics 97, 450-465. 
Demsetz, H., 1973. Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy. Journal of Law and 
Economics 16, 1-9. 
Fernández de Guevara, J., Maudos, J., Pérez, F., 2007. Integration and competition in 
European financial markets. Journal of International Money and Finance 26(1), 26–45. 
Feyzioğlu, T., Porter, N., Takáts, E., 2009. Interest rate liberalisation in China. Working Paper 
WP/09/171, International Monetary Fund.  
Fu, X., 2009. Competition in Chinese commercial banking. Banking and Finance Review 
1(1), 1-16. 
Fu, X., Heffernan, S., 2007. Cost X-efficiency in China‟s banking sector. China Economic 
Review 18, 35-53.  
Fu, X., Heffernan, S., 2009. The effects of reform on China‟s bank structure and performance. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 33(1), 39-52. 
Fu, X., Lin, Y., Molyneux, P., 2014. Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 38, 64 -77. 
Fukumoto, T., Higashi, M., Inamura, Y., Kimura, T., 2010. Effectiveness of window guidance 
39 
 
and financial environment: In light of Japan‟s experience of financial liberalisation and a 
bubble economy. Bank of Japan Review, No.2010-E-4. 
Fungáčová, Z., Pessarossi, P., Weill, L., 2012. Is bank competition detrimental to efficiency? 
Evidence from China. BOFIT Discussion Papers No.31/2012, Bank of Finland. 
García-Herrero, A., Gavilá, S., Santabárbara, D., 2005. China‟s banking reform: An 
assessment of its evolution and possible impact. Documentos Ocasionales No.0502, Banco de 
España. 
Genesove, D., Mullin, W., 1998. Testing static oligopoly models: Conduct and cost in the 
sugar industry, 1890-1914. The RAND Journal of Economics 29(2), 355-377. 
He, D., Wang, H., 2012. Dual-track interest rates and the conduct of monetary policy in 
China. China Economic Review 23(4), 928-947. 
Ho, C.Y., 2010. Deregulation, competition and consumer welfare in a banking market: 
evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of Regulatory Economics 37, 70–97. 
Hong, Z., Yan, Y., 1997. Trust and investment corporations in China. Working Paper 
No.97/06, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 
Huang, Y., Wang, X., 2011. Does financial repression inhibit or facilitate economic growth? A 
case study of Chinese reform. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 73(6), 833-855. 
Liu, M. 2009. Thirty years of reform and opening up – China‟s banking industry. (in Chinese), 
China Financial Publishing House, Beijing. 
Ma, G., Yan, X.D., Xi, L., 2011. China‟s evolving reserve requirements. Working Paper 
No.360, Bank for International Settlements.  
Matthews, K., Zhang, N., 2010. Bank productivity in China 1997-2007: Measurement and 
convergence. China Economic Review 21(4), 617-628. 
Okazaki, K., 2007. Banking system reform in China: The challenges of moving toward a 
market-oriented economy. Occasional Paper No.194, RAND National Security Research 
Division.  
Panzar, J., Rosse, J., 1987. Testing for „monopoly‟ equilibrium. Journal of Industrial 
Economics 35(4), 443–456. 
40 
 
People‟s Bank of China 2005. Supplement to the China Monetary Policy Report – Report on 
Steady Progress in Market-Based Interest Rate Reform. People‟s Bank of China, Monetary 
Policy Analysis Group, January.  
People‟s Bank of China 2009. Chinese Monetary Policy Report, 2009Q2. (in Chinese), 
People‟s Bank of China. 
Podpiera, R., 2006. Progress in China‟s banking sector reform: Has bank behaviour changed? 
Working Paper No.06/71, International Monetary Fund. 
Rosse, J., Panzar, J., 1977. Chamberlin vs Robinson: An empirical study for monopoly rents.  
Bell Laboratories Economics Discussion Paper No. 90. 
Salvo, A., 2010. Inferring market power under the threat of entry: The case of the Brazilian 
cement industry.  RAND Journal of Economics 41(2), 326-350.  
Schaeck, K., Cihák, M., 2010. Competition, efficiency and soundness in banking: An 
industrial organisation perspective. Discussion Paper No.2010-20S, Tilburg University 
European Banking Center.  
Schmalensee, R., 1987. Competitive advantage and collusive optima. International Journal 
of Industrial Organization 5, 351-367.  
Soedarmono, W., Machrouh, F., Tarazi, A., 2013. Bank competition, crisis and risk taking: 
Evidence from emerging markets in Asia. Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money 23, 196-221.  
Stock, J., Wright, J., Yogo, M., 2002. A survey of weak instruments and weak identification in 
Generalized Method of Moments. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 20, 518-29. 
Tabak, B., Fazio, D., Cajueiro, D., 2012. The relationship between banking market 
competition and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter? Journal of Banking and 
Finance 36(12), 3366-3381. 
Uchida, H., Tsutsui, Y., 2005. Has competition in the Japanese banking sector improved? 
Journal of Banking and Finance 29,419-439. 
Van Leuvensteijn, M., 2008. The Boone indicator: Identifying different regimes of 
competition for the American Sugar Refining Company 1890-1914. Tjalling C. Koopmans 
41 
 
Research Institute Discussion Paper No.08-37, Utrecht School of Economics. 
Van Leuvensteijn, M., Bikker, J., Van Rixtel, A., Kok-Sørensen, C., 2011. A new approach to 
measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area.  Applied Economics 43(23), 
3155-3167.  
Van Leuvensteijn, M., Kok-Sørensen, C., Bikker, J., Van Rixtel, A., 2013. Impact of bank 
competition on the interest rate pass-through in the euro area. Applied Economics 7(48), 
1359-1380.  
Vander Vennet, R., 2002. Cost and profit efficiency of financial conglomerates and universal 
banks in Europe. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 34 (1), 254-282. 
Wolfram, C., 1999. Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market. American 
Economic Review 89(4), 805-826. 
Wong, Y., Wong, M., 2001. Competition in China‟s domestic banking industry. Cato Journal 
21(1), 19-41. 
Xu, B., Van Rixtel, A., Van Leuvensteijn, M., 2013. Measuring bank competition in China: A 
comparison of new versus conventional approaches applied to loan markets, Working Paper 
No.422, Bank for International Settlements. 
Yi, G., 2009. Thirty years of reform and opening up, China‟s interest rate marketization 
process. Journal of Financial Research (Chinese Journal, Jinrong Yanjiu) 1(343).  
Yuan, Y., 2006. The state of competition of the Chinese banking industry. Journal of Asian 
Economics 17 (3), 519-534.  
42 
 
Table 1: Main banking reforms and policy steps1 
 Banking reforms and important policies  Interest rate liberalization 
1995 Commercial Bank Law was promulgated; 
Central Bank Law was passed. 
 
1996 Creation of interbank market; start foreign 
currency business commercial banks.  
Liberalization of interest rates in the 
inter-bank market. 
1997 Transformation of state owned banks into 
“commercial banks without direct 
administrative controls”. 
Liberalization of bond repo rates. 
1998 Credit allocation based on market principles 
rather than quotas under credit plan.  
Lending rate ceilings increased to 120% of 
benchmark rate. 
1999 Transfer bad debts of SOCBs to four asset 
management companies.  
Lending rate ceiling increased to 130% of 
benchmark rate. 
2000  Liberalization of foreign currency lending 
rates; liberalization foreign currency deposit 
rates for accounts over 3 million $. 
2001 Accession to World Trade Organization 
(WTO; foreign banks to be treated equally 
as domestic banks within five years.  
 
2002 Foreign banks allowed to provide foreign 
currency services to Chinese residents;  
 
2003 New bank regulator (China Banking 
Regulatory Commission or CBRC); CBRC 
encouraged foreign banks to buy stakes in 
Chinese banks; Law of Banking Regulation 
and Supervision adopted. 
Liberalization interest rates small-value 
deposits in Sterling, CHF and Can $; 
removal lower interest rate limit on 
small-value foreign currency deposits. 
2004 Foreign banks allowed providing local 
currency services to Chinese enterprises in 
designated cities; CBRC required banks to 
fully provision NPLs and maintain min 8% 
capital ratio, fully binding as of 2007; 
CBRC strengthened on-site examinations 
and monitoring of large exposures, and 
introduced risk-based supervision.  
Liberalization foreign currency deposit rates 
for small accounts with maturity > 1 y; 
RMB lending rate ceiling increased to 170% 
of benchmark rate; removal RMB lending 
rate ceiling, except for urban and rural 
credit cooperatives; removal of all RMB 
deposit rates floors; established lending rate 
adjustment reporting system; lending rate 
floor was reduced to a specific range versus 
benchmark rates. 
2005 Banks encouraged to list on stock 
exchanges; five-tier loan classification 
made fully compulsory for all banks. 
 
2006 By December, China opened its banking 
sector fully to foreign banks and eliminated 
geographic and client restrictions; raised 
reserve requirements ratio (RRR) to 9% 
from 6% during 2003-2006. 
 
2007 PBC re-introduced credit quotas for 
individual banks to curb lending activities.  
 
2008 RRR were increased in 16 steps from 9% to 
17.5% during 2007-August 2008; RRR 
were reduced to 15.5% for large banks and 
to 13.5% for small banks in Q4 2008.  
 
1 This overview includes various policy steps after 2004 which correspond to a certain degree of re-regulation and policy 
tightening after 2004 that we discuss in section 6. 
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Table 2: Overview of the Chinese banking sector 1996-2008 
Source: BankScope and authors‟ own calculations.  
 Share of total assets (%) Share of total loans (%) Share of total deposits (%) 
  SOCB JSCB CCB 
FORE
IGN SOCB  JSCB CCB 
FOR
EIGN SOCB JSCB CCB 
FOR
EIGN 
Average 1996–2001 86.32 11.83 1.69 0.16 88.03 10.54 1.29 0.14 87.55 11.41 0.90 0.14 
Average 2002–2008 72.17 21.25 5.78 0.79 71.30 22.40 5.43 0.87 74.47 21.51 3.43 0.59 
Average 1996–2008 78.70 16.91 3.89 0.50 79.02 16.93 3.52 0.53 80.51 16.85 2.26 0.38 
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Table 3: Mean values of key variables by bank group 
 
SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN All Banks 
Total costs/Total assets 4.61 3.71 3.57 3.16 3.6 
Loans/Total assets 57.66 55.61 53.38 55.12 54.46 
Securities/Total assets 21.21 19.08 22.81 9.81 20.22 
Other services/Total income 7.26 6.01 9.98 15.4 9.85 
Interest expenses/Total funding 3.4 2.35 2.25 2.78 2.45 
Other expenses/Fixed assets 37.16 69.02 56.47 224.22 87.68 
Interest income/Total assets 5.19 4.43 4.36 4.14 4.39 
Personnel expenses/Total assets a 0.54 0.41 0.51 0.59 0.5 
Interest income/Total loans 9.07 8.22 8.26 10.36 8.69 
Other non-earning assets/Total assets b 3.23 2.68 3.18 2.95 3.04 
Funding mix c 94.3 91.41 89.22 64.96 86.36 
Equity/Total assets 3.72 4.74 5.11 29.5 9.49 
Other income/Interest income  6.77 6.6 11.8 14.41 10.83 
Notes: All data are in percentages.  
a Personnel expenses to assets ratio serves as a proxy of the wage rate. Ideally, the wage rate is the ratio of personnel 
expenses to the number of staff. However, many banks do not provide information on the variables. Some researchers 
replace the missing number of employees by assuming that its growth rate is equal to that of total assets for a given bank (Fu 
and Heffernan, 2007; Altunbas et al., 2000; Vander Vennet, 2002). This approach might not be appropriate for our sample, as 
very few CCBs report the number of employees, so this growth rate cannot be calculated anyway. We instead follow the 
approach taken by Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) and proxy wages by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. We 
adopt the following procedure to approximate missing data on personnel expenses. For banks that provide these data but not 
for all years, we fill in the missing values of personnel expenses by assuming that they grew at the same rate as non-interest 
expenses. This is a reasonable assumption, as, according to Chinese accounting standards, non-interest expenses are 
composed of personnel expenses and non-operating expenses. For banks that do not report personnel expenses at all, we 
replace missing values by assuming that the ratio of personnel expenses to non-interest expenses equals the average of this 
ratio for the corresponding bank group, namely 𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝑝𝑒𝑗𝑡 𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑗𝑡  𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑡  where 𝑝𝑒𝑗𝑡 𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑗𝑡  is the average personnel 
expenses to non-interest expenses ratio, by bank type and year; j (j = SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs, FOREIGN) represents bank 
groups and i stands for individual banks. Since our sample has almost complete data on non-interest expenses, we can use 
this approach to back-engineer the missing data on personnel expenses.  
b Other non-earning assets to total assets ratio is defined as: (total assets minus loans minus other earning assets)/total assets.  
c The funding mix is defined as: customer deposits/(total funding minus deposits from banks). 
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Table 4: Lerner Index, elasticity-adjusted Lerner Index and marginal costs 
Panel A: Yearly results 
  𝑡  
Average 
loan rate 
Average 
loan 
deposit 
spread 
Elasticity-a
djusted 
Lerner 
index 
Lerner 
index 
𝑀𝐶𝑒  𝑀𝐶𝑙 
1997 0.062 0.168 0.085 0.367 0.358 0.095 0.098 
1998 0.045 0.118 0.063 0.381 0.359 0.079 0.076 
1999 0.029 0.102 0.044 0.288 0.305 0.064 0.061 
2000 0.021 0.098 0.049 0.212 0.303 0.056 0.053 
2001 0.019 0.086 0.05 0.224 0.303 0.052 0.049 
2002 0.015 0.071 0.049 0.214 0.306 0.045 0.041 
2003 0.017 0.071 0.049 0.235 0.327 0.047 0.043 
2004 0.02 0.068 0.047 0.288 0.34 0.047 0.043 
2005 0.023 0.079 0.054 0.287 0.358 0.052 0.048 
2006 0.025 0.079 0.052 0.324 0.38 0.052 0.048 
2007 0.036 0.079 0.052 0.452 0.434 0.05 0.046 
2008 0.041 0.094 0.061 0.439 0.402 0.06 0.055 
Panel B: Subsample results-WTO (2001) as breaking point 
Pre-WTO: 
1996–2001 
0.029 0.115 0.059 0.249 0.32 0.071 0.066 
Post-WTO: 
2002–2008 
0.027 0.079 0.052 0.342 0.375 0.051 0.047 
Panel C: Subsample results-WTO (2001) and interest rate reform (2004) as breaking points 
Pre-WTO: 
1996-2001 
0.029 0.115 0.059 0.249 0.32 0.071 0.066 
Pre-Reform: 
2002-2004 
0.017 0.070 0.049 0.245 0.33 0.047 0.042 
Post-Reform
: 2005–2008 
0.031 0.082 0.054 0.375 0.40 0.054 0.049 
H0: Elasticity Adj Lerner Pre-WTO>=Elasticity Adj Lerner Post-WTO: chi
2(1)=12.13 p-value = 0.0002 
H0: Elasticity Adj Lerner Pre-WTO>=Elasticity Adj Lerner Pre-Reform: chi
2(1)=0.01 p-value = 0.54 
H0: Elasticity Adj Lerner Pre-WTO>=Elasticity Adj Lerner Post-Reform: chi
2(1)=23.29 p-value = 0.0000 
H0: Elasticity Adj Lerner Pre-Reform>=Elasticity Adj Lerner Post-Reform: chi
2(1)=15.14 p-value = 0.0000 
Notes: 𝑡  are statistically different from zero for all years at 1% significance level; 𝑀𝐶𝑒  and 𝑀𝐶𝑙  are average marginal costs for 
elasticity-adjusted Lerner index and traditional Lerner index, respectively.  
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Table 5: Yearly PE indicator  
  PE Indicator z-value AP chi
2(1) p-value AP F (1,433) 
1997 5.783 -0.44 0.4866 0.46 
1998 –2.177    (–1.23)    0.1021 2.53 
1999 1.489 -0.56 0.0000 31.78 
2000 0.147 -0.05 0.0000 27.91 
2001 –4.250*** (–5.85)    0.0000 31.11 
2002 –5.497**  (–2.36)    0.0002 13.1 
2003 –6.327*** (–2.64)    0.0147 5.64 
2004 –4.092*** (–3.92)    0.0000 58.28 
2005 –1.352    (–1.45)    0.0000 67.26 
2006 –4.024*** (–4.17)    0.0000 20.73 
2007 –3.611*** (–5.36)    0.0000 89.77 
2008 –2.482*** (–4.12)    0.0000 28.15 
Constant 0.401 -0.23     
Nr obs 457 
F 6.249 
Centered R2 0.131 
Notes: z-values in parenthesis; AP chi2 is the Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage chi-squared test. AP F is the Angrist-Pischke 
(AP) F-statistic, which can be compared to Stock et al. (2002) critical values for Cragg-Donald F statistic with K1=1. The 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at 10% maximal LIML size is 16.38. Year dummies are not reported to save space. 
** denotes test statistic significant at the 5% level 
*** denotes test statistic significant at the 1% level 
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Table 6: Point estimates PE indicator: Whole sample and subsamples 
Panel A: Estimates of PE indicators 
 All:  
1996-2008 
Pre-WTO: 
1996-2001 
Post-WTO: 
2002-2008 
Pre-Reform: 
2002-2004 
Post-Reform: 
2005-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PE Indicator –2.388*** –1.514 –3.570*** -5.094*** -3.027*** 
 (–5.78) (–1.43) (–7.74) (-4.48) (-6.78) 
Time Trend –0.0332 –0.519** 0.345*** 0.3011 0.5813*** 
 (–0.82) (–2.37) (4.71) (0.98) (4.71) 
Constant –0.24 4.966** –8.050*** -12.429*** -9.185*** 
  (–0.19) -2.18 (–4.51) (-2.27) (-4.71) 
Nr. Obs 457 87 370 112 258 
F 16.78 2.97 33.67 11.52 34.23 
Centered R2 0.089 0.141 0.18 0.01 0.25 
KP-F 211.4 30.98 130.8 25.07 138.50 
KP-LM 62.00(0.0000) 13.94(0.0001) 44.22(0.0000) 18.03(0.0000) 31.17(0.0000) 
Panel B: Differences in PE indicators 
 
Pre-WTO 
– Post-WTO 
Pre-WTO 
 –Post-Reform 
Post-Reform 
 
–Pre-Reform 
Pre-WTO  
–Post-Reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Difference 2.056 3.58 2.067 1.513 
Test Difference<=0, chi2 (p-value) 3.61** (0.029) 5.89***(0.008) 3.22**(0.036) 1.99*(0.079) 
Notes: z-values in parenthesis; Since there is only one endogenous variable, we use Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F (KP-F) and 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (KP-LM) tests to test weak identification and under-identification. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical value at 10% maximal LIML size is 16.38. 
** denotes test statistic significant at the 5% level 
*** denotes test statistic significant at the 1% level 
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Table 7: Pair-wise correlation coefficients with financial reform indices 
  PE Lerner Elasticity-adjusted Lerner 
FREP 0.6560*** –0.5794*** –0.3104*** 
Fin_Lib Index –0.4223*** 0.5015*** –0.055 
Int_Lib Index –0.2206*** 0.7917*** 0.3285*** 
Notes: FREP is the financial repression index as reported in Huang and Wang (2011). Fin_Lib Index and Int_Lib_Index 
represent financial liberalization index and interest rate liberalization index, respectively.  
*** denotes test statistic significant at the 1% level 
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Appendix  
 
A. Supplemental tables for the main analysis 
 
Table 8: Distribution of observations 
 
Table 9: Financial reform indices 
 SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN Observations 
1996 4 9 1 4 18 
1997 4 10 3 6 23 
1998 4 10 5 7 26 
1999 4 10 9 7 30 
2000 4 10 14 5 33 
2001 4 10 17 7 38 
2002 4 10 27 8 49 
2003 4 10 33 8 55 
2004 4 12 40 8 64 
2005 4 12 55 10 81 
2006 4 13 74 11 102 
2007 4 13 73 26 116 
2008 4 13 36 26 79 
Total observations 52 142 387 133 714 
Number of banks 4 13 82 28 127 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Financial 
liberalization index 0.179 0.226 0.298 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.393 0.393 0.488 0.488 
Interest rate 
liberalization index 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 
Source: Abiad et al. (2010), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/data/wp08266.zip. A value of 0 indicates a fully 
repressed financial system, while a value of 1 points at a fully liberalised one. Interest rate liberalization index, which takes 
values of 0, 1, 2 and 3, indicates respectively a fully repressed, partially repressed, partially liberalised and fully liberalised 
system.  
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Table 10: Estimation of elasticity-adjusted Lerner index 
  Yearly estimates Subsample estimates 
Panel A:Cost Equation 
 Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value 
ln(securities) –0.505*** (–2.76)    –0.285    (–1.51)    
(ln(securities))² 0.0300*** (3.57)    0.0314*** (3.61)    
ln(other services) 0.973*** (5.23)    0.831*** (4.37)    
(ln(other services))² 0.0426*** (4.05)    0.0288*** (2.74)    
ln(wage)–ln(other expenses) 1.270*** (4.51)    1.447*** (5.20)    
(ln(wage) –ln(other expenses))² 0.151*** (5.36)    0.150*** (5.41)    
ln(funding rate)–ln(other expenses) 0.460**  (2.26)    0.285    (1.38)    
(ln(funding rate) –ln(other expenses))² 0.197*** (4.94)    0.189*** (4.94)    
(ln(wage) –ln(other expenses))*(ln(funding rate)–ln(other 
expenses)) –0.274*** (–4.96)    –0.268*** (–5.05)    
ln(securities) * ln(other services) –0.0265    (–1.59)    –0.0220    (–1.32)    
ln(securities)*(ln(funding rate)–ln(other expenses)) 0.0528**  (2.29)    0.0415*   (1.84)    
ln(securities)*(ln(wage)–ln(other expenses)) –0.164*** (–5.31)    –0.133*** (–4.25)    
ln(other services)*(ln(funding rate)–ln(other expenses)) –0.00508    (–0.21)    –0.0306    (–1.32)    
ln(other services) *(ln(wage)–ln(other expenses)) 0.147*** (4.66)    0.161*** (5.19)    
ln(equity/assets) –0.0116    (–0.06)    0.0321    (0.17)    
(ln(eqauity/asset))² –0.00769    (–0.23)    0.000250    (0.01)    
SOCB 0.398*** (3.11)    0.371*** (3.04)    
JSCB 0.332*** (4.37)    0.304*** (4.51)    
CCB 0.194*** (3.25)    0.189*** (3.44)    
constant 4.054*** (4.17)    4.273*** (4.42)    
Panel B:Supply Equation 
ln(loans) 0.864*** (6.39)    0.724*** (4.75)    
(ln(loans))² 0.0263**  (2.52)    0.0298**  (2.54)    
ln(loans) * ln(securities) –0.0370**  (–2.35)    –0.0522*** (–3.06)    
ln(loans) * ln(other services) –0.0432*** (–3.26)    –0.0226    (–1.55)    
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)–ln(other expenses)) –0.0366*   (–1.69)    0.00182    (0.08)    
ln(loans)*(ln(wage)–ln(other expenses)) 0.0374    (1.54)    –0.0135    (–0.52)    
 0.0616*** (9.17)      
 0.0449*** (7.89)      
 0.0294*** (5.89)      
 0.0208*** (4.84)      
 0.0191*** (4.66)      
 0.0151*** (4.19)      
 0.0167*** (4.84)      
 0.0196*** (5.96)      
 0.0227*** (7.39)      
 0.0255*** (9.18)      
 0.0359*** (13.99)      
 0.0415*** (13.18)      
–2001   0.0287*** (9.38)    
–2008     0.0269*** (14.12)    
Number of observations:  453 453 
Notes: z-values in parenthesis; * p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Time dummies in cost equation not shown to save space. 
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B. Estimation translog cost functions (TCF) for PE indicator 
In order to be able to calculate marginal costs, we estimate, for each bank group, a translog 
cost function (TCF) using individual bank observations. This is done by allowing for bank 
type dummies h
i
d  to interact with the independent variables in the TCF, resulting in the 
following form:  
 0 1,..., 1,..., 1,...,1,..., 1
ln lnln lnh h
it t t j K jh i ijt j K k K
h
jkh i ijt it kt iT t
є d x xc d d x   
   
                         (B.1)                   
where the dependent variable chit reflects the production costs of bank i (i= 1,…, N) in year t 
(t = 1,…, T). The sub-index h (h = 1,…, H) refers to the type category of the bank (state 
owned banks, joint-stock banks, city commercial banks, foreign banks). The variable dhi is a 
bank type dummy variable, which is 1 if bank i is of type h and otherwise zero. Another 
dummy variable is dt, which is 1 in year t and otherwise zero. The coefficients αh, δjh and ϵjkh, 
all vary with h, the bank type. The parameters γt are the coefficients of the time dummies and 
νit is the error term. The explanatory variables xikt follow the same interpretation as in Section 
4.1.1. The two standard properties of TCF, linear homogeneity in input prices and 
cost-exhaustion, hold for each bank type h. Namely, Equation (B.2) holds for each bank type 
h:  
1, 2, 31 2 , ,1 ,2 ,3 3
0 for 1,2,3, and 0 for 4,...1, ,
j j j k k k
є є є j є є є k K                          (B.2)                 
The marginal costs of output category j = l (of loans) for bank i of category h in year t, mchilt are 
defined as: 
  ln lnh h h hilt it ilt it ilt it iltmc c x c x c x                                                 (B.3)                                                                                          
The term ∂lnchit/∂lnxilt is the first derivative of Equation (B.1) of costs to loans. We use the 
marginal costs of the output component „loans‟ only (and not for the other K1 components) as 
we investigate the loan markets. We estimate a separate translog cost function for each bank 
category (SOCB, JSCB, CCB and FOREIGN), allowing for differences in the production 
structure across bank types. This leads to the following equation of the marginal costs for 
output category loans (l) for bank i in category h during year t:  
 1 1,..., ; 11 ln l2 nlh ilth h hi k K k l khlt it i h it tl ikєmc s є xc x d                                         (B.4)                                                                        
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Table 11: Estimate translog cost functions by bank type 
 
  
 SOCB JSCB CCB FOREIGN 
Dependent variable: ln(costs)–ln(other expenses) 
Outputs 
ln(loans) 0.768**  (2.23)    1.332*** (5.15)    1.174*** (8.91)    1.759*** (17.22)    
(ln(loans))² –0.0743**  (–2.01)    –0.00285    (–0.07)    0.0595*** (4.11)    –0.0263**  (–2.41)    
ln(securities) 0.265    (0.70)    –0.162    (–0.61)    –0.130    (–0.98)    0.0839    (0.96)    
(ln(securities))² 0.0950*** (4.73)    0.0143    (0.53)    0.0486*** (5.24)    –0.0201*** (–3.81)    
ln(other services) 0.945*** (4.76)    –0.411*** (–3.38)    0.142*   (1.82)    –0.0896    (–0.91)    
(ln(other services))² 0.0144*** (4.21)    –0.00469    (–0.90)    0.00641*   (1.70)    –0.0371*** (–2.90)    
Input prices 
ln(wage)–ln(other expenses) 2.907*** (4.78)    –0.698*** (–5.37)    0.352**  (2.04)    1.896*** (13.39)    
ln(funding rate)–ln(other expenses) 0.739**  (2.15)    0.966*** (3.76)    –0.0135    (–0.08)    –1.179*** (–9.83)    
(ln(wage) –ln(other expenses))² –0.364*** (–8.82)    –0.00712    (–0.60)    0.0872*** (4.08)    0.111*** (5.81)    
(ln(funding rate) –ln(other expenses))² –0.0439*** (–3.11)    0.0937*** (3.79)    0.0539*** (2.69)    0.106*** (8.19)    
Cross-products between input prices 
(ln(wage) –ln(other expenses))*(ln(funding 
rate)–ln(other expenses)) 0.0831*** (2.82)    –0.0782*** (–3.00)    –0.128*** (–3.50)    –0.225*** (–7.45)    
Cross-products between outputs 
ln(loans) * ln(securities) –0.0247    (–0.47)    –0.0163    (–0.25)    –0.0947*** (–4.52)    –0.0467*** (–4.06)    
ln(loans) * ln(other services) –0.115*** (–5.40)    0.0454*   (1.91)    –0.0269**  (–2.17)    –0.00174    (–0.12)    
ln(securities) * ln(other services) –0.00459    (–0.31)    –0.0176    (–0.97)    0.0122    (0.96)    0.0810*** (5.53)    
Cross-products between outputs and input prices 
ln(loans)*(ln(funding rate)–ln(other expenses)) –0.0784**  (–2.30)    –0.00700    (–0.15)    0.0481*   (1.93)    0.216*** (9.49)    
ln(loans)*(ln(wage)–ln(other expenses)) –0.745*** (–10.57)    0.123*** (5.19)    0.0975*** (3.80)    –0.130*** (–4.88)    
ln(securities)*(ln(funding rate)–ln(other expenses)) 0.111*** (4.26)    0.0174    (0.46)    –0.0177    (–0.99)    0.0360**  (2.18)    
ln(securities)*(ln(wage)–ln(other expenses)) 0.472*** (12.95)    –0.0769*** (–3.06)    –0.0632*** (–3.21)    –0.0811*** (–3.98)    
ln(other services)*(ln(funding rate)–ln(other 
expenses)) –0.0328**  (–2.34)    –0.0119    (–0.60)    0.0222**  (2.17)    –0.198*** (–9.34)    
ln(other services) *(ln(wage)–ln(other expenses)) –0.126*** (–8.14)    –0.0134    (–0.86)    –0.00528    (–0.43)    0.144*** (5.56)    
Control variables 
ln(equity/assets) –2.490*** (–22.49)    0.105    (0.90)    –0.0254    (–0.13)    0.795*** (5.19)    
(ln(eqauity/asset))² –0.371*** (–22.37)    0.0256    (1.45)    0.00136    (0.04)    0.163*** (4.96)    
Constant –0.00271    (–0.86)    –0.0657*** (–3.16)    0.000664    (0.02)    1.03e–13    (0.00)    
F 1760657.7    86663.1    18374.9    13849.3    
Adj-R2 0.9997 0.9998 0.9990 0.9987 
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C. Competition measures under interest rate regulations: Theoretical proofs 
 
To understand the direct effect of binding deposit rate regulation on the Lerner index and 
RPD, we consider the simple model described in Section 4.2. Binding deposit rate regulation 
in China affects the level of marginal costs of all banks and redistributes market share 
between efficient and inefficient banks. We show below that this redistribution of output can 
result in both increasing and decreasing competition as indicated by the Lerner index, which 
makes it an inconsistent measure of competition under binding deposit rate regulation. On the 
other hand, RPD is continuous and monotone in competition in a market with binding deposit 
rate regulation. In the following exercise, we assume that the slope of the loan demand 
function does not change after exogenous movements in input prices. To keep it simple, we 
also assume that deposit rate regulation does not affect the number of banks operating in the 
market, e.g. we do not allow market exit and entry due to changes in deposit rate regulation.   
Imposing a deposit rate ceiling should reduce the level of competition because more 
efficient banks cannot undercut less efficient rivals by setting deposit rates above the ceiling. 
Less efficient banks then are protected by the ceiling and are less likely to be forced out of 
the market. Abolishing or raising deposit ceilings should increase competition because more 
efficient banks can expand market share at the expense of their less efficient rivals.  
We assume that deposit rate regulation has a homogeneous impact on each bank‟s 
marginal costs. Then, under regulation, a bank‟s marginal cost of loans becomes mci (ε) = mci 
– ε (i = 1,…, N). ε is a regulation parameter, which measures the extent to which deposit rate 
regulation is binding. ε ϵ (-ἓ, mc), where mc is the marginal cost of the most efficient bank 
and ἓ is some positive number that allows the least efficient bank to remain profitable and 
stay in the market. A positive ε reflects a binding deposit rate ceiling, while a negative ε 
corresponds to a binding deposit rate floor. Higher values of ε lead to less competition. This 
parameter can be time-variant to reflect changes in regulation across time. We focus here on 
deposit rate regulation. Nevertheless, this general setup can also be applied to other 
regulations (or technology shocks) that impact homogenously upon the cost side of banks. 
From equations (7), (8) and (9), and imposing ε, we derive the effect of binding deposit rate 
regulation on optimal output: 
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where qi is the optimal output without deposit rate regulation. Given 0<d ≤b, f(ε) is increasing 
in ε and takes the same sign as ε. Hence, under a deposit rate ceiling (floor), each bank‟s 
optimal output increases (decreases) by the same amount. We write the Lerner index for bank 
i as a function of regulation-free optimal output, marginal costs and the regulation parameter 
ε: 
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Taking the derivative with respect to ε and using f‟(ε) = f(ε)/ε, we obtain:  
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Hence, a higher value of ε increases an individual bank‟s Lerner index, indicating less 
competition, as theory would suggest. However, the aggregate Lerner index – i.e. for the 
whole market – might not give a consistent value because the market shares of efficient banks 
decrease due to deposit rate regulation. To see this, define the market share of bank i as si (ε) 
= qi(ε)/Σjqj (ε), and define bank k as the bank that produces at market average marginal costs, 
namely mck = Σjmcj/N. Market share under deposit rate regulation can then be written as: 
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Taking the derivative with respect to ε yields: 
 
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  (C.5)  
It is immediately clear that the market share of bank i increases with a higher ε if, and 
only if, mci>mck. Therefore, regulation reallocates market share from efficient banks to less 
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efficient banks (eg banks with marginal costs above the market average). The effect of 
binding deposit rate regulation on the aggregate Lerner index is then:  
1 1 1
k N Ni i i
i i ii i k i
ds ds dLdL
L L s
d d d d      
                                               (C.6)                                
Denote banks i = 1,…, k as low-efficiency banks, which will see their market shares 
increase. In contrast, the market share of high-efficiency banks i = k+1,…, N will decrease. 
All in all, this leaves the sign of dL/dε undetermined. Specifically, if deposit rate regulation 
reallocates sufficient market share from efficient to less efficient banks (resulting in dL/dε<0), 
then competition such as measured by the Lerner index can increase instead of decrease. This 
simple example shows that the aggregate Lerner index cannot consistently measure 
competition under deposit rate regulation.29 
In contrast, RPD is not biased due to interest rate regulation. As described in Section 
4.2, RPD is defined as the ratio of the profit differences between any three banks in the 
market. Banks can be ordered by their efficiency level (marginal costs), with more efficient 
banks providing more loans. Suppose we take three banks – A, B, C – with mcA<mcB<mcC, 
then RPD is defined as RPD = (πA – πC)/(πB – πC). Using the model presented in Section 4.2, 
profits can be written as a quadratic function of outputs. Then, after imposing deposit rate 
regulation, RPD(ε) can be rewritten as:   
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                                              (C.7) 
We show that RPD (ε) is decreasing in ε by taking the first-order derivative: 
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    
 
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                                            (C.8) 
Given that qB – qA<0 and f ’(ε)>0, the above equation has a negative sign, suggesting that 
higher binding regulation (ie a higher ε) will lower competition, consistent with theory. 
Hence, RPD is a consistent measure of competition in case of binding deposit rate regulation.  
We show below the two main problems with the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index 
when lending rate regulation is binding. First, this index mainly measures variation in 
                                                             
29 Boone (2000) provides another example where an individual firm‟s Lerner index increases after competition intensified. 
Applying that model with a slight modification, it can be shown that the necessary condition for an individual bank‟s Lerner 
index to be increasing in  is that the marginal cost of this bank is lower than the market average. Proof is available upon 
request. 
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competition resulting from changing regulation; it cannot detect competition resulting from 
shifts in demand. Second, ignoring binding price regulation leads to inconsistent estimates of 
the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index (see also Salvo, 2010).  
Consider the simple case of a monopoly bank serving the entire market under a 
lending rate ceiling.30 If this ceiling is not binding (see Panel A of Figure 2), the bank will 
choose the optimal price and quantity combination by equating marginal cost (MC) to 
marginal revenue (MR). When the demand curve shifts from D1 to D2 (da > 0),31 the 
equilibrium combination of prices and output moves from point E1 to E2, resulting in a 
higher Lerner index, or lower competition. Hence, changes in competition resulting from 
exogenous shifts in the demand curve can be correctly picked up by the Lerner index. 
However, this is not the case if the lending rate ceiling is binding, as demonstrated in Panel B. 
This ceiling (Pc) prevents the bank from choosing the optimal price-output combination 
according to MR = MC. In contrast, following profit-maximising behaviour, it will choose the 
quantity at the kink of the demand curve (points E1 and E2 of Panel B), leaving the price 
unchanged at the ceiling. Therefore, changes in competition due to exogenous shifts in 
demand cannot be indentified by the Lerner index, because both prices and costs do not 
change in relation to the change in demand.  
In case both the demand curve and binding lending rate ceiling change, the Lerner 
index can pick up only variations in competition due to changes in the latter, but not those 
due to shifts in the former. In Panel B, suppose that the demand curve shifts to D2 and the 
lending rate ceiling increases to Pc’, both of which will decrease competition. The optimal 
combination of prices and output moves from E1 to E2’ and hence the Lerner index increases. 
It is immediately clear that changes in this index reflect only changes in the lending rate 
ceiling but not in the demand curve, because the new Lerner indices are the same with or 
without demand curve shifts (comparing E2’ and E1’). All in all, in the case of a binding 
lending rate ceiling, the Lerner index provides only an incomplete assessment of changes in 
competition. 
The above analysis also applies to the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index because it 
estimates the price-cost margin of an average bank. This conclusion is closely related to the 
analysis in Salvo (2010), which proves theoretically and empirically that ignoring price 
                                                             
30 Competition is a concept closely related to market power, and in most of the literature they are considered in a similar 
fashion. Even for a monopoly, the issue of market power is relevant. We use a monopoly here for reasons of simplicity. The 
example is also valid for a market with multiple firms. See Koetter et al. (2008) for more details. 
31 For a full proof that 0da   leads to lower competition, please refer to Boone (2000).   
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ceilings result in an over-estimation of competition by the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index in 
the context of the Brazilian cement industry. When prices are unconstrained, the traditional 
joint estimation approach (eg Bresnahan, 1982) can effectively distinguish between 
monopoly and perfect competition, as demand shifts will lead to price changes in the case of 
a monopoly but not under perfect competition. In contrast, when prices are regulated (for 
example, a price ceiling is put in place), demand shifts do not affect prices in the case of both 
a monopoly and perfect competition. 
Figure 2: Lerner index and price ceilings 
Thus, unless marginal costs are observed, one cannot tell whether the observed 
price-quantity combination is established under a monopoly or perfect competition. If one 
were to ignore the existence of a price ceiling and hence conclude that prices remain stable 
after a shift in demand, one would falsely reject collusion and argue in favor of competition. 
In general, if binding price ceilings are not properly accounted for, the underlying structural 
model will be misspecified. Hence, the orthogonality condition that is required for a 
consistent estimation of the related parameter will not be met. Salvo (2010) further shows 
that ignoring price ceilings may lead to an over-estimation of competition, in line with our 
argumentation. 
Overall, we conclude that the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index is a biased measure of 
competition when price ceilings are binding. We suspect that this may account for the very 
high level of competition that it obtains for the pre-WTO period in China. It is generally 
acknowledged that the lending rate ceiling was most likely binding during this period.  
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In contrast, RPD uses relative profits and therefore they can pick up changes in 
competition due to demand shifts under price ceilings. For illustrative purposes, we use a 
simplifying assumption for the additional demand that may result from a binding price ceiling. 
Specifically, we assume that the extra output will be shared among banks according to their 
market share without the price ceiling. This so-called repartition rule relates to Schmalensee 
(1987). It should be noted that our proof does not depend on any specific repartition rule, as 
long as it allows more efficient banks to take on relatively more additional output after the 
price ceiling is imposed. For simplicity, we assume that b=d, meaning that the products 
provided by different banks are perfect substitutes. Denote aggregate loans that are provided 
under the price ceiling as * a P
b
Q

 ; without the ceiling, it is Q. If the ceiling is binding, 
Q*≥Q. Moreover, banks share the additional output Q* - Q according to their original market 
share si when there is no price ceiling. Then the optimal output for bank i is: 
 
 
 
* * *
11
, where 
1
i j j
i i i i i
k j j
a N mc mc
q q s Q Q sQ s
N a N mc mc
   
    
   
                          (C.9)  
Again mck are the marginal costs of producing loans for an average bank. Then profits 
of bank i are  * *i i iP mc sQ   . We focus on the demand shift parameter a and prove that an 
increasing a leads to lower competition under the price ceiling when measured by RPD. We 
reiterate that in this case the Lerner index would not detect any changes in competition. The 
RPD of any three banks under price ceiling is:  
 
   
   
A A C c
B B C c
P mc s P mc S
RPD a
P mc s P mc S
  

  
                                           (C.10) 
Taking the derivative with respect to a, and using mcA<mcB<mcC, it can be shown that: 
        1
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C B A C B A
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sign sign N mc mc mc mc mc mc
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 
     
 

                        (C.11) 
Hence, RPD correctly picks up changes in competition due to demand shifts when a price 
ceiling is put in place. This is its main advantage (and of the PE indicator as well) when 
compared with the Lerner index. Both RPD and the PE indicator can measure competition 
correctly under price ceilings, while the Lerner index can only measure changes in 
competition resulting from changed ceilings, but not those resulting from shifts in demand.  
Finally, the existence of binding interest rate regulations can exarcerbate other 
shortcomings of conventional competition measures such as the Lerner index. A case in point 
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is the reallocation effect identified in Boone et al. (2007). This relates to the fact that more 
intensive competition due to more aggressive conduct will reallocate output and profits from 
less efficient banks to more efficient banks. As more efficient banks usually have higher 
PCMs than less efficient banks, the PCM for the whole market, which is an (output) weighted 
average of individual banks‟ PCMs, actually may increase in response to more intense 
competition. The increase in the market PCM (or aggregate Lerner index) would be 
interpreted as a decline in competition, while actually it has increased. Boone et al. (2007) 
show that the reallocation effect is particularly strong in concentrated markets. As a matter of 
fact, Chinese loan markets are highly concentrated markets, where during 2001-2008 the four 
SOCBs had an average annual market share of around 71%. It can be demonstrated that the 
reallocation effect is more profound when the regulation of interest rates is binding. Hence, 
this should make the Lerner index even less appropriate as an indicator to measure 
competition in Chinese loan markets.  
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D. Additional robustness tests 
In this section, we present a number of tests to check the robustness of our results for 
alternative specifications and estimation methods. The robustness checks show that 
alternative definitions of competition indicators do not change our results significantly. 
Specifically, we test whether the main results are sensitive to: 1) alternative Lerner index 
(conjectural variation); 2) alternative definition of PE indicator; 3) alternative calculation of 
marginal costs.  
 
D.1. Alternative Lerner index (conjectural variation) 
In Section 6.1 we calculated the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index L by first estimating λ, i.e. 
the ratio of conjectural variation Θ to the elasticity of demand ε. Subsequently we could 
estimate L as λ/p, with p the average price of loans (average lending rate). An alternative 
approach is to estimate explicitly the conjectural variation Θ by simultaneously estimating the 
TCF (Equation 2), the supply equation (Equation 5) and an inverse loan demand function. 
Then the conjectural variation parameter Θ can serve as a direct measure of competition. In a 
perfectly competitive market, Θi equals to zero for all i, while for a monopoly it equals to 
one. This approach is adopted in Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) for Japanese banking market. 
Following this approach, we find that the estimated inverse demand elasticity is very stable 
across all years, which implies that conjectural variation follows a similar pattern to the 
evolution of the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index. Subsample estimations show that the 
conjectural variation is 0.068 and 0.087 for the pre-WTO respectively the post-WTO period, 
with the former being more competitive than the latter at a 1% significance level. We 
conclude that our main results obtained with the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index hold if 
conjectural variation is employed as a direct measure of competition. The full estimation 
process and results are not reported here to save space, but are available from the authors 
upon request.  
 
D.2. Alternative definition of PE Indicator  
We calculated the PE indicator by using the logarithm of πilt or profits obtained from loans as 
the dependent variable (see Section 6.2). This is a more accurate measure of profits generated 
by loan business. Alternatively, as a robustness check, we follow Boone et al. (2004) and use 
the logarithm of variable profits as the dependent variable. This approach has the advantage 
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that it avoids potential estimation errors, as variable profits can be obtained directly from 
accounting data. At the same time, it has the disadvantage that variable profits capture not 
only profits from loans but also those from other activities. Variable profits are defined here 
as the difference between total income and the sum of interest expenses and other 
non-interest expenses.32 We find that they are highly correlated with the definition of profits 
that we used in Section 6.2, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.9607.  
Similar to the other estimations, we estimate yearly and subsample PE indicators, which are 
reported in Panels B of Table 12 and Table 13. Again, competition follows the same pattern 
that we reported for the initial results. The structural break test for the point estimates for the 
two subsamples again supports our finding that the pre-WTO period is less competitive than 
the post-WTO period. 
 
D.3. Calculation of marginal costs 
For the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner index, we assumed that the Translog Cost Function (TCF) 
for each bank group (SOCB, JSCB, CCB, FOREIGN) is the same, as only the constant term 
is allowed to vary across bank groups through bank type dummies (Equation 2). For the PE 
indicator, we improved the estimation by imposing different cost functions on different bank 
groups and estimated a separate TCF for each bank group. Both ways of treating cost 
functions for specific bank groups are generally accepted in the literature. Nevertheless, this 
difference could potentially generate different marginal costs. As for both the Lerner index 
and the PE indicator marginal cost estimations directly affect their values, it is important to 
test whether the contradictory results that we find could be driven by differences in the 
estimated marginal costs.   
To this end, we conduct the following two robustness tests. First, we re-estimate the 
(elasticity-adjusted) Lerner indices assuming different cost functions for each bank group. 
Second, we re-estimate the PE indicator using the marginal costs that we estimated for the 
elasticity-adjusted Lerner index (MCe), i.e. assuming similar translog cost functions for bank 
groups.  
When re-estimating the (elasticity-adjusted) Lerner indices, we use different TCFs for each 
bank group by allowing for bank type dummies to interact with the independent variables in the 
                                                             
32 An alternative definition of variable profits is interest income - (interest expenses + other non-interest expenses). Our 
main conclusions are not sensitive to this alternative definition. Results are available upon request.  
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TCF. We calculate again yearly and subsample values, which are shown in Table 14. The 
modification in the TCF turns out to change the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index only very 
marginally for both the yearly and subsample estimations33. Moreover, the traditional Lerner 
index also resembles closely our previous results. This confirms that our previous findings are 
robust to different calculations of marginal costs.  
The results for the re-estimation of the PE indicator using the marginal costs that we estimated 
in order to obtain the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index (MCe) are shown in Panel A of Table 12 
for the yearly results and of Table 13 for the subsample results. The former follows a very 
similar pattern to our previous results. Moreover, also our conclusion that the pre-WTO period 
had much lower competition than the post-WTO era remains intact. 
                                                             
33 Underlying estimations of elasticity-adjusted Lerner index not shown to save space. Results are available upon request.  
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Table 12: Yearly estimates of alternative PE indicator 
 
Panel A:  
Independent variable ln(MCe) 
Panel B:  
Dependent variable ln(variable profits) 
 
PE Indicator z-value 
AP 
chi2(1)  
p-value 
AP  
F(1,440) 
PE 
Indicator z-value 
AP 
chi2(1)  
p-value AP F(1,442) 
1997 –2.314 (–1.53)    0.0000 18.08 6.656 (0.49) 0.4866 0.46 
1998 –1.769 (–1.00)    0.0101 6.27 –2.183 (–1.26)    0.1021 2.53 
1999 3.609 (1.3) 0.0000 33.08 –0.627 (–0.25)    0.0000 26.78 
2000 –1.379 (–0.44)    0.0127 5.88 –0.667 (–0.37)    0.0000 17.13 
2001 –5.748*** (–4.26)    0.0000 29.48 –3.086*** (–4.11)    0.0000 31.54 
2002 –6.826**  (–2.20)    0.0009 10.46 –3.594*** (–2.64)    0.0000 20.2 
2003 –3.754**  (–2.49)    0.0000 65.05 –4.391**  (–2.57)    0.0027 8.57 
2004 –3.810**  (–2.25)    0.0000 72.28 –2.937*** (–3.13)    0.0000 58.35 
2005 –1.605 (–1.41)    0.0000 95.18 –1.1 (–1.58)    0.0000 67.33 
2006 –4.633*** (–2.87)    0.0001 14.46 –3.090*** (–3.28)    0.0000 20.59 
2007 –3.669*** (–4.27)    0.0000 74.47 –3.264*** (–5.47)    0.0000 89.25 
2008 –3.584*** (–3.93)    0.001 10.27 –1.959*** (–3.26)    0.0000 28.18 
Constant –2.511 (–1.00)        1.983 (1.13)   
Nr. Obs 464 466 
F 4.649 4.685 
Centered R2 0.132 0.0961 
z-values in parenthesis; ** represent significance level of 5%, *** represent significance level of 1%; AP chi2 is the Angrist-Pischke (AP) 
first-stage chi-squared test: AP F is the  Angrist-Pischke (AP) F-statistics. Test statistic can be compared to Stock-Yogo (2002, 2005) critical 
values for Cragg-Donald F statistic with K1=1. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values at 10% maximal LIML size are 16.38. Year 
dummies are not reported here to save space. 
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Table 13: Subsample estimates of alternative PE indicator  
 
Panel A 
Independent variable ln(MCe) 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: ln(variable profits) 
1996–2008 1996–2001 2002–2008 1996–2008 1996–2001 2002–2008 
PE Indicator –1.928*** –1.522 –3.717*** –2.023*** –1.487 –2.870*** 
 (–3.81)    (–1.01) (–5.65)    (–5.66) (–1.64) (–7.07)    
Time Trend –0.0142 –0.508* 0.367*** 0.0087 –0.461** 0.296*** 
 (–0.34)    (–1.67) (4.9) (0.24) (–2.20) (4.45) 
Constant 1.069 4.889 –8.492*** 0.516 4.540** –5.236*** 
  (0.73) (1.63) (–3.67)    (0.46) (2.34) (–3.37)    
H0:prewto 
–postwto<=0 
(p-value) 2.14* (0.071) 2.34* (0.063) 
Nr. Obs 464 91 373 466 91 375 
F 7.226 1.815 21.24 16.01 2.349 29.25 
Centered R2 0.0247 0.0495 0.104 0.0691 0.101 0.141 
K-P rk Wald F 336.7 77.97 163.2 227.9 34.97 142.4 
K-P rk LM  
(p-value) 
73.24 
(0.000) 
15 
(0.000) 
50.52 
(0.000) 
64.78 
(0.000) 
13.59 
(0.000) 
45.18 
(0.000) 
z-values in parenthesis; * represents significance level of 10%, ** represent significance level of 5%, *** represent 
significance level of 1%. K-P rk Wald F is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. K-P rk LM is Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values at 10% maximal LIML size are 16.38 
65 
 
Table 14: Lerner indices assuming different TCFs for each bank type 
 
   λt 
Elasticity 
adjusted 
Lerner index Lerner index MCe MCt 
1997 0.077 0.458 0.330 0.080 0.104 
1998 0.048 0.410 0.317 0.080 0.079 
1999 0.030 0.294 0.244 0.062 0.066 
2000 0.022 0.221 0.284 0.055 0.055 
2001 0.020 0.237 0.228 0.051 0.055 
2002 0.016 0.223 0.292 0.044 0.042 
2003 0.017 0.240 0.298 0.046 0.045 
2004 0.020 0.287 0.311 0.047 0.045 
2005 0.023 0.288 0.330 0.051 0.050 
2006 0.026 0.332 0.349 0.052 0.051 
2007 0.036 0.457 0.417 0.047 0.047 
2008 0.040 0.426 0.410 0.059 0.056 
1996–2001  0.027 0.235 0.284 0.071 0.069 
2002–2008  0.026 0.335 0.355 0.051 0.049 
H0: Elasticity Adj Lerner prewto>=Elasticity Adj Lerner postwto : chi
2(1)=7.93 p-value = 0.0024 
λt are statistically different from zero for all year at a 1% significance level; MCe and MCt are average marginal cost 
estimated from elasticity-adjusted Lerner index and traditional Lerner index, respectively. 
66 
 
E. Panzar-Rosse H-statstic model 
The so-called H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse has been employed in a small 
number of empirical studies on bank competition in China (Yuan, 2006; Fu, 2009).34 The 
H-statistic is defined as the sum of the elasticities of a bank‟s total revenue with respect to 
that bank‟s input prices (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987). Under monopoly, 
the revenues of the banks in question are independent of the decisions made by their actual or 
potential rivals. Panzar and Rosse proved that in this situation an increase in input prices will 
increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce revenues. 
Therefore, in this situation the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero. In contrast, 
in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the revenue function of 
individual banks depends upon the decisions made by its actual or potential rivals (Bikker 
and Haaf, 2002). Under monopolistic competition, the change in input price is greater than 
the change in revenue and the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1. Finally, under perfect 
competition, the H-statistic is equal to one because increases in input prices are passed on to 
output prices (in our case the lending rate). Higher input prices raise both marginal and 
average costs without, under certain assumptions, changing the optimal output of any 
individual bank. As some banks exit the market, the demand facing the remaining banks will 
increase, resulting in higher output prices and revenues equivalent to the rise in costs. 
Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition.  
 
E.1. Recursive least squares 
Following Bikker and Haaf (2002), we estimate the H-statistic based on the following revenue 
equation: 
                                                             
34 Bikker et al. (2007) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) include China in Panzar-Rosse based investigations of bank 
competition in large country samples as well.  
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             (E.1) 
The dependent variable ln(llit / TAit) is the logarithm of the ratio of interest income to total 
assets.35 Hence, we employ the so-called scaled version of the Panzar-Rosse model, in order to 
be able to compare our results with those of Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009). We use the ratio of 
interest expenses to total funding as a proxy for the average funding rate (AFR). The ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets is adopted as a proxy for the wage rate or price of personnel 
expenditure (PPE). Furthermore, the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets is used as a 
proxy for the price of capital expenditure (PCE). The H-statistic, or the sum of the elasticities 
of a bank‟s total revenue with respect to that bank‟s input prices, is then defined as H=++. 
We follow the standard approach to include several bank specific variables as control 
variables to capture bank differences in risk, size and business structure. As the H-statistic 
assesses market structure by evaluating the relationship between costs and revenues, 
bank-specific characteristics need to be controlled for. We take the following variables into 
account: The ratio of loans to total assets (LNS_TA); the ratio of other non-earning assets to 
total assets (ONEA_TA) reflects the composition of assets; the ratio of customer deposits to the 
sum of customer deposits and short-term funding (DPS_F) captures the features of the funding 
mix; the ratio of equity to total assets (EQ_TA) is employed to reflect risk; the ratio of other 
income to interest income (OI_II) proxies the specific business structure. The variable di
h is the 
bank type dummy. As we have four types of banks in our sample (SOCB, JSCB, CCB and 
FOREIGN), we drop the CCB dummy to avoid over identification. The respective data are 
summarised in Table 3.   
                                                             
35 Bikker et al. (2007) and Bikker et al. (2012) demonstrate that taking interest income as share of total assets, or the 
inclusion of scale variables as explanatory variables, may lead to overestimate competition and distorted tests results. Instead, 
they suggest using unscaled variables, ie using interest income, as the dependent variable. However, we use the scaled 
version of the H-statistic in order to be able to compare our results with those of Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009). As a robustness 
check, we also have estimated unscaled H-statistic. For more details see Appendix E (E.2).  
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The coefficient for LNS_TA is expected to be positive, as more lending potentially 
generates more interest income. The coefficient for ONEA_TA may be negative, as a higher 
ratio may be associated with lower interest income. OI_II is likely to have a negative 
coefficient, because generating other income might come at the expenses of interest income. 
For the signs of the coefficients for the other control variables, no prior expectations are offered 
by theory.     
An important limitation of the H-statistic is that the market must be in long-run 
equilibrium, ie the return on total assets (ROA) should not be significantly correlated with input 
prices. The underlying motivation is that competitive markets will equalise the risk-adjusted 
rates of return across firms to such an extent that, in equilibrium, their correlation with input 
prices will be zero (Gutiérrez de Rozas, 2007). As is standard in the literature, we test the 
long-run equilibrium condition based on a regression in which the dependent variable is 
ln(ROA), while the independent variables are the same as in Equation (E.1): 
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             (E.2) 
where ROA is defined as net income over total assets. With this specification, E=++ =0 
indicates long-run equilibrium, while E<0 represents disequilibrium. 
Estimations are carried out with recursive least squares.36 This approach does not 
impose any parametric structure on the evolution of the H-statistic and has the advantage of 
allowing for the assessment of bank competition for various time windows in our sample. We 
do not employ the commonly used yearly estimation of the H-statistic, as in Fu (2009) and 
Yuan (2006), because the test statistics based on a small number of banks in the early years of 
our sample might not be reliable. Another advantage of recursive least squares is that this 
approach can avoid the erratic pattern of the H-statistic which is often obtained with yearly 
                                                             
36 Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) employ a parametric approach by incorporating time variant coefficients in the revenue 
equation. We use this approach as one of the robustness tests in Appendix E (E.3). We also tested 3-year rolling-window 
regressions and found similar results to recursive least squares. Results are available upon request.   
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estimations (Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008). We estimate Equation (E.1) recursively, starting 
with a window of two years and expanding the sample by one year at a time. In total we 
obtain 12 estimation windows. The results are summarised in Table 15, Panel A. To ensure 
standard errors and statistics that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance 
estimations are employed. The long-run equilibrium condition tests are provided for each 
time window, which are summarised in Panel B of Table 15. To save space, the coefficients 
of the control variables are not reported. Nevertheless, the signs of the coefficients of the 
control variables confirm our prior expectations. 
The estimated H-statistic show a slightly increasing level of bank competition for the 
early time windows, but with an increasing time span, bank competition generally follows a 
declining pattern. This result is rather similar to those obtained by Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009). 
However, it should be noted that the differences between the H-statistic across all time 
windows are not statistically different. Wald F-tests on the sum of the input price elasticities 
reject both H=1 (perfect competition) and H=0 (monopoly), indicating that all time windows 
can be characterised by monopolistic competition. Long-run equilibrium condition tests are 
rejected for all time windows except for one.  
To assess whether bank competition experienced structural changes, we estimate 
H-statistic for the whole sample and two subsamples. The break year for the subsamples is 
2001, the year of WTO accession, resulting in the pre-WTO period 1996–2001 and post-WTO 
period 2002–2008.37 The results for the H-statistic are reported in Table 16, while the long-run 
market equilibrium condition tests for the whole sample and sub-samples are reported in Table 
17. The H-statistics for each sub-sample and for the whole sample again suggest that Chinese 
banking markets were in a state of monopolistic competition. When comparing the H-statistic 
for each subsample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are equal across the 
                                                             
37 The selection of 2001 as break year in the dataset is supported by formal structural break tests. 
70 
 
subsamples for any conventional significance level, suggesting no significant structural 
change. Table 17 shows that the long-run equilibrium condition (E=0) is rejected for the whole 
sample period and both subsample periods. This is likely to be related to the ongoing process of 
financial reform in China, which makes it unlikely that the banks have fully adjusted to market 
conditions. Hence, inferring competitive conditions from these results for China are likely to be 
biased.38  
 
E.2. Unscaled Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
In our estimation of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (Appendix E.1), we used the scaled 
approach, i.e. the logarithm of interest income to total assets as the dependent variable, in 
order to be able to compare our results with those of Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009). However, 
we know from the literature that this approach is biased. Bikker et al. (2007) and Bikker et al. 
(2012) demonstrate that taking interest income as a share of total assets as the dependent 
variable, instead of the absolute amount of interest income (unscaled version), overestimates 
the degree of competition. In addition, when using this specification, results indicating both a 
monopoly and a situation of perfect competition will be distorted. The inclusion of scale 
variables as explanatory variables in the revenue function has a similar distorting effect.  
As a sensitivity test, we estimate an unscaled version of the H-statistic using 
ln(interest income) as dependent variable. The results show even a more pronounced different 
pattern before and after China joined the WTO: The H-statistic indicate that Chinese loan 
markets were characterised by perfect competition before WTO accession and moved to 
monopolistic competition afterwards. Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009) reached similar 
conclusions, although with the scaled approach. Hence, the results of the theoretically better 
founded unscaled version of the Panzar-Rosse model show that Chinese loan markets were 
                                                             
38 To test for monopolistic or perfect competition, it is necessary for the observations to be generated in long-run 
equilibrium (Panzar-Rosse, 1987). This equilibrium may not have been achieved yet in transitional economies, doubting its 
usefulness to assess competition in these markets (Shaffer, 1994; Northcott, 2004). 
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already in a state of perfect competition before further important financial reforms were 
implemented in the context of WTO accession in 2001 and that since then competition only 
declined. We hold the view that applying the more preferable unscaled version actually 
reinforces the shortcomings of the H-statistic for China (results are avaible upon request).     
 
E.3. Parametric approach  
Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) employed a parametric approach by incorporating time variant 
coefficients in the revenue equation, which allows for formally testing the evolution of bank 
competition over time. As a robustness test, we also estimated the H-statistic assuming a 
parametric structure of the evolution of competition, with the following specification: 
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                  (E.3)          
where t is time, and the H-statistic is defined as Ht=(++)exp(δ
*t). With this specification, 
if ζ=0, the competitive structure is constant over time, while δ>0 (δ<0) indicates an increasing 
(decreasing) level of competitiveness over time. Estimation is carried out with nonlinear least 
square. Our results show a significantly negative time coefficient δ of –0.0041 (p-value 
0.0000), suggesting an annual decrease in the level of competition for the whole sample 
period. Wald F-tests on the sum of the input price elasticities reject the H-statistic being 1 
(perfect competition) and 0 (monopoly) at a 1% significance level, indicating that all years 
could be characterised by monopolistic competition. Furthermore, a Wald F-test on the 
long-run equilibrium condition rejects E=0 at a 1% significance level for each year which 
suggests that Chinese loan markets were in disequilibrium. These results confirm that our 
results for the H-statistic are not sensitive to specific estimation methods. Results are 
available upon request.  
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Feyzioğlu et al. (2009) and Bikker et al. (2007) indicate that the H-statistic probably 
picks up the co-movement of regulated deposit and lending rates in China. So, instead of 
measuring the degree of pass-through of input prices to output prices that would measure the 
degree of competition in a liberalised market, it measures the degree in which the regulator sets 
deposit and lending rates jointly. The H-statistic may be biased upwards due to the high 
correlation between the ceilings on deposit and loan rates, which may have been especially 
relevant for the earlier sample years when interest rate deregulation had hardly started. The 
high values of the H-statistic for the pre-WTO period reported in previous studies (Yuan, 2006; 
Fu, 2009) and in our own estimates in the previous section likely are driven by this effect. The 
ceiling on the lending rate was abolished in 2004, which may have reduced the impact of this 
bias in subsequent years. This conclusion is supported by the findings reported in Table 16, 
where the coefficient of the average funding rate (AFR) is much higher in the pre-WTO period, 
while dropping considerably later on when the lending rate ceiling was abolished.   
To conclude, using similar specifications as Yuan (2006) and Fu (2009), we find that 
the market structure indicated by our results is that of monopolistic competition. Moreover, the 
level of competition does not change significantly across time. Finally, it should be noted that 
the long-run equilibrium condition underlying the Panzar-Rosse model generally is not 
satisfied. 
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Table 15: H-statistic and long run equilibrium condition: Recursive least squares 
 
  
Panel A: H-Statistic 
  ln(AFR) ln(PPE) ln(PCE) H 
H0: H=1 
chi2(1) 
H0: H=0 
chi2(1) 
Nr.
obs F Adj R2 
1996–1997 0.717*** 0.0736**  –0.0647*   0.7254 7.77*** 54.24*** 25 113.09 0.836 
1996–1998 0.778*** 0.0652** –0.0588*  0.7840 7.48*** 98.52*** 39 66.13 0.864 
1996–1999 0.715*** 0.0771**  –0.0493 0.7424 20.64*** 171.51*** 60 64.37 0.821 
1996–2000 0.689*** 0.0828*** –0.026 0.7461 26.48*** 228.61*** 84 92.34 0.852 
1996–2001 0.650*** 0.0986*** –0.024 0.7246 38.79*** 268.57*** 112 74.17 0.852 
1996–2002 0.550*** 0.113*** 0.00124 0.6642 57.99*** 226.82*** 144 44.51 0.858 
1996–2003 0.535*** 0.136*** 0.0113 0.6818 53.43*** 245.21*** 184 51.39 0.837 
1996–2004 0.517*** 0.129*** 0.0303 0.6757 52.01*** 225.9*** 223 51.58 0.826 
1996–2005 0.512*** 0.134*** 0.0164 0.6627 60.64*** 234.14*** 277 62.03 0.823 
1996–2006 0.507*** 0.120*** 0.0097 0.6364 81.79*** 250.59*** 350 74.11 0.799 
1996–2007 0.522*** 0.131*** 0.0121 0.6643 74.54*** 291.9*** 432 86.4 0.795 
1996–2008 0.532*** 0.126*** 0.0183 0.6765 82.5*** 360.86*** 493 96.5 0.777 
Panel B: Long-run equilibrium condition test 
  ln(AFR) ln(PPE) ln(PCE) H 
H0: E=1 
chi2(1) Equilibrium 
Nr.
obs F Adj R2 
1996–1997 –0.0189 –0.0589 –0.0948 –0.1726 0.31 A 24 13.17 0.528 
1996–1998 1.186*** –0.164 –0.163 0.8590 6.14** R 38 16.72 0.585 
1996–1999 0.852*** –0.121 –0.128 0.6026 9.71*** R 59 9.904 0.364 
1996–2000 0.795*** –0.0983 –0.0735 0.6232 15.83*** R 83 11.82 0.389 
1996–2001 0.566*** –0.0499 0.0414 0.5573 15.83*** R 111 8.406 0.345 
1996–2002 0.341*** 0.00301 0.112 0.4556 10.92*** R 141 7.702 0.307 
1996–2003 0.362*** –0.0416 0.0621 0.3825 7.25*** R 181 6.391 0.263 
1996–2004 0.311*** –0.0413 0.0174 0.2871 4.00** R 219 4.969 0.203 
1996–2005 0.283*** –0.0695 0.0494 0.2625 3.9** R 273 5.17 0.167 
1996–2006 0.235*** –0.0917 0.0616 0.2049 2.74* R 345 5.86 0.145 
1996–2007 0.267*** –0.0789 0.131** 0.3193 7.34*** R 427 7.847 0.167 
1996–2008 0.286*** –0.05  0.155** 0.3907 14.9*** R 486 9.661 0.182 
* represents significance level of 10%, ** represent significance level of 5%, *** represent significance level of 1%. A and R represent 
“Accepting” and “Rejecting” the null hypothesis that E=0 (equilibrium) at a 10% significance level. 
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Table 16: H-statistic point estimates: Whole sample and subsamples 
 
  
 1996–2008 1996–2001 2002–2008 
ln(AFR) 0.532*** (24.63) 0.650***  (20.09)  0.537*** (21.81) 
ln(PPE) 0.126*** (4.89) 0.0986*** (3.85) 0.145*** (4.03) 
ln(PCE) 0.0183 (1.27) –0.024 (–0.96) 0.0149 (0.92)  
lnLNS_TA 0.0920* (1.68) 0.0293 (0.60) 0.0905 (1.41) 
LnONEA_TA –0.0191*** (–3.75)  –0.0545*** (–4.31) –0.0140*** (–2.62) 
lnDPS_F 0.117*** (2.61) –0.0378 (–1.03) 0.179*** (3.88) 
lnEQ_TA 0.0846*** (3.62) 0.120*** (3.55) 0.0841*** (3.08) 
lnOI_II –0.0737*** (–9.56) –0.0736*** (–5.56) –0.0760*** (–8.48) 
SOCB –0.0779*** (–2.83) –0.100** (–1.98) –0.0485 (–1.59) 
JSCB –0.0137 (–0.58) 0.0870** (2.10) –0.0595* (–1.94) 
FOREIGN –0.204*** (–4.29)  –0.402*** (–3.59) –0.163*** (–3.34) 
Constant –0.361** (–2.23)  –0.252 (–1.30) –0.207  (–0.99) 
H-statistic 0.6765 0.7246 0.6974 
H0: H=0 chi
2(1) 360.86*** 268.57*** 226.37*** 
H0: H=1 chi
2(1) 82.50*** 38.79*** 42.63*** 
Hprewto=Hpostwto chi
2(1)=0.22 p–value=0.6357 
Nr. Obs 493 112 381 
F 96.50*** 74.17*** 83.00*** 
Adj R2 0.777 0.852 0.768 
z-values in parenthesis; * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5%,  
*** represents significance level of 1% 
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Table 17: Long-run equilibrium condition: Whole sample and subsamples 
 1996–2008 1996–2001 2002–2008 
ln(AFR) 0.286*** (3.42) 0.566***  (3.25)  0.341*** (3.70)  
ln(PPE) –0.05 (–0.61) –0.0499 (–0.36) –0.0621 (–0.62) 
ln(PCE) 0.155** (2.57) 0.0414 (0.38) 0.119** (1.98) 
lnLNS_TA –0.137 (–0.76) –0.875* (–1.67) –0.00647 (–0.03) 
LnONEA_TA –0.111*** (–5.35) –0.165*** (–2.83) –0.107*** (–4.98) 
lnDPS_F 0.142 (1.01) –0.113 (–0.77) 0.403*** (3.07) 
lnEQ_TA 0.355*** (4.25)  0.473*** (2.65) 0.355*** (3.77) 
lnOI_II –0.00345 (–0.13) –0.0633 (–1.47) –0.00194 (–0.07) 
SOCB –0.211* (–1.76) –0.614** (–2.41) 0.0405 (0.36)  
JSCB –0.0959 (–1.08) 0.0739 (0.43) –0.234**   (–1.98)   
FOREIGN –0.486*** (–2.64)  –1.676*** (–2.82) –0.21  (–1.41)  
Constant –3.155*** (–5.62) –2.802*** (–2.94) –2.880*** (–4.24) 
H0: E=0 chi
2(1) 14.90*** 15.83*** 10.22*** 
Nr obs 486 111 375 
F 9.661*** 8.406*** 8.950*** 
Adj R2 0.182 0.345 0.208 
z-values in parenthesis; * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5%, *** represents 
significance level of 1%. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Do banks extract informational rents through collateral? 
 
1. Introduction 
Information asymmetries among lenders may be used to “hold up” borrowers (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 
1992). Banks obtain private inside information about their customers through lending, giving inside 
banks an informational advantage relative to outside banks (Santos and Winton, 2008). Adverse 
selection problems facing outside banks make it difficult for borrowers to switch lenders. Hence, 
inside banks are in a position to request harsher loan conditions than would prevail were all banks 
symmetrically informed, allowing them to extract informational rents. Empirical validations of 
informational rent extraction mainly have focused on lending rates (see e.g. Hale and Santos, 2009; 
Schenone, 2010; Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010), while rent extraction operating through non-price 
terms, such as collateral requirements, has been left largely unexplored.  
In this paper, we intend to fill this gap by examining if inside information, obtained through 
both relationship lending and concentrated market structures, allows banks to extract informational 
rents through collateral. In doing so, we employ the equity IPOs of borrowers as information releasing 
shocks that erode information based rent-seeking opportunities. Using a unique hand-collected loan 
level dataset from China, our evidence suggests proprietary information does allow rent extraction 
through collateral. 
The crucial precondition for information rent extraction is the existence of information 
asymmetries among lenders. We focus on two sources that create such information asymmetries: 
relationship lending and market structure. Banks accumulate proprietary information about borrowers 
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through lending relationships (e.g. Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Von Thadden, 2004). In addition, 
concentrated bank market structures may facilitate information asymmetries among lenders as well 
(e.g. Dell‟Ariccia et al., 1999; Dell‟Ariccia, 2001).  
Our identification strategy is very intuitive: informational rent extraction through collateral 
should be moderated after some exogenous shock that reduces information asymmetries existing 
between inside and outside banks. In other words, the degree of collateralization should decrease for 
the informed banks after the information releasing shock. Equity IPOs of borrowing firms present an 
ideal case of an information-releasing shock (see e.g. Schenone, 2010).39 In the course of the public 
offering and after being listed, previously privately-held information about the firm will be released 
through compulsory listing requirements and subsequent regular financial reporting, public auditing, 
financial analysts‟ research and movements in its stock price. As this new information is made public 
to all banks, the informational monopoly position of inside banks is eroded and the adverse selection 
problem facing outside banks is alleviated, making rent extraction less likely for loans granted after 
the IPO than for loans granted before the IPO. Furthermore, we postulate that once the IPO has 
reduced information asymmetries among lenders, rent extraction will decline for safer firms, but not 
for risky ones. This because outside banks will be less inclined to lend once the borrower is revealed 
as risky, leaving inside banks in a better position to charge rents (see e.g. Rajan, 1992).  
One crucial part of the methodology is to control for shifts in firm risk around the IPO and for 
differences in risks between listed and unlisted firms, so that changes in the degree of loan 
collateralization can be attributed to changes in information asymmetries instead of differences in 
credit risk. We control for this by introducing a wide range of firm risk characteristics both before and 
after the IPO, and later perform additional robustness tests. 
We test our hypotheses on a unique hand-collected data set with information on individual 
loans from China. The unique settings of Chinese banking markets and the existing public listing 
                                                             
39
 A similar approach has been followed by Santos and Winton (2008) and Hale and Santos (2009) using corporate bond 
IPOs as informational equalization shocks. These papers together with Schenone (2010) investigate informational rent 
extraction through lending rates.  
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procedure make loan markets in China an ideal case for our purposes (section 2.2 presents more 
detail). Our sample is composed of loans borrowed by firms listed at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
both before and after their IPO. Focusing on this sample will bias against finding informational rent 
extraction, as one would expect that the “hold-up” problem is particularly pronounced for smaller 
firms, while our sample exists of large and relatively transparent firms. Our loan level dataset contains 
data on around 9,000 loans granted by a differentiated group of Chinese banks to 649 listed 
non-financial firms.  
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, all else equal, both high relationship 
intensity and concentrated banking market structures are associated with a higher incidence of 
collateral, and these effects are less pronounced for transparent firms. We further find that there exists 
a boundary transparency level beyond which informational rent extraction becomes less feasible. 
Second, when applying equity IPOs as an informational shock, we find for pre-IPO originated loans 
that the likelihood of collateralization is increasing with relationship intensity, while this effect is 
greatly moderated for post-IPO loans. In some specifications, relationship intensity is no longer 
significant in predicting collateral incidence for loans originated after the IPO. Third, the likelihood of 
collateral incidence increases with the degree of banking market concentration both before and after 
the equity IPO, but the effect is moderated for post-IPO loans. This finding supports the hypothesis 
that concentrated banking markets facilitate the existence of information asymmetries among lenders 
and hence are associated with a higher likelihood of rent extraction through collateral. Unlike 
relationship intensity, the impact of market structure on collateral remains significantly positive and 
economically large for post-IPO loans. This lends some support to the idea that pure market power 
stemming from concentrated market structures may allow banks to charge rents, regardless of the 
level of information asymmetries existing among banks (Hainz, 2003; Berlin and Butler, 2002). 
Fourth, using a novel measure of firm risk – whether a firm‟s first IPO application was rejected by the 
Chinese market regulator (China Securities Regulatory Commission or CSRC) or not – we find that 
once information about firm risk is made public after the IPO, rent extraction through collateral is 
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moderated for safe firms, but intensified for risky firms. This result is in line with the theoretical 
prediction of Rajan (1992) that informed banks are more able to extract rents from risky firms than 
from safer ones. Our finding further complements Hale and Santos (2009) who report similar results 
using lending rates as the rent extraction mechanism.  
Overall, our findings are largely consistent with the informational rent extraction hypothesis, 
but with two important caveats. First, our results may be explained by alternative theories. Second, 
both listing status and relationship lending could be endogenous, which could bias our results.  
Regarding the first caveat, we contrast the informational rent hypothesis with three alternative 
explanations. Firstly, various theories suggest that relationship lenders require less collateral for 
financially healthier firms (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Longhofer and Santos, 2000). If listed 
firms are financially sounder than non-listed firms and our analysis has not fully controlled for this 
difference, the moderated effect of relationship lending on collateral incidence for post-IPO loans 
could also be explained by these theories. We show that our findings are not driven by the risk 
differential between listed and unlisted firms by comparing observed risk proxies and by employing 
propensity score matching to re-estimate our baseline model with a sample that is matched by the 
listing status of borrowers. 
The second alternative explanation is related to heterogeneous risk dynamics around the IPO 
for relationship dependent and non-dependent firms. If “relationship dependent” firms improve their 
credit qualities more (or deteriorate less) than “relationship non-dependent” firms after the listing, 
then this pattern could explain the moderated effect of relationship lending on collateral incidence for 
post-IPO loans. To address this concern, we perform difference-in-difference tests for observed risk 
proxies. We do not find that the dynamics of risk proxies around IPOs differ according to relationship 
dependence. 
The third alternative explanation that we explore is that banks exchange better loan conditions 
(i.e. a lower likelihood of required collateral) for corporate bond underwriting business. To isolate this 
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alternative explanation, we re-estimate the baseline model on samples of loans that were originated 
before the bond IPO. Also here, our results hold. 
Regarding the second caveat, we employ recursive bivariate Probit models to test if the listing 
status and relationship dependency are endogenous and if our results change after controlling for the 
endogeneity of the respective variables. In both cases, we find appropriate instrumental variables, so 
that the identification does not rely solely on the non-linearity of the functional form. Again, our main 
results remain valid.  
Finally, we investigate if our results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects, the 
endogeneity of other loan contract terms and to alternative samples.40 These tests do not change our 
results.  
Our study complements previous studies such as Schenone (2010) and Hale and Santos (2009) 
that banks price their information monopolies. Our findings suggest that private inside information 
allows informed banks to charge rents through collateral, a channel that has not been explored before. 
Understanding this channel is of particular relevance for countries with less developed financial 
markets, where the pricing of credit risk is generally more difficult and hence charging collateral is a 
particularly important mechanism to reduce the risk of debt. Furthermore, we provide additional 
insights to Rajan (1992) and Hale and Santos (2009), supporting their finding that rent extraction is 
more severe for risky firms. From a methodological perspective, our paper is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first to apply equity IPOs as the identification strategy to test if banks charge 
informational rents through collateral.  
Our findings contribute to the discussion on the role of collateral in bank loan contracts.41 We 
also contribute to the literature on the structure of banking markets and information asymmetries 
                                                             
40
 In a set of unreported robustness tests, we further investigate if our results hold when using alternative relationship 
lending measures and controlling for regional legal and institutional differences that potentially may determine the likelihood 
of collateral incidence. These tests do not change our results. 
41
 Literature identified three main important roles played by collateral in a loan contract: it mitigates ex-post borrower moral 
hazard problems (e.g. Boot et al., 1991; Brick and Palia, 2007; Berger et al., 2011; Cerqueiro et al., 2016); signals credit 
quality of the borrower and mitigates adverse selection problems (e.g. Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Berger et al., 
2011; Jiménez et al., 2006); and minimizes expected loan losses given a borrower‟s default (Berger and Udell, 1990).  
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among lenders (e.g. Dell‟Ariccia, 2001; Marquez, 2002; Dell‟Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Hauswald 
and Marquez, 2006). Our empirical evidence shows that market structure is an important source of 
information asymmetries, extending previous understandings on how banking market structure affects 
loan conditions. Our findings may also provide insights about the functioning of other credit markets 
characterized by asymmetrically informed lenders. For example, lenders providing trade credit are 
generally more informed about buyers than other lenders and hence may be able to exploit 
informational advantages (Smith, 1987). Our findings also contribute to the literature on bank lending 
markets in emerging markets in general and in China in particular. To our knowledge, the paper is 
among the first to investigate collateral incidence in Chinese bank lending markets using loan-level 
data.42 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details our methodology and 
data. Section 3 presents the main empirical results. Section 4 compares our conclusions with 
alternative theories. Section 5 controls for endogeneity problems related to IPOs and relationship 
lending. Section 6 reports the results of further robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
Additional results are reported in an Internet Appendix to this paper.  
  
2. Methodology and data  
2.1. Methodology 
The methodology of the main analysis contains four parts. First, we investigate if the likelihood of 
collateral increases with relationship lending and market concentration, after controlling for a broad 
range of other determinants. The second part attempts to find evidence that the increasing likelihood 
of collateral is at least partially due to information asymmetries between inside and outside banks. To 
this end, we test if the effects of relationship lending and market concentration on collateral are less 
                                                             
42
 Very few studies have investigated the determinants of collateral in China. Notable exceptions include Firth et al. (2012) 
and Chen et al. (2013). However, none of these studies investigates the determinants of collateral at the loan-level and pays 
attention to the importance of relationship lending and market structure for the incidence of collateral, as well as how 
changes in information asymmetries among lenders may affect these linkages. 
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pronounced for transparent firms, using various information transparency proxies. The third part 
investigates if informational rent extraction is moderated for post-IPOs loans relative to pre-IPOs 
loans. Finally, we investigate if this moderated effect for post-IPOs loans varies with firm risk. We 
discuss the methodologies related to alternative explanations, the possible endogeneity of key 
variables and further robustness tests in Sections 4, 5 and 6, respectively.  
 
2.1.1. Relationship lending and market structure as determinants of collateral incidence  
We start by testing whether relationship lending and banking market structure are important 
determinants of collateral incidence. One strand of literature suggests that as relationships between 
borrower and lender intensify, relationship lenders accumulate inside information, which develops 
mutual trust and reduces the risk of moral hazard, allowing the inside bank to reduce collateral 
requirements. In essence, this “information accumulation view” considers relationship lending and 
collateral as substitutes, and therefore predicts a negative correlation between relationship intensity 
and collateral (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Bharath et al., 2011). On the 
other hand, the proprietary information obtained through lending relationships can create adverse 
selection problems for outside banks, allowing inside banks to hold-up borrowers and charge harsher 
loan conditions (e.g. Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). In other words, 
proprietary information obtained through relationship lending allows for informational rent extraction. 
This argument implies a positive correlation between relationship lending and collateral.   
Besides information asymmetries, relationship lending affects collateral incidence also 
through other channels. For instance, Longhofer and Santos (2000) suggest that pledging collateral 
improves the seniority of a bank‟s debt claims, which incentivizes the bank to engage in ongoing, 
long-term, valuable lending relationships. Borrowers benefit from this, because bank seniority induces 
relationship lenders to provide support to distressed borrowers, as the senior debtors benefit the most 
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from a turn-around of the firm.43 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) highlight another potential cost of 
relationship lending, which hinges on the observation that relationship lenders have an incentive to 
extend further credit in the hope of recovering loans granted previously when a borrower is in 
financial stress. Anticipating the ex-post realization of this “soft budget constraint”, the borrower is 
not sufficiently incentivized to make an effort ex-ante to prevent such an adverse outcome. Collateral 
is therefore more likely to be requested when a bank-firm relationship intensifies to solve this soft 
budget constraint problem (Boot, 2000). Both theories suggest that, as borrower risk increases, 
relationship lenders are more likely to request collateral, because the likelihood of engaging in a 
future rescue increases, in other words the soft budget constraint problem intensifies. Lastly, 
Menkhoff et al. (2006) suggest that banks may extend relationship length (intensity) to minimize the 
per unit fixed costs associated with evaluating and monitoring collateral (“cost minimization 
incentive”), which de facto produces a positive correlation between collateral and relationship 
duration (intensity). These theories imply that finding a positive correlation between relationship 
lending and collateral does not automatically confirm the validity of informational rent extraction.  
In light of these discussions, we postulate the following hypothesis: 
H.1: If relationship lending is negatively related to collateral incidence, the information accumulation 
view holds. In contrast, a positive correlation would reject this.  
Banking market structure affects collateral incidence through at least two channels: the 
information channel and the market power channel. The first relates banking market structure to the 
information distribution among lenders, which in turn interact with banks‟ strategic behavior in 
determining lending policies and standards (e.g. Dell‟Ariccia, 2001; Marquez, 2002; Dell‟Ariccia and 
Marquez, 2006; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).44 We review the related literatures briefly in order to 
                                                             
43
 See Elsas and Krahen (2000) for further discussion and empirical testing of this argument. Their results indicate that 
house banks require more collateral as compensation for their active involvement in the restructuring of distressed 
borrowers.   
44
 We restrict ourselves to theories that relate bank market structure to information asymmetry among lenders. Other 
theories (not crucially related to information asymmetry among lenders) also provide predictions. For instance, Manove et al. 
(2001) propose a “lazy bank” model in which banks choose between screening the borrower or ask for collateral. They argue 
that intensified competition would favor bank laziness by reducing screening and requesting more collateral. Hainz et al. 
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develop our hypothesis. First, information extraction is likely to be less effective in markets composed 
of many small banks instead of a few large banks (Marquez, 2002). Concentrated markets also allow 
for better protection of proprietary information, preventing spillovers to competitors, as banks with 
larger market shares have higher incentives and capacity to maintain this informational advantage. 
Therefore, concentrated lending markets not only consolidate market shares, but also protect 
proprietary information about borrowers. Second, different market structures associated with different 
implied levels of competition may also affect the incentive of banks to accumulate information. 
Increased competition reduces the rent that banks can extract, reducing the incentive to generate 
information through credit evaluation (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). More outside borrowing 
options for firms in less concentrated markets also inhibit the (re)usability of information and 
diminishes its value, as firms can switch banks easily, therefore banks are incentivized to invest less in 
information production (Boot and Thakor, 2010; Chan et al., 1986; Berlin and Mester, 1999).45 Third, 
because of limited outside options, firms are likely to borrow more often from the same lenders in 
concentrated markets, which allow these banks to accumulate more private information. Lastly, the 
consolidation of proprietary information in concentrated markets deters the entry of new banks, as 
new entrant banks face larger adverse selection problems. Thus, information consolidation further 
increases the degree of market concentration and reinforces the information monopoly of incumbent 
banks (Dell‟Ariccia et al., 1999; Dell‟Ariccia, 2001). To sum up, these arguments suggest that 
concentrated markets allow for a more efficient extraction of private information and provide stronger 
incentives to obtain it; offer better protection from this information spilling over to competitors 
(outside banks); and deters competitors from entering the market which reinforces information 
monopolies. A straightforward implication is that concentrated markets may also facilitate 
informational rent extraction.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(2013) propose that bank competition makes screening more effective. Hence, collateral – an alternative to screening – is 
less common in competitive markets. Inderst and Muller (2007) develop an inside lenders‟–based model of collateral which 
does not assume the existence of information asymmetries on the borrower‟s side. These authors predict that the incidence of 
collateral is higher in more competitive markets. 
45
 If increased competition makes differentiation from outside banks more important, inside banks should acquire 
information more intensely (Boot and Thakor, 2000 and 2010). 
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However, a positive association with collateral would not unequivocally suggest 
informational rent extraction. Sheer market power in concentrated markets could allow banks to 
request more collateral, independently from the imbedded information structure. This is the market 
power channel (e.g. Hainz, 2003; Berlin and Butler, 2002).  
Following the arguments above, we postulate our second hypothesis:  
H.2: Concentrated markets allow for a higher probability of collateral incidence, either because of 
the existence of informational monopolies, more market power or both. 
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the following Probit model:  
 
𝑃 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑙 = 𝐹 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑅4𝑖𝑙 +  𝜍𝑗𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑗=1 + 𝜌𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑙 +
                                    
𝑗=1𝜑𝑗𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑙+𝑗=1𝜃𝑗𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑙+𝑗=1𝛾𝑗𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑙+𝑗=1𝛿𝑗𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑙+𝑗=1𝛼𝑗𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑙     (1)  
where i indexes for firm, l for loan number, and F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. The dependent variable Collateralil is a binary variable that equals one if 
loan l extended to firm i is collateralized and zero otherwise. IPOil is a dummy equals 1 if a loan is 
issued after the borrower‟s IPO.  
Following Schenone (2010), we measure bank-firm relationships by the intensity with which 
the borrower turns to the same lender.46 This measure, which we call Sizeconcenil, is defined as the 
amount of loans that firm i has borrowed from its current lender as a proportion of the total amount of 
loans which the firm has obtained prior to the current loan.47 By definition, Sizeconcenil takes values 
                                                             
46
 The strength of bank-firm relationships is traditionally measured by relationship duration, defined as the time difference 
between the first loan obtained and the current one (see e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995). As 
suggested in Schenone (2010), duration may not fully capture how dependent a firm is on its current lender or how “locked 
in” the firm is in the lending relationship. 
47
 We employ another relationship measure, Numconcenil, defined as the number of loans that firm i borrowed from its 
current lender as a proportion of the total number of loans which the firm obtained prior to the current loan, as a further 
robustness check. Our main results are not sensitive to this alternative measure (results are available on request). The implicit 
assumption of Numconcenil is that the inside lender is more informed than outside lenders if the firm borrows more times 
from its current lender, while the amounts borrowed are irrelevant for the accumulation of information. As it is expected that 
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of between zero and one. Borrower i is more dependent on the lender if Sizeconcenil is closer to one. 
This measure of relationship lending essentially takes into account the relative importance of a lender 
to the borrower, compared to other lenders. The next set of controls Relcontrolsil accounts for 
additional features of relationship lending that can affect collateral incidence, including: the number 
of different lenders that firm i has borrowed from prior to the current loan, Numlenderil; whether the 
current loan is the first loan borrowed from the lender, Firstil; and whether the current lender is 
different from the previous lender, Switchil. Numlenderil controls for the fact that the same value of 
Sizeconcenil does not preclude that a firm borrows from different number of banks. For instance, a 
loan associated with a value for Sizeconcenil of 0.5 can be the result of borrowing from two banks, 
with each accounting for half of the total loans, or borrowing from five banks, with the largest loan 
accounting for half of the total loans. The first loan from lender (Firstil) might be subject to different 
collateral requirement. Finally, we include Switchil to control for the possibility that banks may 
condition their collateral requirements depending on whether they can provide subsequent loans, for 
instance to minimize the costs of collateral evaluation. For all these variables, loans originated by 
either the parent bank or a subsidiary are treated as loans from the same lender, since it is likely that 
the information available about the borrowing firm is shared within all subsidiaries. 
Banking market structure is measured by the concentration ratio ACR4il, which is defined as 
the share of total assets of the four largest banks as a percentage of the total assets of all banks in each 
province at the time of one semi-accounting year prior to the current loan.48 We treat each province as 
a separate banking market.  
The set of variables 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑙  accounts for firm characteristics that are likely to affect collateral. 
These include the age of the firm in (log) months, Ageil; (log) total assets, Sizeil; current assets over 
total assets, Liquidityil; return on total assets, ROAil; tangible assets over total assets, Tangibilityil; and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
banks devote more efforts in assessing firms that borrow larger amounts and subsequently accumulate more firm-specific 
information if the loan is relatively large, Sizeconcenil is probably a more precise measure of firm-bank relationships. 
48
 For our purposes, market structure should be measured at the regional level. The concentration ratio is the only measure 
available of regional market structures. Market structure is closely related to competition. For a discussion of bank 
competition in China and the results for various competition measures see Xu et al. (2013).  
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firms ownership dummy FTil (equals 1 if the Chinese State is the majority owner and 0 if majority 
ownership lies in the private sector). Following Berger and Udell (1990), we also control for the ratio 
of loan size relative to total outstanding debt (Loanconcenil), as a higher ratio suggests more important 
loans, which are more likely to be collateralized. These variables are obtained from the semi-annual 
financial reports that are published the closest to the moment before the loan was originated. This 
procedure ensures that in our estimations, banks use the most recent publicly available accounting 
information at the time that the loan is issued. All variables in monetary term are deflated to 2006 
RMB. 
The set of controls 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑙  covers loan characteristics, such as the maturity of loan l in (log) 
months, Maturityil; its (log) size in real terms (deflated to 2006 RMB), Loansizeil; and the difference 
between its lending rate and the benchmark deposit rate of a corresponding maturity, Spreadil. We also 
control for monetary policy and regional macro-economic factors (𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑙  and 𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑙 , respectively) that 
potentially can influence the pledging of collateral (e.g. Boot et al., 1991; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; 
Jiménez et al., 2006). Monetary policy controls include the reserve requirements ratio, RRRil and the 
7-day repo rate, Repoil. These variables are matched to the month when the loan was originated. 
Regional macro-economic controls are the provincial real GDP growth rate (deflated with national 
CPI), Realgdpindexil; provincial non-performing loan ratio, NPLratioil; and the provincial consumer 
price index, CPIil. These variables are matched to one semi-accounting year before the loan was 
originated. All these data come from the CEIC database.  
The last set of controls are fixed effects (𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑙 ) for time (Time), bank-type (Banktype), 
province (Prov) and industry-type (Indu). These fixed effects capture systematic differences related to: 
business or credit cycles at the national level; bank type specific propensities in requiring collateral; 
provincial collateral policies; and differences in technology, production, market conditions, and 
government industry policies across different industries. In total 7 time dummies, 31 provincial 
dummies, 7 bank type dummies, and 51 industries dummies are introduced.  
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2.1.2. Informational rent and borrower transparency  
This subsection attempts to find evidence that the increasing likelihood of collateral related to 
relationship lending and market concentration is at least partially due to informational hold-up. To this 
end, we test if the effects of relationship lending and market concentration on collateral are less 
pronounced for transparent firms, because information about these firms is more widely distributed 
among all lenders. Specifically, we test the following specification: 
 
𝑃 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑙 = 𝐹 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑅4𝑖𝑙 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑙 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑙 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑅4𝑖𝑙 ∗
                                   
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑙++𝜔𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑙+𝑗=1𝜍𝑗𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑙+𝜌𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑙+𝑗=1𝜑𝑗𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑙+                                   
𝑗=1𝜃𝑗𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑙+𝑗=1𝛾𝑗𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑙+𝑗=1𝛿𝑗𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑙+𝑗=1𝛼𝑗𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑙                  (2)  
where an informational transparency measure Inforil (higher value representing more transparent) is 
interacted with the relationship lending and market structure variables (Sizeconcenil and ACR4il, 
respectively). If β1 > 0 and β3 < 0,  or respectively β2 > 0  and β4 < 0 , it would lend some 
support to the idea that relationship lending respectively concentrated markets facilitate informational 
rent extraction, and that rent extraction is relatively more difficult if borrowers are transparent.  
We apply two sets of transparency measures (Inforil): transparency based on firm 
characteristics, and transparency resulting from stock market information production. The first set of 
transparency measures includes: listing board (Listmainil); firm ownership (FTil); and firm size 
(Mediantail). Listmainil is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is listed at the main board of 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and zero if the firm is listed either at the small and medium-sized firms‟ 
board (SME board) or the China Next board (ChiNext board)49. Firms listed at the latter two boards 
                                                             
49
 The listing boards are unknown for loans obtained before the listing. However, both firms and banks should have some 
idea about which listing board will be the most likely outcome when the firm applies for an IPO, given the characteristics of 
the firm. The lengthy approval process of the CSRC also suggests that firms need to decide at which board they will list long 
before the actual listing. As a robustness check, we reproduce the Listmain regression using loans issued only after listing. 
Our results hold for this alternative sample as well. Results are available upon request. 
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are typically smaller or high-tech firms, which should be more informational opaque. Since nearly all 
banks in China are fully or partly state-owned, it is expected that banks are better informed about 
state-owned firms than about private firms. Finally, firm size is a standard measure of informational 
transparency, with smaller firms considered to be more informational opaque. We define a dummy 
Mediantail that equals one if the firm‟s total assets are above the provincial median, and zero 
otherwise.  
The second set of transparency measures is related to stock market information production. 
Specifically, we postulate that firm transparency increases with the number of financial analysts 
(Numalstil) following the firm, and the percentage of shares held by non-bank institutional investors 
(Instishareil). We further investigate if informational spillovers from the stock market generate a 
boundary transparency level beyond which inside and outside banks are equally informed, and inside 
banks can no longer extract informational rents. As these information production variables are 
available only after being listed, we restrict the sample exclusively to post-IPO loans.  
However, since these informational transparency proxies are also correlated with the 
probability of firms‟ financial distress or bargaining power, this identification strategy cannot fully 
differentiate the “hold-up” problem from competing theories (see section 2.1.1). For instance, under 
the assumption that larger firms are less likely to face financial stress than smaller firms, these firms 
have less incentive to pledge collateral to relationship lenders in exchange for a possible future rescue, 
leading to a smaller impact of relationship intensity on collateral incidence on larger firms. The 
implicit guarantee enjoyed by state owned firms may render collateral irrelevant in exchange for a 
future rescue from a relationship lender, which can lead to a lower impact of relationship intensity on 
collateral incidence for these firms. Similarly, as larger firms or state owned firms may have greater 
bargaining power, market structure could affect their collateral pledging less than that of smaller or 
private firms. The stock market information production measures could also be positively related to 
firm size or the financial health of firms. Namely, more analysts are required for larger firms, or 
non-bank institutional investors target financially healthy firms. These arguments suggest that the 
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coefficients of the interaction terms should be negative, which can be a result independent of the 
informational rent extraction hypothesis. To better test this hypothesis, in the next sections we use 
equity IPOs as an informational shock that reveals informational to all banks, and therefore reduces 
the capacity of inside banks to extract informational rents.  
 
2.1.3. Equity IPOs as strategy to identify informational rent extraction 
This subsection formulates the methodology applying equity IPOs to identify informational rent 
extraction. This strategy hinges on the following observations. Before an IPO, inside banks enjoy 
superior information obtained from lending relationships, which allows for rent extraction through 
collateral. After an IPO, the constant release of information and market monitoring prevents any 
inside bank from obtaining or maintaining an informational monopoly position, therefore alleviating 
the adverse selection problems facing outside banks. Furthermore, a secondary effect might be at 
work which reinforces the direct effect of an IPO in reducing information asymmetries among inside 
and outside banks. Because an IPO will reveal information to all banks, inside banks are less 
incentivized to acquire additional but costly information to maintain their informational monopoly. 
This may be caused by a decreasing return on investment in information or an increasing cost of 
accumulating additional information in markets where all banks are well informed. Banks may also 
free-ride when costly information production can be conducted and disseminated by the stock market. 
With less investment in information after an IPO, information asymmetries among banks are reduced 
further. These arguments suggest that the informational monopolies of inside banks are greatly 
reduced after IPOs, making rent extraction through collateral less likely.  
Similar arguments apply to banking market structure. As discussed in section 2.1.1, when 
borrowers lack a credible channel for disseminating information, such as before an IPO, concentrated 
markets permit: more efficient information extraction (Marquez, 2002); better reusability of 
information (Boot and Thakor, 2010; Chan et al., 1986; Berlin and Mester, 1999) and protection of 
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information from spilling over to outside banks; and deters entry of competitors which self-reinforces 
the information monopolies (Dell‟Ariccia et al., 1999; Dell‟Ariccia, 2001). After an IPO, information 
is made public to outside banks through regularly published financial statements, public auditing, 
financial analysts‟ research and movements in stock prices. Hence, the role of market concentration in 
facilitating information asymmetry among lenders becomes less important, which erodes the 
possibility of informational rent extraction.  
We formulate the following hypotheses:  
H.3: If relationship lenders extract informational rents through collateral, this will be more likely for 
loans originated before the IPO and less likely for those originated after the IPO. If this moderated 
effect for post-IPO loans is not supported by the empirical results, alternative theories should explain 
the positive correlation between relationship lending and collateral incidence.    
H.4: The positive correlation of market concentration with collateral should be mitigated by the 
informational shock of an IPO. If this result is not established, the positive impact of market 
concentration on collateral incidence is attributed to market power.    
To test these hypotheses, we introduce interaction terms between the relationship intensity and 
market structure variables respectively, with IPOs in Equation (1), which yields Equation (3): 
 
  𝑃 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑙 = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑅4𝑖𝑙 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑙 ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑙 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑅4𝑖𝑙 ∗
                                      𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑙 +  𝜍𝑗𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑗=1 +  𝜇𝑗 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑗=1 ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑙 + 𝜌𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑙 +
                                      𝜑𝑗 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑙𝑗 =1 +  𝜃𝑗𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑙𝑗 =1 +  𝛾𝑗 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑙𝑗=1 +  𝛿𝑗 𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑙𝑗 =1 +  𝛼𝑗𝑗=1 𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑙 )    (3) 
 
Informational rent extraction by relationship lenders is identified if 𝛽1 > 0 and 𝛽3 < 0. Similarly, 
market concentration facilitates informational rent extraction if 𝛽2 > 0 and 𝛽4 < 0. If 𝛽3 < 0 or 
𝛽4 < 0 is rejected, the positive coefficients of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 should be explained by other theories as 
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discussed in section 2.1.1. We include the interaction term Relcontrolsil * IPOil to control for the 
possible heterogeneous impact of other relationship characteristics on collateral incidence before and 
after an IPO.  
Two important caveats must be kept in mind. First, the moderated effect of relationship 
lending on collateral for the post-IPO loans could be explained by theories other than informational 
rent extraction. We discuss and test these alternative explanations in Section 4. A second caveat is 
related to the endogeneity assumption of IPOs and relationship lending. In practice both variables 
could be endogenous due to omitted variables. We address these issues using recursive bivariate 
probit models in Section 5. We discuss some further robustness tests in Section 6.  
 
2.1.4. Informational rent extraction and firm risk 
Rajan (1992) suggests that inside banks can charge informational rents more easily from riskier 
borrowers than from safer ones, because outside banks will be less inclined to lend once the borrower 
is revealed as risky. This view suggests that when information asymmetry between inside and outside 
banks is alleviated, rent extraction will decline for safer firms but not for risky ones. We test to see if 
this prediction applies to collateral as well (see Hale and Santos (2009) for similar tests on lending 
rates).   
We propose a novel measure of firm risk: whether the first IPO application of a firm was 
rejected by the CSRC (Multiappil). A firm can be rejected for an IPO by the CSRC for many reasons, 
such as cash-flow problems, uncertain or weak profitability perspectives, unclear corporate 
governance structures or suspicious earnings, all of which suggest potential risk factors that do not 
meet CSRC listing requirements. In a way, this measure is similar to a credit rating (see an application 
in Hale and Santos, 2009), but now the firm is rated by a government body instead of private sector 
rating companies. To test this hypothesis, we expand the baseline Equation (3) with three-way 
interaction terms between informational rent variables (Sizeconcenil and ACR4il), IPOil, and firm risk 
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proxy Multiappil. 
 
2.2. Data 
Unlike most studies on informational rent extraction which focus on advanced economies, we 
concentrate on China, which is an ideal testing ground for our purpose for several reasons. First, 
collateral is particularly important in markets where banks lack sufficient tools or expertise to price 
credit risk, or are inhibited to do so due to price regulations. This has been the case in Chinese bank 
lending markets for many years. An additional incentive to request collateral in these markets is to 
reduce the personal risks faced by loan officers, as the “loan officer responsibility system” introduced 
in 2002 holds individual loan officers accountable for bad loans (Qian et al., 2015). Second, Chinese 
banking has been characterized by strict interest rate controls, which only very recently have been 
lifted completely. This suggests that banks have had less discretion in setting prices compared to their 
counterparts in advanced economies, making rent extraction through collateral an attractive 
alternative. Third, the protection of creditor rights in China was strengthened after the approval of the 
Property Law of the People‟s Republic of China in 2006 (Berkowitz et al., 2015), which increased the 
value of collateral. As our sample starts in 2007, informational rent extraction though collateral may 
have become more valuable since then, given the enhanced credit rights protection embedded in the 
new law. Fourth, bank lending markets in China are relatively segmented and offer significant 
variation across regions and time. This feature allows us to test if collateral requirements vary with the 
information configurations embedded in regional bank market structures. Finally, the particular 
features of equity IPO regulations and procedures in China make IPOs a valid choice as an exogenous 
informational shock for Chinese credit markets. Firms might expect to go public at some point, but 
the exact timing of an IPO depends on the approval by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(hereafter the CSRC), which is unpredictable and exogenous to both banks and firms, suggesting that 
adjustments of loan contract terms prior to an IPO are hardly economically viable. 
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We manually collect loan-level data from listed firms‟ financial reports, published by Wind 
Finance Co., Ltd. Hence, our analysis departs importantly from most studies on Chinese loan markets, 
which either use yearly aggregate firm-level data from the China Securities Markets and Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR) (e.g. Firth et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013) or rely on loan-level datasets 
provided by few state-owned banks (Chang et al., 2014; Qian et al., 2015).  
Our dataset consists of 10,654 loans made to 676 firms listed at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) between 2007 and 2013.50 The size of the sample is reduced by some recording errors, 
incomplete loan contract information and questionable financial data. In particular, loans issued at 
rates below the lending rate floor (i.e. below 90% of the baseline lending rate) are removed, because 
these loans are likely to have been issued at non-commercial terms. We further remove loans to 
financial institutions and loans made in foreign currencies. This reduces our database to 9,288 loans 
provided to 649 listed non-financial firms. Our database provides information on multiple borrowings 
by each firm (on average, each firm has 20 loans in our sample) and from multiple banks (on average 
4 banks per firm), including almost all types of Chinese banks. 
Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table I. 66% of the loans in our database 
are collateralized, which is comparable to figures recorded for other emerging market economies, 
such as 53% for Mexico (La Porta et al., 2003) and 72% for Thailand (Menkhoff et al., 2006). Our 
main relationship variable Sizeconcenil has an average value of 0.33, suggesting that on average 
around one third of loans are obtained from a firm‟s current lender. The concentration ratio ACR4il, 
which is our proxy for market structure, has an average of 0.55, indicating that the four largest banks 
in each province on average hold 55% of total provincial banking assets.   
The summary statistics for IPOil show that 83% of the loans in our sample were issued after 
an IPO. Among the 649 firms in our sample, 111 firms reported at least one loan before their IPO and 
at least one after; in total these firms account for 2,181 loans, representing 23% of all loans. The 
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 We concentrate on listed firms from Shenzhen Stock Exchange because firms listing at this stock exchange market are 
more diverse in terms of size and industry when compared with those listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Our sample 
starts from 2007 because listed firms were required to comprehensively report their loan records from 2007.  
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remaining firms only had loans either before their IPO (142 firms with 660 loans) or after (396 firms 
with 6,447 loans). Furthermore, our sample consists of relatively old (on average 13 years) and large 
firms (average total assets of RMB 2,139.5 million). Regarding firm ownership (FTil), firms with state 
majority ownership represent 33% of all firms in our sample and account for 40% of all loans.  
Regarding the controls for loan characteristics, the average maturity of the loans in our sample 
(Maturityil) is around two years (25.9 months), while the average size (Loansizeil) in real terms is 
RMB 62.6 million. The average spread between loan lending rates and corresponding deposit rates 
(Spreadil) is 2.85%. 
Of the other controls, we provide further detail only on the variable that we use to investigate 
rent extraction and firm risk, i.e. Multiappi , which measures whether the firm is rejected in its first 
IPO application. 40 firms, or around 7% of all firms, were rejected for an IPO when they applied for 
the first time (but were eventually listed, after multiple applications). The definition and summary 
statistics for each instrumental variable and additional variables are discussed in their respective 
sections, but are all reported in Table I, panel F, G.  
 
3. Main results 
3.1. Univariate tests 
This subsection investigates whether the mean values of the key variables differ across relationship 
intensity, market structure and for pre- and post-IPOs loans. Results are reported in Table II.  
Relationship loans, defined as the ones with Sizeconcenil above the sample median, on 
average enjoy better loan terms such as longer maturity and lower lending spreads. At the same time, 
these loans are smaller; however collateral requirements do not differ significantly between 
relationship and non-relationship loans.  
Collateral requirements are significantly more severe in concentrated markets, where 
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concentrated markets are defined as the ones with ACR4il above the sample median. Loan maturity 
does not differ across markets, while loan size and the average lending spread are significantly larger 
in less concentrated markets. Lastly, loan contract terms such as collateral (-), maturity (+) and loan 
size (+) change significantly after listing (in brackets change after IPO compared to before), while the 
average lending spread does not differ for loans issued before and after IPOs. 
Firm characteristics do not depict a clear pattern between groups. For instance, firms that 
borrow from relationship lenders are on average more liquid, less leveraged and have higher 
tangibility ratios. However, they are also younger and smaller than firms borrowing from 
non-relationship banks. Firms that borrow in concentrated markets are on average less liquid, smaller, 
younger and more leveraged, and have higher tangibility ratios. Lastly, firms that borrow after an IPO 
are less liquid and less profitable, but the leverage ratio of borrowing firms does not differ before and 
after the IPO.  
 
3.2. Multivariate tests 
3.2.1. Do relationship lending and market structure determine collateral incidence? 
In this section, we first test the impact of relationship lending and market structure on collateral 
incidence in a cross-sectional setting by estimating Equation (1) in Section 2.1.1. The results are 
reported in Panel A of Table III. Marginal effects (M.E.) are calculated based on the results in Column 
(1). To account for the possibility that some loan contract terms such as Maturity and Spread are 
endogenous, we follow Berger and Udell (1995) and estimate the model with and without these terms 
(Columns (1) and (2), respectively). We conduct additional robustness tests for endogeneity issues of 
loan contract terms in Section 6.2.   
Our results show that relationship intensity is positively related to the incidence of collateral 
and is highly significant. The marginal effects show that a one standard deviation increase in 
Sizeconcen from its sample mean increases the probability of collateralization by 1.4%. This result 
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does not support the “information accumulation” view that relationship lending and collateral are 
substitutes in mitigating borrower risks (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995). In contrast, our finding is in 
line with the other hypotheses discussed in section 2.1.1. (e.g. “hold-up” problem (Sharpe, 1990; 
Rajan, 1992), “soft budget constraint” (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Boot, 2000), “bank seniority” 
(Longhofer and Santos, 2000) and “cost minimization incentive” (Menkhoff et al., 2006)). Results 
similar to ours have been reported in e.g. Elsas and Krahnen (2000) and Ono and Uesugi (2009).  
Banking market structure, measured as the concentration ratio ACR4, is positive and highly 
significant at the 1% level across all specifications. A one standard deviation increase in this ratio 
increases the likelihood of collateral incidence by 4.45%. This result confirms Hypothesis H.2 
(Section 2.1.1) that concentrated markets are associated with a higher likelihood of collateralization. 
Our finding is in line with Hainz et al. (2013), but contrasts with Jiménez et al. (2006). As discussed, 
both the “informational rent extraction” and “market power” hypotheses can explain this positive 
coefficient.  
The coefficient of Numlender is significant and positive as well. A one standard deviation 
increase in the number of lenders of the firm from its mean increases the incidence of collateral by 
2.13%.51 Other relationship control variables such as First and Switch are not statistically significant; 
we shall discuss these results in more detail later on.  
Loans obtained after an IPO are significantly less likely to be collateralized (marginal effect is 
-10.39%). This result lends some support to the notion that IPOs are beneficial to firms with respect to 
the non-price terms of lending. This adds to the empirical findings in Santos and Winton (2008), Hale 
and Santos (2009) and Schenone (2010) that loan terms improve after bond or equity IPOs, with these 
studies presenting evidence of a decline in lending rates. 
Before moving forward, we discuss briefly other determinants of collateral, which has merit 
in itself, as the existing literature on Chinese lending markets has investigated this issue only using 
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 This result is in line with Chakraborty and Hu (2006) and Jiménez et al. (2006), but in contrast to Menkhoff et al. (2006). 
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firm-year data (e.g. Firth et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013). As expected, the coefficients of Age and Size 
are negative and significant, indicating that older and larger firms are less likely to pledge collateral, 
possibly because these firms are less prone to moral hazard problems. Firms that are more profitable, 
more liquid, have a higher tangible assets ratio and are less leveraged are less likely to pledge 
collateral. Similar to Berger and Udell (1990), we find that Loanconcen is significantly positive at the 
1% level across all specifications.52 Among all factors, the most important determinant of collateral is 
firm ownership. Private firms in China have on average a 16.7% higher probability of pledging 
collateral than state-owned firms, presumably because the latter enjoys the implicit guarantee from the 
State. This results adds to the previous empirical studies that private firms in China have been 
financially discriminated in a state-dominant banking system (Cull and Xu, 2003; Allen et al., 2005).  
Other loan contract terms affect the incidence of collateral as well. Loans with a longer 
maturity are more likely to be collateralized. A one standard deviation increase in loan maturity from 
its sample mean increases the incidence of collateral by 3.39%. This result is in line with the 
theoretical prediction that banks use shorter loan maturities to solve adverse selection or moral hazard 
problems (e.g. Berlin and Mester, 1992; Flannery, 1986; Barclay et al., 1995; Degryse and Van 
Cayseele, 2000). Larger loans (Loansize) are less likely to be collateralized. A one standard deviation 
increase of loan size reduces the incidence of collateral by 3.37%.53 Finally, loans with a higher 
interest rate spread (Spread) are more likely to be collateralized (marginal effect of 1%) giving some 
support to the notion that collateral is associated with risky loans. Nevertheless, the results for 
contract terms on collateral should be treated with caution, as these variables are potentially 
endogenous. Excluding potentially endogenous loan contract terms such as Maturity and Spread does 
not alter our results for other determinants, as shown in Column (2).  
In contrast, the monetary policy stance has a limited impact on the incidence of collateral, 
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 See for instance Boot et al. (1991), Dennis et al. (2000) and Bharath et al. (2011) for similar results. 
53
 This result is consistent with Leeth and Scott (1989), Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Menkhoff et al. (2006), but in 
contrast to the findings of Boot et al. (1991). 
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with only the 7-day Repo rate being positively related to collateral at the 10% significance level.54 
Regional macroeconomic variables (CPI, NPLratio and Realgdpindex) generally do not affect 
collateral decisions. It is likely that the impact of business cycles is captured by time fixed effects. As 
a further robustness check, we include regional legal and institutional variables (results available upon 
request).55 Our results do not materially change when these additional controls are added.  
 
3.2.2. Does rent extraction vary with firm information transparency? 
We test in this section if informational rent extraction is less pronounced for transparent firms. To this 
end, we estimate Equation (2) in Section 2.1.2 using various informational transparency proxies. 
Results are reported in Table III, Panel B and C, where Panel B uses firm characteristics as 
transparency measures, and Panel C employs stock market information production as transparency 
measures.   
 Firms that are not listed at the main board, privately owned, or small, are more likely to 
pledge collateral when relationship intensity increases, as suggested by the significantly positive 
coefficients of Sizeconcenil in all specifications of Panel B. For transparent firms, the impact of 
Sizeconcenil on collateral vanishes, as the null-hypothesis H0: Sizeconcenil+Inforil*Sizeconcenil = 0 is 
not rejected for all three informational transparency measures. As for the impact of market structure 
on collateral, a similar pattern prevails. The concentration ratio ACR4il is statistically positive in all 
specifications, and its interaction term with information transparency measures is significantly 
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 Jiménez et al. (2006) find that collateral incidence is lower during episodes of monetary tightening. They resort to credit 
rationing to explain their results, since during tightening periods banks prefer high-quality borrowers (hence less collateral). 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) suggest that higher interest rates raise a firm‟s default probability, resulting in a higher 
likelihood of collateral incidence during monetary policy tightening cycles. Our insignificant result could be due to the 
combined effect of competing theories, which we leave to future research.  
55
 Empirical studies have identified that banks are better able to control for credit risk if legal frameworks allow lenders to 
seize collateralized assets in times of default (Qian and Strahan, 2007). We employ the indices of legal infrastructure 
developed by Fan et al. (2011). These indices have been widely applied for China (e.g. Li et al., 2009), with Li et al. (2009) 
providing a detailed description. As data for these indices end in 2009 (while our sample ends in 2013), we interpolate the 
missing values by assuming that the indices grow at the average growth rate of 2006-2009. Our results show that collateral is 
more likely to be pledged in provinces with better legal infrastructure, a result that is similar to Qian and Strahan (2007). 
These authors suggest that a better protection of credit rights increases the incidence of collateral for firms with more 
tangible assets. The results that we present in the rest of the paper are not sensitive to the inclusion of these legal and 
institutional variables. Results are available upon request.   
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negative for all three cases. Unlike for relationship lending, the null hypothesis that market structure 
has no impact on collateral for transparent firm (e.g. firms listed at the main board or state-owned 
firms), i.e. ACR4il+Inforil*ACR4il=0, is rejected. Both results suggest the inside banks‟ ability to 
charge rent decreases with firms‟ information transparency.   
Next we employ stock market information production variables (Numalstil and Instishareil) as 
proxies of firm transparency. Results are reported in Panel C, Columns (6) and (7). All interaction 
terms are significantly negative, indicating a moderated effect on rent extraction when more 
information is produced by stock market, a result similar to Panel B. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
coefficients further suggests a boundary effect of information production on rent extraction. In other 
words, rent extraction becomes infeasible when sufficient information is produced by stock market. 
Specifically, in Column (6), when a borrower is followed by more than 11 analysts (65th percentile), 
the positive impact of Sizeconcen vanishes. Similarly, higher market concentration does not increase 
collateral incidence for borrowers followed by more than 22 analysts (88th percentile). Column (7) 
reports similar results where Instishare serves as a measure of information production.56 The results 
in this subsection are in line with the informational rent hypothesis. However, as discussed in section 
2.1.1, alternative theories can also support these finding as information transparency measures are 
often correlated with firm quality or likelihood of financial stress. We proceed in the next subsection 
using IPO as an identification strategy.  
 
3.2.3. Do equity IPOs reduce informational rents? 
In this subsection, we provide a direct test of informational rent extraction, i.e. we compare the impact 
of Sizeconcenil and ACR4il on collateral incidence for pre-IPO and post-IPO loans where information 
asymmetry among lenders is significantly lower for the latter group than the former. Estimations are 
                                                             
56
 Arguably, institutional investors not only bring on board more information disclosure, but also active monitoring and 
better alignment of management incentives, such as reducing tunneling behavior (e.g. Lin et al., 2011). We control for these 
effects by incorporating corporate governance variables that directly affect firms‟ tunneling incentives: the “control and cash 
flow rights wedge” and cash-flow rights. Our results remain intact, and they are available upon request.  
101 
 
based on Equation (3). 
Results are reported in Table IV. Column (1) includes only the interaction term Sizeconcenil* 
IPOil; Column (2) includes only the interaction term ACR4il * IPOil; Column (3) includes both, while 
Column (4) re-estimates Column (3) excluding possible endogenous loan contract terms (Maturity 
and Spread). The results show that Sizeconcenil is significantly positive across all models. The 
coefficient of the interaction term Sizeconcenil*IPOil is negative and significant for the broader 
specification (Column (3)), while it is marginally insignificant (p-value 0.102) in Column (1). The 
coefficient of ACR4il is significantly positive while the interaction term with IPOil is significantly 
negative across all specifications. As the results of these three specifications are quantitatively similar, 
we provide a detailed explanation of the results presented in Column (3) only, which is our baseline 
model.  
The likelihood of pledging collateral is increasing with relationship intensity for pre-IPO 
loans (coefficient 0.596***), while for post-IPO loans this positive impact is greatly moderated 
(coefficient 0.124*, and H0: Sizeconcenil+Sizeconcenil*IPOil=0 is rejected at the 10% level). In terms 
of marginal effects, a one standard deviation increase in Sizeconcenil increases the probability of 
pledging collateral by 4.78% for pre-IPO loans, compared to 1.17% for post-IPO loans. This pattern is 
consistent with Hypothesis H.3 (Section 2.1.3) that a reduction in informational asymmetry among 
lenders makes it harder to establish “hold-ups” through relationship lending, therefore lowering the 
likelihood of rent extraction through collateral.  
A similar pattern is observed for banking market structure. The pre-IPO coefficient of the 
concentration ratio ACR4il is 5.94***, indicating that pre-IPO loans obtained in concentrated markets 
are significantly more likely to be collateralized. The post-IPO impact of ACR4il is moderated, but 
remains statistically positive (coefficient 2.43***, H0: ACR4il+ACR4il*IPOil=0 rejected at 1%). 
Alternatively, looking at the marginal effects, a one standard deviation increase in the concentration 
ratio increases the probability of collateral incidence by 8.51% for pre-IPO loans, while for post-IPO 
loans this effect is reduced to 4.15%. Hence, the contribution of concentrated markets in facilitating 
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the extraction of information, or preventing its spillover to competitors, is greatly eroded, since more 
information about borrowing firms has been disseminated due to the IPO. This more equal 
distribution of information further reduces de novo banks‟ adverse selection problems and lowers 
barriers to entry, which is another reason why informational rent extraction is more difficult for 
post-IPO loans. This result confirms Hypothesis H.4 (Section 2.1.3).  
We find the positive impact of market concentration on collateral is both statistically and 
economically significant even for post-IPO loans. The presence of a certain degree of information 
asymmetry among lenders even post-IPO could explain this results. This result could also lend some 
support to the view that information asymmetries are not the only channel leading to higher collateral 
incidence in concentrated markets. The “market power channel”, discussed in section 2.1.1, suggests 
that monopolistic or oligopolistic banks can extract rents by using their market power, increasing 
collateral requirements even in an environment where all lenders are equally informed. This channel 
could be particularly important for banking markets characterized by geographic restrictions in branch 
expansion or restrictions in business scope.   
It is likely that firms gain bargaining power vis-à-vis lenders after their IPO, for example 
because the listing improves their access to capital markets or increase their attractiveness as clients 
for other lenders. This reduces the positive impact of relationship lending or bank market structure on 
collateral incidence. Nevertheless, at least part of the bargaining power gain is due to the higher 
visibility of post-IPO information dissemination, which makes it extremely hard to differentiate 
information and bargaining power effects. We control for possible shifts in a borrowing firms‟ 
bargaining power by introducing an interaction term Numlenderil*IPOil. Firms that can borrow from 
different lenders might be expected to benefit from higher intra-bank competition and therefore have 
more bargaining power vis-à-vis their current lender(s) (Yasuda, 2007). In our univariate tests, we 
found that an average firm borrows from two banks before an IPO, while this number increases to 
four after the IPO, suggesting increasing bargaining power. However, the coefficients on Numlenderil 
and Numlenderil*IPOil are both insignificant.  
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Next, we briefly discuss the other control variables. Firstil is significantly positive for pre-IPO 
loans, indicating that borrowing for the first time from a certain lender before an IPO is associated 
with a higher likelihood of collateral pledging. For post-IPO loans, collateral incidence is not affected 
by whether the loan is the first one from a certain lender or not (H0: Firstil+Firstil*IPOil=0 cannot be 
rejected). This pattern is fairly persistent throughout all our regressions, which further supports the 
role of IPOs in disseminating information. Before an IPO, the first loan is associated with higher 
collateral incidence due to limited knowledge of the borrower. However, this significant relationship 
disappears after the IPO, given that the IPO process and post-IPO information disclosure increases the 
transparency of the borrowing firm to all potential lenders. Switching lenders (Switchil), however, 
does not affect collateral incidence before or after the IPO. The coefficients on other control variables 
are similar to those reported in Table III, which are available upon request.   
To conclude, using IPOs as an informational shock, the results in this section provide 
evidence of informational rent extraction, whether the informational advantage is driven by 
relationship lending or concentrated markets. As discussed in section 2.1.1, the results of this section 
are subject to caveats related to alternative explanations and endogeneity issues of key variables, 
which we examine in Section 4 and 5.  
 
3.2.4. Do informational rents vary with firm risk? 
Finally, we test whether following an IPO, informational rents reduce for safe firms, but not, or to a 
lesser extent, for risky firms. We introduce a three-way interaction term between our informational 
rent variables (Sizeconcenil or ACR4il ), IPOil and the firm risk proxy Multiappil. Results are reported 
in Table V.  
 In the first column, we examine the main effect of Multiappil. A firm with multiple 
applications is 7% more likely to pledge collateral than first-time approved firms, which is consistent 
with our belief that being rejected for IPO is associated with higher firm risk. Three-way interaction 
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terms are introduced in Column (2). Our results show that the marginal effects of the informational 
rents variables (Sizeconcenil and ACR4il) on collateral are all positive both before and after IPOs. 
However, whether these marginal effects are moderated after an IPO depends on the riskiness of firms. 
To see this, we calculate the change in the marginal effects of the informational rent variables after 
and before IPO, for safe (Multiappil=0) and risky firms (Multiappil=1). For safe firms, the marginal 
effects of Sizeconcenil on collateral drops by 4% after the IPO, while for risky firms, it increases by 
3.2%. Similar results are found for market structure. The marginal effect of ACR4il drops by 6% for 
safe firms after the IPO, but for risky firms it increases by 5.5%.  
These results show that the ability of inside banks to charge informational rents after an IPO 
falls for safer firms, but increases for risky ones. This is because once the borrower is identified as 
safe, outside banks bid aggressively for lending business, reducing the inside bank‟s monopoly power. 
In contrast, outside banks will be less interested in lending to risky firms when the latter‟s poor 
creditworthiness is revealed, strengthening the ability of inside banks to extract rents. We test the 
robustness of these results by removing loan contract terms (Column (3)) and monetary policy and 
regional macroeconomic variables (Column (4)). In all cases, our results remain the same.  
 
4. Alternative explanations 
As noted earlier, the moderated effect of relationship lending on collateral incidence for post-IPO 
loans could be explained by alternative theories, which we discuss in this section.57 One possible 
alternative is that credit quality is significantly higher for listed firms compared to unlisted ones. In 
other words, it is higher credit quality instead of lower information asymmetry that explains this 
moderated effect. The second possible explanation is related to potential heterogeneous risk dynamics 
around the IPO for relationship dependent and non-dependent firms. The final alternative explanation 
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 We can discard one alternative explanation of the positive correlation between collateral incidence and relationship 
lending intensity that we find. This is the “cost minimization incentive” view (Menkhoff et al., 2006), which we discussed in 
section 2.1.1. This interpretation is not able to explain our results, as this incentive is unlikely to change depending on 
whether the borrower is listed or unlisted. Hence, the observed significant and negative coefficient of the interaction term 
Sizeconcenil*IPOil is not supported by this theory. 
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that we explore is that relationship banks reduce their collateral requirements in exchange for 
corporate bond underwriting business. We do not find supporting evidence for the first two alternative 
explanations and the last alternative explanation cannot dismiss the informational rent extraction 
hypothesis.  
 
4.1. Higher credit quality of listed firms 
Boot (2000) and Longhofer and Santos (2000) (see section 2.1.1) predict a weaker positive correlation 
between relationship lending and collateral incidence for financially sound firms relative to distressed 
firms. If listed firms are financially healthier than unlisted ones, it would reduce the need to post 
collateral from the relationship lender‟s perspective, as the risk of financial distress and the likelihood 
of engaging in a future rescue is lowered. However, various studies have shown that the operating 
performance of listed Chinese firms drops markedly after an IPO. For example, Allen et al. (2014) 
compare the operating performance of listed and non-listed firms in China for the years around an 
IPO and find that the average return on assets of listed firms drops significantly from 0.12 to 0.07 
within a [-3, 3] years window. This sudden drop is not observed for the unlisted firms over the same 
time horizon. These authors attribute the deterioration in performance to the extremely strict listing 
requirements of the CSRC,58 which induce firms to improve earnings in the years prior to an IPO, 
adjusting operations to generate short-term profits at the possible cost of long-term growth. Similar 
evidence is also found in our sample where the average return on assets for pre-IPO firms is around 
10% higher than post-IPO firms (e.g. from 15% prior to the IPO to 5% after, see Table II).  
To further address selection bias in listing status caused by observables, we employ a 
propensity score matching method. The propensity score of loans being borrowed by listed firms is 
estimated based on a set of variables determining an IPO. Using nearest neighbor matching, loans 
borrowed by listed firms are then matched to the ones borrowed by unlisted firms. We drop loans that 
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 To be approved for listing, firms need to report positive earnings in the three consecutive years prior to the IPO or have 
accumulated at least 30 million in net income. In addition, firms are required to have accumulated net cash flows of more 
than 50 billion or revenues in excess of 300 million in the three years prior to the IPO. 
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are outside of the common support to minimize the potential bias introduced by these loans. This 
process generates a matched sample of loans that are “identical” in every aspect, except for the 
borrower‟s listing status. We re-estimate the baseline model in Table IV, Column (3) on this matched 
sample. Our results do not materially change (available upon request) and so we conclude that higher 
observed credit quality of listed firms is unlikely to drive our results. 
Obviously, the credit quality of listed and unlisted firms may also differ in an immeasurable 
way. We conduct further analysis in Section 5 to account for these unobserved risk factors.     
 
4.2. Heterogeneous risk dynamics for relationship dependent and non-dependent firms 
Suppose “relationship dependent” firms improve credit quality more (or deteriorate less) than 
“relationship non-dependent” firms after listing. This heterogeneous change in firm riskiness could 
explain the moderated effect of relationship lending on collateral incidence for post-IPO loans. To 
address this concern, we perform difference-in-difference tests for observed risk proxies broken down 
by whether a firm is relationship dependent and whether the loan is borrowed after an IPO. In a 
fashion similar to Presbitero and Zazzaro (2011), a relationship dependency dummy is defined as 
equal to 1 if Sizeconcen is above or equal to the sample median (0.20). We construct 
difference-in-differences tests by regressing key financial risk proxies (ROA, Leverage, Tangibility, 
Liquidity, Size, Maturity, Spread and Loansize) on IPOil, the relationship dependency dummy and the 
interaction terms of these two variables. The coefficient on the interaction term and its statistical 
significance indicate whether changes in risk proxies around the IPO differ according to relationship 
intensity. Results are reported in the Internet Appendix, Table IA.I. In all these 
difference-in-differences tests, the interaction terms are statistically insignificant except for Liquidity. 
Hence, heterogeneous risk dynamics are unlikely to be a key driver of our results.  
Finally, we conduct matched sample analysis within pre- and post-IPO samples and compare 
the impact of relationship lending on collateral pledging across samples. This way we remove the 
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possibility that firm-risk dynamics around IPOs could be driving our results. If relationship banks 
charge informational rents and if IPOs reduce information asymmetry among lenders, the average 
treatment effect of relationship lending should be positive for pre-IPO loans and be moderated or 
insignificant for post-IPO loans. We find that relationship dependent firms are on average 10% to 12% 
more likely to pledge collateral relative to matched non-dependent firms for pre-IPO loans, while the 
difference between these two groups vanishes for post-IPO loans. Technical details, estimation results 
and sensitivity tests (including balancing property of covariates and sensitivity to unobservables) are 
reported in the Internet Appendix, Section A and Tables IA.II-III. 
 
4.3. Corporate bond underwriting and concurrent lending  
Banks may exchange better loan conditions for corporate bond underwriting business.59 As most 
firms have a bond IPO after an equity IPO, and many firms choose their relationship banks as 
underwriters, the moderated effect of relationship lending for post-IPO loans could be the result of 
exchanging better loan conditions for bond underwriting fees, instead of an informational equalization 
effect. Our sample includes 1,287 loans that were originated after the firms‟ bond IPO, which is a 
sizeable sample. To address this issue, we construct various samples that only incorporate loans 
granted before a firms‟ bond IPOs. If our results are driven by concurrent lending and corporate bond 
underwriting, once we exclude loans borrowed after the bond IPO, the significant results for the 
interaction term Sizeconcenil*IPOil should vanish. We find that this is not the case. Results are 
reported in the Internet Appendix, Table IA.IV.  
 
5. Endogeneity of IPOs and relationship lending 
In the previous sections, we treated the IPO or relationship lending variables as exogenous. However, 
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 For instance, Yasuda (2007) documents that firms in Japan obtain a fee discount when employing relationship banks as 
corporate bond underwriters.  
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they could be endogenous due to unobserved risk factors. We apply recursive bivariate probit models 
to address the potential endogeneity issue of IPOs in Section 5.1, and that of relationship lending in 
Section 5.2. Our results are robust after controlling for these endogeneity concerns.  
 
5.1. Endogeneity of IPOs 
The fact that all of the firms in our sample have eventually completed their IPOs alleviates the 
endogeneity concern of IPOs to some extent. However, selection bias could still be present due to 
unobserved factors. As discussed in section 2, the exact timing of an IPO is to a large extent 
unpredictable for firms, but it is possible that there are uncontrolled factors that could affect both the 
timing of an IPO and collateral. For instance, firms‟ political connections (unobserved to 
econometricians) can speed up the listing process and at the same time lower collateral requirement as 
banks may consider politically connected firms less risky. This omitted variable problem makes the 
IPO variable and its interaction terms with other covariates in Equation (3) correlated with the error 
term in the equations, leading to biased estimates. To address this issue, we follow Wooldridge (2010) 
and implement a recursive bivariate probit model with instrumental variables60. The model is 
estimated with Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Besides consistency and efficiency of the 
MLE, a crucial benefit of this approach is that we can easily estimate the interactions of binary 
endogenous variable with exogenous variables in the structural equation (Wooldridge 2010).61 One 
simply needs to specify that the only source of endogeneity comes from the binary treatment variable, 
treating the interaction terms in the structural equation as if they were exogenous. Specifically, we 
estimate the following model:  
 
                                                             
60
 Since IPO is a binary variable, the traditional two-stage least squares models will produce inconsistent estimators (Greene, 
2008). 
61
 The existence of endogenous interaction terms in the structural equation causes no problem for MLE estimation of the 
bivariate probit model because the density function of the outcome variable is conditional on all exogenous variables and 
endogenous binary variable (or function of endogenous binary variable), therefore the conditional density function is the 
same whether or not endogenous binary variable (or function of endogenous binary variable) enters the structural equation. 
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𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = 1 𝑍1𝛼1 + 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑋1𝛽1 + 𝜀1 > 0 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 = 1 𝑍2𝛾 + 𝜀2 > 0                                                             (4) 
 
where 𝑍1 is a vector of collateral determinants and 𝑋1 contains unity and variables that are allowed 
to be interacted with 𝐼𝑃𝑂. This Collateral Equation is the same as Equation (3). In the IPO Equation, 
𝑍2 contains all variables in 𝑍1 and at least one additional instrumental variable, i.e. it contains some 
exogenous variable that affects listing status, but does not explain collateral except through firm‟s 
listing status62. The error terms are assumed to be bivariate normal distributed with correlation 𝜌, i.e. 
𝜀1 , 𝜀2~∅(0, 0, 1, 1, 𝜌).  
We derive our instrumental variables from CSRC IPO suspensions. By the end of 2013, the 
CSRC has unexpectedly suspended the IPO reviewing and approval process on eight occasions63. 
These suspensions were unforeseeable by banks or borrowers, and therefore can serve as exogenous 
shocks. During these suspension periods, no new IPOs were approved, while firms that had already 
started their IPO applications were forced to stop it. These suspensions affect listing status for at least 
two reasons: firstly, listings will be delayed as the amount of reviewing work for the CSRC to 
complete piles up; and, secondly, some applicants need to prepare their application documents again 
as previous documents expire after the IPO suspension; this is costly and sometimes infeasible for 
firms that have exhausted their resources to boost up their accounting performance.  
Naturally, it is unrealistic to assume that IPO applications are affected by all past CSRC 
suspensions. Only the ones that occur during firms‟ preparation period should affect their IPOs. The 
actual dates when firm started their preparation process are unknown, but the preparation and 
completion of IPO usually takes at least 1 to 3 years. We take the middle value of 2 years prior to 
                                                             
62
 Wilde (2000) shows that exclusion restrictions are not generally needed in a multi-equation probit system and that 
identification is achieved if varying exogenous regressors appear in both equations of the bivarate probit model. Wooldridge 
(2010) however recommends not relying on nonlinearities solely to identify parameters in bivariate probit models.  
63
 By the end of 2013, the CSRC IPO suspension periods are: 1) 1994/7/21-1994/12/7; 2) 1995/1/19-1995/6/9; 3) 
1995/7/5-1996/1/3; 4) 2001/7/31-2001/11/2; 5) 2004/8/26-2005/1/23; 6) 2005/5/25-2006/6/2; 7) 2008/9/16-2009/7/10; 8) 
2012/11/16-2013/12/31.   
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actual listing dates as our cut-off point, which ensures that most of the applicants have started their 
preparation process64. Our first instrument is a dummy variable, Affected_Firms, which equals 1 if 
firms experienced at least one CSRC IPO suspension during the two-year window prior to their actual 
listings. 442 (68% of all firms) firms satisfy this condition, and in total these firms borrowed 6351 
loans (68% of all loans) throughout our sample period. We further calculate the number of IPO 
suspension days within this 2-year window as our second instrument, denoted it as dd_lag2. The 
average suspension days for Affected_Firms are 258 days. For unaffected firms, the number of 
suspension days is zero. To address skewness, we use log(1+dd_lag2) in the estimation.  
The results of the recursive bivariate probit model are reported in Table VI. For comparison 
purpose, Column (1) reproduces the baseline mode of Table IV, Column (3). Column (2) and (3) 
estimate the recursive bivariate probit model using Affected_Firms and log(1+dd_lag2) as instruments, 
respectively. For brevity we report the key results only. Looking at the instrumental variables in the 
IPO Equation, we find the coefficients of Affected_Firms and log(1+dd_lag2) and are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, consistent with our projection that IPO suspensions affect 
listing status. More importantly, after controlling for the endogeneity of IPO, the coefficients of the 
key variables in the structural equation (Collateral Equation) are very similar to the single Probit 
estimation results in Column (1). This result should not come as surprise since the MLE estimates of 
the correlation coefficient 𝜌 are statistically insignificant in both Column (2) and (3), indicating that 
the exogeneity assumption of IPO cannot be rejected, which further justifies our estimations in 
previous sections using a single equation Probit model. 65  
                                                             
64
 Defining a 3-year window does not materially change our results. Results are available upon request.  
65
 The validity of instruments hinges on the assumption that the CSRC IPO suspensions did not influence collateral 
incidence directly. Unfortunately, this assumption is not testable. An informal test of the exclusion restriction can be derived 
by including instrumental variables in the structural equation and test if their coefficients are statistically significant. The 
coefficients of log(1+dd_lag2) and Affected_Firms are -0.009 (p-value 0.22) and -0.03 (p-value 0.53), both of which are 
statistically insignificant. Another caveat is that banks may consider the IPO suspensions as negative shocks to the firms 
involved. Consequently, banks may raise collateral requirements for loans obtained during the suspension periods. This 
could relate IPO suspensions directly to the incidence of collateral, and therefore violate the exclusion restriction. To test this, 
we define a dummy variable Affected_Loans which equals one if loans are obtained by Affected_Firms during the suspension 
periods and zero otherwise. We find that 1,410 loans (or 15% of our sample) satisfy this condition. We re-estimate the 
baseline model (Table IV, Column (3)) including the Affected_Loans dummy. If banks consider the IPO suspensions as 
negative shocks to firms, Affected_Loans should be significantly positive. The coefficient of Affected_Loans is indeed 
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5.2. Endogeneity of relationship lending 
Relationship lending could also be endogenous due to omitted variables affecting both relationship 
formation and collateral66. For instance, firms with poor credit quality (unobserved to econometricians 
but known to competing banks) could only borrow repeatedly from their incumbent banks due to 
limited outside options. Therefore the positive correlation between relationship lending and collateral 
could be the result of unobserved poor credit quality instead of informational rent. We employ a 
recursive bivariate probit model with instrumental variables to address this concern. To implement 
this approach, firstly, we need to transform our continuous measure of relationship lending into a 
binary variable. In a fashion similar to Presbitero and Zazzaro (2011), a relationship dependency 
dummy (𝑅𝑒𝑙) is defined to equal 1 if the firm obtains at least 20% (the sample median of the 
Sizeconcen) of bank loans from the lender prior to the current loan, and 0 otherwise. Secondly, at least 
one exclusion restriction must be imposed, i.e. there exists at least one exogenous variable that 
determines 𝑅𝑒𝑙, but does not affect Collateral except through relationship lending. We use past 
regional average lending rates (Localavrate) as instruments (definition and summary statistics are in 
Table I). A similar approach has been applied in Bharath et al. (2011).67 Localavrate is expected to 
affect relationship lending positively as firms might prefer to borrow from their relationship lenders 
when past conditions in regional (local) credit markets are tight. It is unlikely that past regional 
average lending rates will affect the collateral pledged for current individual loans.68  
Similar to Equation (4), the recursive bivariate probit model is defined by a two-equation 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
positive (0.04, with p-value 0.48), but statistically insignificant. Results of these validity tests are available upon request.  
66
 The self-selection issue of borrowing in concentrated or non-concentrated banking markets is not modeled. This 
self-selection issue is unlikely to be present because cross-regional loans are rare, due to the segmentation of Chinese 
banking markets. Regional banks such as city commercial banks and rural commercial (co-operative) banks mainly serve 
clients located in their own region. It is only recently that some city commercial banks have been allowed to establish 
branches outside their home province to better serve local customers. Banks that operate at the national level such as 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) have a wide distribution of branch 
networks, which allows their local branches to provide loans to local firms. It is unlikely that firms will self-select 
themselves to borrow from banks (branches) outside their home province or in regional markets characterized by specific 
market structures in order to avoid collateral requirements.   
67
 Bharath et al. (2011) invests joint estimations of loan contract terms, employing lagged average lending spread over the 
last six month as instrument for collateral. They argue lagged average lending spread do not necessary affect non-price terms 
such as collateral, based on their conversation with bankers.  
68
 Unreported results show Localavrate is statistically insignificant as a determinant of collateral incidence. Results are 
available upon request.   
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system: a Collateral Equation and a Relationship Equation, where both relationship dependency 
dummy 𝑅𝑒𝑙  and its interaction term with IPO (𝑅𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝑂)  enter Collateral Equation. Other 
covariates in the Collateral Equation correspond to the ones used in Table IV, Column (3). The model 
is identified once the exclusion restriction Localavrate is added to the Relationship Equation, together 
with other determinants of relationship lending69. Results are reported in Table VI, Column (4). The 
estimated correlation between the error terms of the two equations, i.e. 𝜌, is significantly negative 
(-0.508***, p-value is 0.002), rejecting the exogeneity assumption of relationship lending and 
supporting the recursive bivariate probit estimation approach. The coefficient of the instrumental 
variable (Localavrate) in the Relationship Equation is 0.115, significant at 1%, indicating firms in 
provinces with higher past average lending rates are also more likely to borrow from relationship 
lenders. Turning to the Collateral Equation, the estimates controlling endogeneity of relationship 
lending are consistent with the baseline results of Column (1).  
 
6. Further robustness tests 
This section presents further robustness tests accounting for the unobserved firm specific 
time-invariant risks with fixed effect logit model (6.1); the endogeneity of other loan contract terms 
using instrumental (IV) probit model (6.2); and the sensitivity of the results to alternative samples 
(6.3).  Our main results are robust to all these tests. 
 
6.1. Firm fixed effects  
Including firm fixed effects alleviates the concern that unobserved time-invariant risk factors can 
drive our results. As the Probit model is not suitable for fixed effects regressions, we use a fixed 
                                                             
69
 Covariates in the Relationship Equation include firm and loan characteristics, monetary policy and regional 
macroeconomic variables, and fixed effects dummies. Excluding potentially endogenous loan characteristics do not change 
our results. Estimation of the Relationship Equation show firms are more likely to borrow from relationship lenders if they 
are located in concentrated markets, are liquid, smaller, more leveraged, less profitable, have better loan contract terms such 
as longer loan maturities and lower spreads, and if the loan represents a relatively large portion of the firm‟s existing debt 
(Loanconcen). Full results of the recursive bivariate probit model are available upon request. 
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effects Logit model. Table VII reports the full sample results for specifications without potentially 
endogenous loan contract terms (Column (1)) and with those terms (Column (2)). Column (3) and (4) 
replicate these regressions for a sample excluding loans originated after a firm‟s bond IPOs. After 
controlling for firm fixed effects, the impact of relationship intensity on collateral incidence is 
significantly positive for pre-IPO loans, but is statistically insignificant across all specifications for 
post-IPO loans (H0: Sizeconcenil+Sizeconcenil*IPOil=0 cannot be rejected). This result is even 
stronger than that of the baseline model (Column (3) of Table IV), supporting the hypothesis that IPOs 
as an informational shock eliminates rent extraction opportunities. The results for market 
concentration are similar to previous findings, i.e. increasing market concentration increases the 
likelihood of collateral, and this effect is stronger for pre-IPO loans.    
 
6.2. Endogeneity of loan contract terms 
In this subsection we apply instrumental variable (IV) Probit regressions to address the endogeneity 
issue of loan contract terms. We examine two possibilities: exclude Spread from the determinants of 
collateral and treat Maturity as the sole endogenous variable; and treat both Spread and Maturity as 
endogenous variables.70 The instruments chosen for Maturity are asset maturity (Amaturity, Barclay 
et al., 1995) and term spread (Termspread, Dennis et al., 2000 and Brick and Ravid, 1985). For the 
lending spread (Spread), we use as an instrument the benchmark loan spread (Benchsprd = benchmark 
lending rate minus the benchmark deposit rate), and lagged regional average lending rates 
(Localavrate). Benchsprd and Localavrate should be correlated with the lending spread but are not 
likely to be related to whether or not a particular loan is collateralized.71 Summary statistics and 
                                                             
70
 The existing literature differs in treating which of the loan contract terms should be endogenous in determining collateral. 
Dennis et al. (2000) and Bharath et al. (2011) consider Maturity as the only endogenous contract term that affects collateral. 
The underlining assumption is that the lending spread is determined after the decision on collateral pledging. On the other 
hand, Brick and Paila (2007) and Ono and Uesugi (2009) model the spread as an endogenous determinant of collateral. As 
empirical validations are provided for both assumptions and theoretical advantages of either assumption are unknown a 
priori, we examine both. 
71
 Benchsprd and Localavrate may reflect changes in the monetary policy stance or business cycle, which in turn might 
affect the incidence of collateral. See Jiménez et al. (2006). If this were true, these variables cannot serve as valid 
instruments. However, our estimations show that monetary conditions measured by the reserve requirement ratio or 7-day 
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definitions of these instrumental variables are in Panel F of Table I. Technical details, results and the 
relevance and validity of instrumental variables are reported in the Internet Appendix, Section B and 
Table IA.V. We find loan contract terms are indeed endogenous. Nevertheless, the IV probit results are 
largely consistent with previous findings, except that Sizeconcenil loses its explanatory power for 
post-IPO loans (H0:Sizeconcenil+Sizeconcenil*IPOil=0 cannot be rejected, p-value=0.99 or 0.86 
depending on specifications), which is a even stronger result than for the baseline model. Results for 
banking market structure are also similar to previous findings.  
 
6.3. Alternative samples   
Lastly, we investigate in this section if results from the baseline model are sensitive to alternative 
samples. First, we focus on a sample of firms that borrowed at least once before its equity IPO and at 
least once after, which allows us to compare more precisely changes in collateral incidence around 
IPOs. Second, we restrict the sample to loans that were originated right before and after the IPO (e.g. 
one loan before and one loan after); four loans closest to IPO dates (e.g. two before and two after); 
and six loans closest to IPO dates (e.g. three before and three after). These short event windows 
minimize the possibility that significant events other than IPOs affect our results. Results for these 
samples are reported in the Internet Appendix, Table IA.VI. Finally, we investigate if our results are 
driven by non-commercial basis loans. We re-estimate Equation (3) by removing progressively loans 
from policy banks, state-owned banks, trust and investment companies and other financial institutions, 
on the basis that loans from these institutions could be based on policy preferences, political pressure, 
or other non-standard credit criteria. Results are reported in the Internet Appendix, Table IA.VII. Our 
main findings are solid in almost all of these samples.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
repo rate, or the business cycle measured by regional GDP growth rates, do not impact significantly on collateral incidence, 
as reported in most of our tables. 
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7. Conclusions  
In this paper, we investigate whether proprietary information obtained from both lending relationship 
and banking market concentration allow for informational rent through collateral. We find collateral 
incidence increases with both relationship lending and market concentration, and these effects are less 
pronounced for transparent firms. Using equity IPOs as informational shocks, we find that collateral 
incidence increases with both relationship intensity and market concentration for pre-IPO loans, while 
these effects are greatly moderated for post-IPO loans. Furthermore, we demonstrate that following an 
IPO, rent extraction through collateral is moderated for safe firms but intensified for risky firms, a 
result in line with the prediction of Rajan (1992). Further robustness tests suggest that our results are 
not caused by differences in credit risks, the possible endogeneity of IPOs and relationship lending, 
concurrent lending and underwriting, or non-commercial basis loans. Our results complement the 
finding that banks extract informational rents by charging higher lending rates (Hale and Santos, 2009; 
Schenone, 2009), and in part validate the theoretical predictions that concentrated market structure 
facilitates accumulation of inside information (Dell‟Ariccia et al., 1999; Dell‟Ariccia, 2001). Finally, 
we provide the first loan-level analysis on collateral for China, which has received little attention so 
far.  
Our study opens up a few avenues for future research. A cross-country investigation of rent 
extraction through collateral could be fruitful. Rent extraction through collateral may be more likely 
to be observed in less developed markets where banks lack sufficient tools to price credit risks. 
Another possibility is to check if banks choose methods to charge rents (either through lending rates 
or collateral) depending on price regulation or monetary policy. A third avenue is to investigate how 
rent extraction through collateral could vary with the legal and institutional environment, as these 
aspects crucially determine how valuable collateral is to banks. We leave these issues for future 
research.  
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Table I: Summary statistics and variable definition 
 
Variable Definition N Mean S.D Min Max 
Panel A: Market structure 
ACR4 The market share (in terms of assets) of the top four banks in the province. 
Measured at one semi-accounting year prior to current loan. 
9288 0.55 0.06 0.35 0.97 
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets in millions of RMB deflated to year 2006 
value. Measured at one semi-accounting year prior to current loan.   
8779 7.67 1.16 4.01 12.72 
 
Leverage Outstanding debt/total assets, measured at one semi-accounting year prior to 
current loan. 
8779 0.56 0.19 0.02 2.37 
 
ROA 
Return on assets, measured at one semi-accounting year prior to current loan. 8779 0.06 0.07 -0.44 1.71 
 
Age Natural log of firm age. Firm age is the difference in months between the 
firm‟s establishment date and the loan initiation date. 
9288 5.03 0.40 2.77 6.62 
 
Tangibility (Net property, plants and equipment)/total assets, measured at one 
semi-accounting year prior to current loan. 
8779 0.27 0.19 0.00 0.92 
 
FT = 1 if majority stake is owned by the State, and 0 otherwise. 9288 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Liquidity Current assets/total assets, measured at one semi-accounting year prior to 
current loan. 
8779 0.55 0.23 0.01 1 
 
Loanconcen Loan concentration ratio. Defined as Loansize / (Loansize and debt 
outstanding). 
8779 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.93 
 
IPO = 1 if loan is issued after the IPO, and 0 otherwise. 9288 0.83 0.37 0 1 
Panel C: Loan characteristics  
Collateral = 1 if loan is secured by collateral, and 0 otherwise. 9288 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Maturity Natural log of loan maturity. Measured in months. 9288 3.25 0.79 0.00 5.70 
Spread Difference between lending rate and benchmark deposit rate of corresponding 
maturity. Measured in percentage. 
9288 2.85 1.21 0.71 13.60 
 
Loansize Natural log of loan size. Measured in millions of RMB deflated to year 2006 
value. 
9288 3.13 1.41 -3.70 8.97 
 
Panel D: Relationship variables 
Numlender Number of different lenders the firm has borrowed from prior to origination 
of current loan. 
9288 3.93 3.45 0 28 
 
Sizeconcen The amount of loans that a firm has borrowed from its current lender as a 
proportion of the total amount of loans it obtained prior to the current loan.  
9288 0.33 0.35 0 1 
 
Numconcen The number of loans that a firm has borrowed from its current lender as a 
proportion of the total number of loans it borrowed prior to the current loan. 
9288 0.34 0.34 0 1 
 
First = 1if the current loan is the first loan borrowed from this lender, and 0 
otherwise. 
9288 0.24 0.43 0 1 
 
Switch = 1 if the current loan is borrowed from the same lender as the previous loan, 
and 0 otherwise. 
9288 0.40 0.49 0 1 
 
Panel E: Monetary and regional macroeconomic variables 
RRR Reserve Requirement Ratio for the month when the loan is issued.  9288 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.21 
Repo 7-day repo rate for the month when the loan is issued, in percentage.  9288 2.55 1.21 0.94 6.92 
CPI Provincial consumer price index, measured at one semi-account year prior to 
current loan.  
9288 1.03 0.03 0.98 1.10 
 
NPLratio Provincial non-Performing loan ratio, measured at one semi-account year 
prior to current loan. 
9288 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.21 
 
Realgdpindex Provincial real GDP growth rate, measured at one semi-account year prior to 9288 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.18 
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current loan 
Panel F: Instrumental variables 
Amaturity ((current assets/total assets)*(current assets/cost of goods sold)+(fixed 
assets/total assets)*(fixed assets/depreciation))/1000 
9288 10.68 6.64 0.18 55.33 
 
dd_lag2 
The number of CSRC IPO suspension days during the 2-year window prior to 
listing date.  
9288 188.6 168.8 0 523 
Affected_Firms 
Dummy variable equals 1 if firm experienced at least one CSRC IPO 
suspension during the 2-year window prior to listing date.  
9288 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Termspread Yield difference between 5-year Treasury bond and 1-year Treasury bond, for 
the month when the loan is issued, in percentage. 
9288 0.86 0.44 -0.19 1.54 
 
Localavrate People‟s Bank of China reports on a yearly basis the percentage of loans that 
are issued below/at/above the corresponding benchmark rate. The actual 
lending rate to benchmark rate ratio is classified in seven groups: [0.9,1], [1], 
[1.0-1.1], [1.1-1.3],[1.3-1.5],[1.5-2.0] and [above 2.0]. We take the middle 
value of each group and calculate the weighted average ratio using the 
percentage of loans within each group as weight. This weighted average is 
then multiplied with the one-year reference rate to calculate the regional 
average lending rates. Measured at one semi-account year prior to the current 
loan. In percentage. 
9288 6.79 0.94 5.14 9.88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benchsprd Benchmark lending rate minus benchmark deposit rate of corresponding 
maturity, for the month the loan is issued. In percentage. 
9288 2.42 0.55 1.4 3.78 
 
Panel G: Additional variables 
Numalst 
Number of analysts following the firms measured at one semi-accounting year 
before loan origination. 
7719 11.01 10.90 0 66 
Instishare 
Percentage of shares held by institutional investors measured at one 
semi-accounting year before loan origination, in percentage. 
7367 29.07 22.03 0 96.33 
Multiapp 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm applied for its IPO multiple times before 
eventually listed, and 0 if succeeded in the first IPO application. 
9288 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Affected_Loans 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the loan is borrowed by firms that experienced 
CSRC IPO suspension during the suspension periods. 
9288 0.15 0.36 0 1 
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Table II: Univariate tests 
 
 Panel A: Sizeconcen  Panel B: ACR4  Panel C: IPO 
 <Median >=Median Mean diff <Median >=Median Mean diff Pre-IPO Post-IPO Mean diff 
Relationship variables 
Sizeconcen -- -- -- 0.32 0.35 -0.02*** 0.40 0.32 0.08*** 
Numconcen 0.22 0.73 -0.51*** 0.33 0.35 -0.02*** 0.41 0.33 0.08*** 
Numlender 4.65 3.21 1.44*** 4.41 3.46 0.96*** 2.17 4.29 -2.11*** 
Market structure 
ACR4 0.55 0.55 -0.00* - - - 0.56 0.55 0.01*** 
Loan characteristics 
Collateral 0.66 0.66 -0.00 0.62 0.70 -0.08*** 0.86 0.62 0.24*** 
Maturity 3.19 3.32 -0.13*** 3.26 3.25 0.00 3.12 3.28 -0.16*** 
Spread 2.99 2.70 0.30*** 2.87 2.82 0.04* 2.85 2.85 0.01 
Loansize 3.19 3.07 0.12*** 3.17 3.10 0.08** 2.32 3.30 -0.97*** 
Firm characteristics 
FT 0.42 0.39 -0.03** 0.42 0.39 0.03*** 0.11 0.46 -0.35*** 
Liquidity 0.55 0.54 0.01* 0.60 0.50 0.10*** 0.58 0.54 0.04*** 
Total Assets 7.76 7.58 0.18*** 7.81 7.53 0.28*** 6.32 7.85 -1.53*** 
Leverage 0.57 0.55 0.02*** 0.55 0.57 -0.02*** 0.55 0.56 -0.00 
ROA 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.07 -0.00 0.15 0.05 0.09*** 
Age 5.04 5.02 0.02*** 5.06 5.00 0.06*** 4.70 5.10 -0.40*** 
Tangibility 0.27 0.27 -0.01* 0.24 0.31 -0.07*** 0.27 0.27 -0.01 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table III: Collateral determinants and borrower information transparency 
Panel A shows the results for the estimation of Equation (1). M.E are the marginal effects calculated on the basis of the results in Column (1). Panel B 
estimates Equation (2). It reports the impact of 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑙  and 𝐴𝐶𝑅4𝑖𝑙  on collateral incidence differentiated by the informational transparency of 
borrowers (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑙), which is defined by three proxies: Borrower ownership (FT=1 if state owned and 0 otherwise); Listed Board (Listmain=1 if 
listed in the main board and 0 otherwise); and Firm Size ( Medianta=1if log(total assets) is above the provincial median and 0 otherwise). Panel C 
estimates Equation (2) using stock market information production (Numalst and Instishare) as measures of informational transparency of borrowers. 
The sample is restricted to post-IPO loans for Column (6) and (7). In all panels, the control variables include firm characteristics, loan contract terms, 
monetary policy variables, regional macroeconomic variables and a set of fixed effects, including Industry, Province, Banktype and Loan-year 
dummies. In column (2), Maturity and Spread are excluded for endogeneity concerns. Removing these terms in Panel B and C do not affect our 
results, which are available upon request. Results for fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. The equations are estimated with the 
Probit model. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Panel A: Main Effects  Panel B: Borrower Information 
Transparency 
Panel C: Stock Market 
Infor Production 
 With 
contract 
terms 
Without 
contract 
terms 
M.E of 
model (1) 
(%) 
Board of 
listing 
Ownership Firm size Numalst Instishare 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sizeconcen 0.153** 0.170** 1.40 0.231*** 0.256*** 0.287*** 0.209** 0.277*** 
 (0.068) (0.068)  (0.085) (0.082) (0.076) (0.088) (0.097) 
ACR4 2.685*** 2.623*** 4.45 3.826*** 3.463*** 3.482*** 4.912*** 4.897*** 
 (0.805) (0.802)  (0.895) (0.858) (0.832) (0.901) (0.924) 
Listmain*Sizeconcen    -0.129     
    (0.098)     
FT*Sizeconcen     -0.203**    
     (0.098)    
Medianta*Sizeconcen      -0.390***   
      (0.102)   
Numalst*Sizeconcen       -0.010**  
       (0.005)  
Instishare*Sizeconcen        -0.770*** 
        (0.240) 
Listmain*ACR4    -1.664***     
    (0.616)     
FT*ACR4     -1.603***    
     (0.619)    
Medianta*ACR4      -2.051***   
      (0.571)   
Numalst*ACR4       -0.149***  
       (0.032)  
Instishare*ACR4        -4.924*** 
        (1.318) 
Listmain    0.705**     
    (0.346)     
Medianta      1.334***   
      (0.316)   
Numalst       0.074***  
       (0.017)  
Instishare        2.574*** 
        (0.722) 
FT -0.606*** -0.594*** -16.7 -0.565*** 0.335 -0.618*** -0.597*** -0.568*** 
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 (0.047) (0.046)  (0.048) (0.340) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) 
First 0.036 0.049 0.94 0.048 0.044 0.019 -0.030 -0.042 
 (0.056) (0.055)  (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) 
Switch -0.028 -0.064 -0.75 -0.033 -0.028 -0.023 -0.020 -0.023 
 (0.039) (0.039)  (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) 
IPO -0.412*** -0.387*** -10.39 -0.322*** -0.391*** -0.405***   
 (0.071) (0.071)  (0.073) (0.071) (0.071)   
Numlender 0.024*** 0.018** 2.13 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Liquidity -0.458*** -0.545*** -2.76 -0.504*** -0.447*** -0.375** -0.558*** -0.689*** 
 (0.155) (0.153)  (0.156) (0.155) (0.155) (0.168) (0.167) 
Size -0.221*** -0.215*** -7.29 -0.191*** -0.222*** -0.233*** -0.163*** -0.217*** 
 (0.027) (0.027)  (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) 
Leverage 0.941*** 1.049*** 4.53 1.040*** 0.926*** 0.951*** 0.891*** 0.963*** 
 (0.127) (0.126)  (0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.138) (0.137) 
ROA -1.134*** -1.084*** -2.22 -1.124*** -1.102*** -1.160*** -0.583* -0.704** 
 (0.277) (0.282)  (0.279) (0.278) (0.276) (0.330) (0.325) 
Age -0.415*** -0.432*** -4.50 -0.331*** -0.419*** -0.409*** -0.385*** -0.422*** 
 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.064) (0.064) 
Tangibility -0.852*** -0.891*** -4.43 -0.893*** -0.855*** -0.782*** -1.028*** -1.021*** 
 (0.179) (0.178)  (0.180) (0.179) (0.179) (0.189) (0.188) 
Maturity 0.169***  3.39 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.171*** 0.187*** 0.200*** 
 (0.028)   (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) 
Spread 0.031*  1.00 0.036** 0.031* 0.035** 0.021 0.023 
 (0.017)   (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Loansize -0.089*** -0.070*** -3.37 -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.095*** -0.095*** 
 (0.020) (0.020)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Loanconcen 1.830*** 1.921*** 3.37 1.956*** 1.804*** 1.866*** 1.779*** 1.672*** 
 (0.413) (0.408)  (0.410) (0.414) (0.415) (0.440) (0.434) 
RRR -0.071 -0.021 -0.05 0.050 -0.202 -0.188 0.645 0.422 
 (2.902) (2.884)  (2.909) (2.904) (2.907) (3.068) (3.068) 
Repo 0.048* 0.045* 1.51 0.044 0.048* 0.050* 0.054* 0.047* 
 (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) 
CPI 1.475 2.003 1.04 1.241 1.320 1.518 2.608 2.614 
 (1.510) (1.501)  (1.514) (1.513) (1.513) (1.601) (1.597) 
NPLratio -0.535 -0.647 -0.42 -0.305 -0.526 -0.685 -0.414 -0.121 
 (1.135) (1.132)  (1.137) (1.135) (1.140) (1.183) (1.179) 
Realgdpindex 1.097 1.548 1.00 0.763 0.787 0.975 1.606 1.198 
 (1.435) (1.429)  (1.441) (1.442) (1.439) (1.500) (1.496) 
Constant -0.566 -0.644  -1.577 -0.850 -1.123 -7.478 -6.924 
 (1.874) (1.869)  (1.888) (1.879) (1.884) (106.776) (106.273) 
Observations 8,741 8,753  8,741 8,741 8,741 7,620 7,620 
Pseudo R2 0.287 0.283  0.289 0.288 0.290 0.291 0.291 
H0:Sizeconcen+Infor*Sizeconcen=0    0.102 0.052 -0.103   
H0: ACR4+Infor*ACR4=0    2.162*** 1.860** 1.431   
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Table IV: Identify informational rents through IPOs  
This table reports estimates based on various versions of Equation (3). Column (1) to Column (3) add the interaction terms Sizeconcenil*IPOil and 
ACR4il*IPOil progressively. Column (4) excludes the potentially endogenous contract terms Spread and Maturity and re-estimates Column (3). M.E. 
are marginal effects based on Column (3). For variables interacting with IPOil, we report marginal effects of said variable from before and after the 
IPO. Results for control variables and fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) M.E. of Model (3) 
Sizeconcen 0.493** 0.169** 0.596*** 0.604*** 4.78 
 (0.215) (0.069) (0.218) (0.218)  
ACR4 2.806*** 5.617*** 5.935*** 5.931*** 8.51 
 (0.807) (1.201) (1.216) (1.211)  
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.369  -0.471** -0.463** 1.17 
 (0.226)  (0.229) (0.228)  
ACR4*IPO  -3.218*** -3.503*** -3.574*** 4.15 
  (1.000) (1.016) (1.012)  
First 0.423** 0.203 0.478** 0.462** 10.78 
 (0.194) (0.143) (0.195) (0.195)  
First*IPO -0.430** -0.190 -0.485** -0.454** -0.19 
 (0.201) (0.144) (0.203) (0.203)  
Switch 0.177 0.153 0.175 0.133 4.14 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126)  
Switch*IPO -0.218* -0.189 -0.215 -0.207 -1.06 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132)  
Numlender -0.000 -0.023 0.009 -0.002 0.78 
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033)  
Numlender*IPO 0.025 0.051* 0.016 0.021 2.34 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034)  
IPO -0.132 1.396** 1.914*** 1.951*** -7.13 
 (0.206) (0.572) (0.627) (0.626)  
Constant -1.063 -2.417 -2.936 -3.025  
 (1.886) (1.946) (1.964) (1.959)  
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank Type, Time  
Other loan contract terms Yes Yes Yes No  
Controls variables firm characteristics, monetary policy and regional macro variables  
Observations 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,753  
Pseudo R2 0.288 0.289 0.289 0.285  
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.124*  0.124* 0.141**  
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0  2.399*** 2.431*** 2.357***  
H0:First+First*IPO=0 -0.007 0.013 -0.007 0.008  
H0:Switch+Switch*IPO=0 -0.041 -0.036 -0.039 -0.074*  
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Table V: Informational rents and firm risk 
This table investigates how informational rents vary with firm risk. Firm risk is proxied by a dummy variable Multiapp that equals one if the firm 
applied multiple times before eventually being listed, and zero if being listed in its first IPO application. Column (1) tests the main effect of Multiapp. 
Column (2) introduces three-way interaction terms among informational rent variables (Sizeconcen and ACR4), listing status (IPO) and Multiapp. For 
these two columns, other control variables are the same as in Table III (Column (1)). Column (3) and (4) removes progressively loan contract terms 
and monetary and regional macroeconomic variables. Results of control variables and fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sizeconcen 0.600*** 0.634*** 0.648*** 0.646*** 
 (0.219) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
ACR4 5.979*** 6.073*** 6.081*** 5.741*** 
 (1.217) (1.254) (1.249) (1.226) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.476** -0.532** -0.526** -0.526** 
 (0.229) (0.236) (0.235) (0.235) 
ACR4*IPO -3.558*** -4.368*** -4.441*** -4.419*** 
 (1.016) (1.060) (1.055) (1.054) 
Multiapp 0.286*** 0.730 0.925 0.820 
 (0.094) (2.131) (2.093) (2.098) 
Sizeconcen*Multiapp  -0.462 -0.497 -0.510 
  (0.471) (0.465) (0.465) 
ACR4*Multiapp  -1.493 -1.856 -1.647 
  (3.676) (3.608) (3.617) 
Multiapp*IPO  -4.872** -4.873** -4.791** 
  (2.364) (2.327) (2.331) 
Sizeconcen*Multiapp*IPO  0.944* 0.959* 0.974* 
  (0.552) (0.546) (0.546) 
ACR4*Multapp*IPO  9.315** 9.305** 9.143** 
  (4.085) (4.019) (4.026) 
IPO 1.962*** 2.347*** 2.384*** 2.379*** 
 (0.627) (0.650) (0.647) (0.647) 
Constant -2.854 -2.794 -2.904 -0.632 
 (1.963) (1.972) (1.967) (0.925) 
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank Type, Time 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other loan contract terms Yes Yes No No 
Monetary policy variables Yes Yes Yes No 
Regional macro variables Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 8,741 8,741 8,753 8,753 
Pseudo R2 0.290 0.293 0.289 0.289 
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Table VI: Bivariate Probit Models 
This table reports the results of recursive Bivariate Probit models with instrumental variables. Column (1) replicates the Probit model results of Table 
IV, column (3) for comparison purposes. Column (2) and (3) treat IPO as endogenous variable. Column (4) treats relationship lending dummy Rel as 
endogenous variable, where Rel is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm obtains at least 20% (i.e. the sample median of the Sizeconcen) of bank loans 
from the lender prior to the current loan, and 0 otherwise. In all specifications, the variables in the Collateral Equation correspond to the ones used in 
Table IV, column (3), except that in Column (4) where Sizeconcen and Sizeconcen*IPO are replaced by Rel and Rel*IPO, respectively. Variables in 
the IPO Equation include one instrument (Affected_Firms or Log(1+dd_lag2)) and all variables in the Collateral Equation, except IPO and its 
interaction terms with other covariates. Variables in the Relationship Equation include one instrument (Localavrate) and all variables in the Collateral 
Equation, except Rel, Rel*IPO, relationship control variables (Relcontrols defined in section 2.1.1), and their interactions with IPO. The instrumental 
variables are defined as following: Affected_Firms is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has experienced at least one CSRC IPO suspension within 
the 2-year window prior to the firm‟s actual listing; Log(1+dd_lag2) is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of CSRC IPO suspension days within the 
2-year window prior to the firm‟s actual listing; Localavrate is the regional average lending rate one semi-accounting year before the current loan. 
Full results of Bivariate Probit models are available upon request. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Probit  Bivariate probit  
IPO as endogenous 
Bivariate Probit  
Rel as endogenous 
IV: Affected_Firms IV: Log(1+dd_lag2) IV: Localavrate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Collateral Equation 
Sizeconcen (Rel) 0.596*** 0.589*** 0.589*** 1.314*** 
 (0.218) (0.217) (0.217) (0.247) 
ACR4 5.935*** 5.873*** 5.848*** 4.999*** 
 (1.216) (1.214) (1.214) (1.178) 
Sizeconcen*IPO (Rel*IPO) -0.471** -0.460** -0.460** -0.521*** 
 (0.229) (0.228) (0.228) (0.148) 
ACR4*IPO -3.503*** -3.487*** -3.469*** -3.198*** 
 (1.016) (1.013) (1.012) (0.935) 
IPO Equation 
Affected_Firms  -0.681***   
  (0.094)   
Log(1+dd_lag2)   -0.080***  
   (0.016)  
Relationship Equation 
Localavrate    0.115*** 
    (0.040) 
𝜌  -0.129 (p=0.12) -0.114 (p=0.17) -0.508***(p=0.002) 
Observations 8741 8,765 8,765 8765 
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Table VII: Firm fixed effects 
This table reports the results for the fixed effects Logit model for alternative samples, and for specifications with and without loan contract terms. 
Results for firm characteristics and fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. Monetary policy variables and regional macro variables are 
not included in this estimation. Including them does not change our results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Fixed effects Logit model 
 All loans Loans originated before corporate bond IPOs 
 Without loan contract 
terms 
With loan contract 
terms 
Without loan contract 
terms 
With loan contract 
terms 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sizeconcen 1.645*** 1.634*** 1.750*** 1.713*** 
 (0.543) (0.544) (0.542) (0.543) 
ACR4 23.247*** 24.007*** 23.356*** 24.055*** 
 (5.305) (5.284) (5.337) (5.309) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -1.472*** -1.453** -1.774*** -1.722*** 
 (0.564) (0.565) (0.567) (0.568) 
ACR4*IPO -17.824*** -18.051*** -19.251*** -19.548*** 
 (5.210) (5.177) (5.209) (5.169) 
First 1.074*** 1.080*** 1.292*** 1.287*** 
 (0.389) (0.388) (0.397) (0.395) 
First*IPO -1.209*** -1.199*** -1.547*** -1.527*** 
 (0.400) (0.399) (0.410) (0.408) 
Switch 0.407 0.448 0.325 0.374 
 (0.300) (0.299) (0.303) (0.302) 
Switch*IPO -0.472 -0.476 -0.365 -0.368 
 (0.311) (0.310) (0.316) (0.315) 
Numlender 0.023 0.033 0.063** 0.075** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
IPO 10.171*** 10.272*** 10.954*** 11.097*** 
 (2.978) (2.959) (2.978) (2.954) 
Observations 5,856 5,851 4,816 4,811 
Number of firms 291 291 255 255 
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.142 0.138 0.144 
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.173 0.181 -0.024 -0.009 
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0 5.423*** 5.967*** 4.105* 4.506* 
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Internet Appendix for “Do banks extract informational rents 
through collateral?” 
 
 
 
This appendix provides technical details and results of the propensity score matching analysis 
(Section 4.2) and the instrumental variable Probit model (Section 6.2). Results of propensity score 
matching analysis are reported in Table IA.II and Table IA.III. Results controlling for endogeneity of 
loan contract terms are reported in Table IA.V. Moreover, details and results are reported of several 
additional tests discussed in Section 4.2 (“difference-in-difference” tests, Table IA.I.) and Section 4.3 
(corporate bond underwriting and concurrent lending, Table IA.IV), and for alternative samples such 
as conducted in Section 6.3 (Table IA.VI-VII).  
 
A.  Propensity score matching 
This section presents the technical details of propensity score matching (e.g. Heckman et al., 1998). 
We divide our sample into two subsamples: pre-IPO loans and post-IPO loans, with the former 
presumably subjected to a higher degree of information asymmetries for non-relationship banks. 
Within each subsample, we estimate the propensity score of loans borrowed from relationship lenders 
using a Logit model. Specifically, for each sample, we regress the relationship dummy on the 
following covariates: ACR4, FT, Liquidity, Size, Leverage, ROA, Age and Tangibility.72 For the sake 
of robustness, we further expand the covariates list by introducing their square terms.73 Relationship 
dummies equal one if Sizeconcen is greater or equal to the sample median of the respective samples 
(0.25 for the pre-IPO sample and 0.19 for the post-IPO sample, respectively). Then we match each 
relationship loan (treatment group) with a (set) of non-relationship loans (control group) that have the 
                                                             
72
 Estimates on propensity scores are available upon request. 
73
 The main purpose of propensity score estimation is not to predict selection into treatment as good as possible, but to 
balance all covariates (Augurzky and Schmidt, 2000). 
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closest propensity scores to that specific relationship loan. The average treatment effects of 
relationship intensity on collateral incidence are expected to be significantly positive for the pre-IPO 
loans, and moderated or insignificant for the post-IPO loans.  
To compute the average treatment effects, two alternative matching methods are used, i.e. 
“nearest neighbor” matching and “kernel” matching. We drop all loans that are outside of the common 
support to minimize the potential bias introduced by these loans. Bootstrap standard errors based on 
50 replications are reported.  
Next, we test the balancing property of covariates. The estimated average treatment effects are 
biased if the covariates determining participation in the treatment group are not sufficiently balanced. 
The standardized bias of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) is a common statistic to test the balance of the 
distribution of the covariates in both the control and treatment groups. For brevity, we only report the 
mean bias of the matched sample.74 Several other overall balancing tests including the pseudo-R2, 
Rubin‟s B and Rubin‟s R are also reported. All of these diagnoses confirm that the covariates of the 
matched sample are balanced. In more detail: the mean bias for the matched sample is below the 5% 
threshold; the pseudo-R2 for the matched sample is fairly low; Rubin‟s B is below 25 thresholds for 
most of the cases, and Rubin‟s R is within [0.5, 2].75 Results are reported in the Internet Appendix 
Table IA.II.  
Finally, we test the sensitivity of our results to unobserved variables that affect both 
relationship lending and collateral incidence. Rosenbaum (2002) developed a bounding approach to 
address whether or not inference about treatment effects may be affected by unobserved factors. We 
focus on pre-IPO loans, because as noted by Hujer et al. (2004), sensitivity analysis for insignificant 
treatment effects is not meaningful. Results are reported in Internet Appendix Table IA.III. Taking into 
account that the estimated treatment effect is positive for pre-IPO loans, the lower bounds (Q_mh-) – 
under the assumption that the true treatment effect has been underestimated – are less interesting 
                                                             
74
 The standardized biases of individual covariates are available upon request.  
75
 Sianesi (2004) suggests that a low pseudo-R2 for the post matching sample is an indicator of balanced matching. Rubin‟s 
B is the absolute standardized difference of the means of the linear index of the propensity score in the treated and matched 
sample. Rubin‟s R is the ratio of treated to matched variances of the propensity score index. Rubin (2001) recommends that 
Rubin‟s B is less than 25 and Rubin‟s R lies between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be sufficiently balanced. 
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(Becker and Caliendo, 2007). Therefore, we focus on the upper bounds (Q_mh+). We report the 
Rosenbaum bounds for propensity score model II with the nearest neighbor matching (NN(20)). The 
results for the bounds are similar for propensity score model I and other matching methods. The 
critical level eγ, at which one would question the positive effect of relationship lending on collateral 
incidence, is 1.85, a fairly large value by normal standards (see e.g. Bharath et al., 2011, for further 
discussion). Note that a critical value of 1.85 does not mean that relationship lending has no effect on 
collateral incidence and that unobserved heterogeneity exists. It only states that the confidence 
interval for the treatment effect would include zero if unobserved variables caused the odds ratio of 
relationship lending to differ between relationship borrowers and non-relationship borrowers by a 
factor 1.85. We conclude that it is unlikely that our causal inference of the positive effect of 
relationship lending on collateral incidence for pre-IPO loans could be challenged by powerful 
unobserved variables.      
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B. Endogeneity of loan contract terms: IV Probit model 
This section addresses the endogeneity issue of loan contract terms using IV Probit estimations. We 
examine two possibilities: exclude Spread from the determinants of collateral and treat Maturity as the 
sole endogenous variable; and treat both Spread and Maturity as endogenous variables.76 Our choices 
of instruments are guided by the existing literature and the specific characteristics of Chinese banking 
regulation. For Maturity, we follow Barclay et al. (1995) and employ asset maturity (Amaturity) as 
instrument, as firms may match their debt maturity with that of their assets to mitigate agency costs.77 
In addition, as proposed in Dennis et al. (2000) and Brick and Ravid (1985), loan maturity is expected 
to be positively related to the slope of the yield curve, proxied by the term spread (Termspread). This 
spread is defined as the yield difference between the 5- and 1-year government bonds for the month 
when the loan was originated. Regarding the lending spread, we use as instrument the benchmark loan 
spread (Benchsprd) for maturities that correspond with that of loan l in the month of the loan 
origination (Benchsprd = benchmark lending rate minus the benchmark deposit rate). Another 
instrument we introduce is the lagged regional average lending rate (Localavrate), measured at one 
semi-accounting year before the current loan. Benchsprd and Localavrate should be correlated with 
the actual lending spread, but they are not likely to be related to whether a particular loan is 
collateralized or not. Summary statistics and definitions of these instrumental variables are in Panel F 
of Table I.  
Results of the IV Probit model are reported in Internet Appendix, Table IA.V. Column (1) 
excludes Spread from the determinants of collateral and treats Maturity as the sole endogenous 
variable, whereas Column (2) treats both Spread and Maturity as endogenous variables. Newey‟s 
                                                             
76
 The existing literature differs in treating which of the loan contract terms should be endogenous in determining collateral. 
Dennis et al. (2000) and Bharath et al. (2011) consider Maturity as the only endogenous contract term that affects collateral 
incidence. The underlining assumption is that the lending spread is determined after the decision on collateral pledging. On 
the other hand, Brick and Paila (2007) and Ono and Uesugi (2009) model the spread as an endogenous determinant of 
collateral. As empirical validations are provided for both assumptions and theoretical advantages of either assumption are 
unknown a priori, we examine both. 
77
 Bharath et al. (2011) and Barclay et al. (2003) provide in-depth discussions of the validity of using asset maturity as an 
instrument for debt maturity. We follow Li et al. (2009) in defining asset maturity. See Table I, Panel F for definitions. 
Missing data for asset maturity is replaced by the industry median. 
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efficient two-step estimator is employed to obtain coefficient estimates for both specifications. The 
relevance and validity of our instruments in the IV Probit model are reported at the bottom rows.78 In 
both Column (1) and (2), the null hypotheses that Maturity alone or Maturity and Spread together are 
exogenous are strongly rejected (Wald-test p-value=0.0192 and 0.0000, respectively), validating the 
IV Probit approach. Nevertheless, the IV Probit results are largely consistent with our previous 
findings, except that Sizeconcenil loses its explanatory power for post-IPO loans 
(H0:Sizeconcenil+Sizeconcenil*IPOil=0 cannot be rejected, p-value=0.99 or 0.86 depending on 
specifications), which is an even stronger result than the one obtained in our baseline model. Results 
for market structure are also similar to our previous findings. The results of the conditional 
likelihood-ratio (CLR) test, K test and Anderson-Rubin Chi square test (AR) all reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are (jointly) 
zero. We also conduct the J statistics test, which assesses the validity of the instruments, i.e. the null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. In both Column (1) and (2), the 
J statistics are statistically insignificant, confirming the validity of our instruments for the endogenous 
loan contract term Maturity, or for both Maturity and Spread.  
 
  
                                                             
78
 See Finlay and Magnusson (2009) for details on weak instrument robustness tests for limited dependent variable models.  
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Table IA.I Difference-in-Difference  
This table reports the difference-in-difference tests in key risk factors for post- and pre-IPO samples (post-IPO-pre-IPO) and for both relationship 
dependent and non-dependent firms. Relationship dependent firms are the ones with Sizeconcen greater or equal to the sample median, while the rest 
are non-dependent firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Mean differences (post-IPO-pre-IPO) 
 ROA Leverage Tangibility Liquidity Size Maturity Spread Loansize 
Relationship dependent Firms -0.03*** 0.21*** 0.08*** 0.23*** 4.04*** 0.14** 0.25** 1.06*** 
Relationship non-dependent firms -0.05*** 0.20*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 3.94*** 0.19*** -0.06 0.83*** 
Difference-in-Differences -0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.08*** -0.11 0.04 0.19 -0.23 
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Table IA.II: Selection of observables – Propensity score matching on relationship lending.  
This table reports average treatment effects of relationship lending on collateral incidence for pre-IPO and post-IPO loans. Propensity Score Model I 
in Panel A employs the following variables: ACR4, FT, Liquidity, Size, Leverage, ROA, Age and Tangibility. The Propensity Score Model II in Panel 
B includes all variables used in Panel A and the square terms of these variables (except the square term of FT). Logit regression is adopted in both 
panels. Bootstrap standard errors based on 50 replications are reported. NN(20) and NN(50) are the nearest neighbor matching estimators with 20 and 
50 nearest neighbors. Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.06 is applied for the kernel matching estimator. Observations of common support are 
discarded. All balancing tests are based on matched samples. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Panel A: Propensity Score Model I 
Pre-IPO loans Post-IPO loans 
 
NN(20) NN(50) Kernel NN(20) NN(50) Kernel 
ATE 0.126*** 0.116*** 0.115*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 
Std.Err. (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Mean Bias 4.7 3.2 4.3 3.1 2.5 2.0 
Rubin‟s B  17.6 15.0 18.3 10.7 9.5 8.0 
Rubin‟s R 0.99 1.16 1.01 1.28 1.46 1.36 
Panel B: Propensity Score Model II 
ATE 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.108*** 0.007 -0.002 0.002 
Std.Err. (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) 
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Mean Bias 3.3 4.4 3.3 1.8 1.4 1.9 
Rubin‟s B  27.0* 27.4* 20.2 11.0 11.2 9.8 
Rubin‟s R 1.16 1.23 1.04 1.42 1.41 1.44 
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Table IA.III: Sensitivity test-Rosenbaum bounds. 
This table reports results for the Rosenbaum bounds test for Propensity Score Model II with nearest neighbor matching (NN(20)). eγ is the odds of 
differential assignment due to unobserved factors. Q_mh+ and Q_mh- are the upper and lower bounds of the Mantel-Haenszel statistic. With 
increasing eγ, the bounds move apart, reflecting uncertainty about the test-statistics in the presence of hidden bias. p_mh+ and p_mh- are significance 
levels for upper and lower bounds.  
 
eγ Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 4.51  4.51  0.00  0.00  
1.05 4.24  4.78  0.00  0.00  
1.1 3.98  5.04  0.00  0.00  
1.15 3.74  5.29  0.00  0.00  
1.2 3.51  5.53  0.00  0.00  
1.25 3.29  5.77  0.00  0.00  
1.3 3.07  6.00  0.00  0.00  
1.35 2.87  6.22  0.00  0.00  
1.4 2.68  6.43  0.00  0.00  
1.45 2.49  6.64  0.01  0.00  
1.5 2.31  6.84  0.01  0.00  
1.55 2.13  7.04  0.02  0.00  
1.6 1.97  7.23  0.02  0.00  
1.65 1.80  7.42  0.04  0.00  
1.7 1.64  7.60  0.05  0.00  
1.75 1.49  7.78  0.07  0.00  
1.8 1.34  7.95  0.09  0.00  
1.85 1.20  8.13  0.12  0.00  
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Table IA.IV: Corporate bond underwriting and concurrent lending 
This table reports the results for samples of loans issued before corporate bond IPOs using the Probit model. Column (1) reports results for the full 
sample. Column (2) report results for a sample of firms that borrowed both before and after their equity IPOs. In both columns, loans borrowed after 
corporate bond IPOs are excluded. Results for firm characteristics and fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Loans before corporate bond IPOs 
 All firms Firms that borrowed both before and 
after equity IPO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Sizeconcen 0.642*** 1.531*** 
 (0.190) (0.326) 
ACR4 4.651*** 12.911*** 
 (1.228) (2.637) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.511** -0.813** 
 (0.201) (0.398) 
ACR4*IPO -3.777*** -4.129* 
 (1.022) (2.460) 
First 0.542*** 1.083*** 
 (0.154) (0.252) 
First*IPO -0.562*** -1.079*** 
 (0.160) (0.288) 
Switch 0.106 0.500*** 
 (0.121) (0.188) 
Switch*IPO -0.182 -0.592*** 
 (0.128) (0.222) 
Numlender 0.027*** 0.111*** 
 (0.008) (0.028) 
IPO 2.086*** 3.371** 
 (0.601) (1.425) 
FT -0.631*** -0.731*** 
 (0.052) (0.255) 
Constant -0.341 -7.682 
 (0.920) (182.973) 
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank Type, Time 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Monetary policy variables  No No 
Regional macro variables  No No 
Other contract terms No No 
Observations 7,453 1,606 
Pseudo R2 0.270 0.401 
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.131* 0.719*** 
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0 0.875 8.781*** 
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Table IA.V: Endogeneity of loan contract terms 
This table reports IV Probit regression results, treating other loan contract terms as endogenous variables. Column (1) treats Maturity as the sole 
endogenous variable, assuming that Spread does not affect collateral incidence. Column (2) treats both Spread and Maturity as endogenous variables. 
The instruments for Maturity are asset maturity (Amaturity) and term spread (Termsprd). Instruments for Spread are the lagged local average lending 
rate (Localavrate) and benchmark loan spread (Benchsprd). Definitions and summary statistics for these instrumental variables are reported in Table I, 
Panel F. Results for fixed effects dummies and first stage estimations of IV Probit regression are not reported to save space. They are available upon 
request. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 IV Probit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Maturity   0.597** 
  (0.273) 
Spread  0.996** 0.746*** 
 (0.426) (0.271) 
Sizeconcen 0.503** 0.591** 
 (0.250) (0.242) 
ACR4 4.972*** 5.279*** 
 (1.314) (1.320) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.501** -0.608** 
 (0.251) (0.253) 
ACR4*IPO -3.013*** -3.364*** 
 (1.099) (1.098) 
First 0.394* 0.345 
 (0.217) (0.223) 
First*IPO -0.446** -0.480** 
 (0.225) (0.228) 
Switch 0.530*** 0.358** 
 (0.191) (0.146) 
Switch*IPO -0.392*** -0.368** 
 (0.149) (0.148) 
Numlender 0.076 -0.016 
 (0.049) (0.039) 
Numlender*IPO -0.018 0.021 
 (0.040) (0.037) 
IPO 1.648** 1.920*** 
 (0.684) (0.683) 
FT -0.671*** -0.534*** 
 (0.067) (0.056) 
Liquidity 0.090 -0.242 
 (0.329) (0.201) 
Size -0.260*** -0.172*** 
 (0.038) (0.036) 
Leverage 0.372 0.667*** 
 (0.262) (0.155) 
ROA -1.460*** -1.077*** 
 (0.335) (0.351) 
Age -0.452*** -0.521*** 
 (0.071) (0.064) 
Tangibility -0.587** -0.788*** 
 (0.284) (0.222) 
Loansize -0.200*** -0.107*** 
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 (0.060) (0.024) 
Loanconcen 1.471*** 1.665*** 
 (0.523) (0.475) 
RRR -3.191 -0.083 
 (3.273) (3.755) 
Repo 0.045 0.068** 
 (0.030) (0.031) 
CPI -1.791 -1.389 
 (1.949) (1.839) 
NPLratio 0.891 -0.905 
 (1.309) (1.382) 
Realgdpindex -1.625 -0.290 
 (1.858) (1.647) 
Constant 0.385 -2.186 
 (2.193) (2.468) 
Observations 8,159 8,159 
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank Type, Time 
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.002 (p=0.99) -0.017 (p=0.86) 
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0 1.959**(p=0.03) 1.914** (p=0.03) 
H0:First+First*IPO=0 -0.052 (p=0.46) -0.136 (p=0.14) 
H0:Switch+Switch*IPO=0 0.138 (p=0.21) -0.009 (p=0.86) 
Wald test (p-value) Chi2(1)=5.48 (0.0192) Chi2(2)=20.36 (0.0000) 
CLR (p-value) 6.12 (0.0146) 23.94 (0.0000) 
K (p-value) Chi2(1)=6.12 (0.0134) Chi2(2)=23.23 (0.0000) 
J (p-value) Chi2(1)=0.00 (0.9488) Chi2(2)=1.81 (0.4041) 
AR (p-value) Chi2(2)=6.12 (0.0469) Chi2(4)=25.04 (0.0000) 
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Table IA.VI: Alternative samples – Firms which borrowed both before and after IPO 
This table reports the results for a sample of firms that borrowed both before and after their equity IPOs. Panel A reports results for all loans. Panel B 
further restricts this sample to loans around IPO dates. Results for firm characteristics and fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Firms borrowed both before and after IPO 
 Panel A: All loans  Panel B: Loans around IPOs dates 
  One loan before and 
one after equity IPO 
Two loans before 
and two after equity 
IPO 
Three loans before 
and three after equity 
IPO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sizeconcen 1.532*** 2.293** 1.099** 1.173*** 
 (0.324) (0.921) (0.534) (0.441) 
ACR4 12.211*** 14.652 11.515** 7.357* 
 (2.543) (9.731) (5.416) (4.284) 
Sizeconcen*IPO -0.713* -1.108 -1.165* -1.076* 
 (0.394) (1.208) (0.683) (0.552) 
ACR4*IPO -4.224* -0.766 -8.850* -8.722** 
 (2.405) (8.008) (4.901) (4.031) 
First 1.121*** 2.497*** 1.439*** 0.854** 
 (0.251) (0.842) (0.499) (0.378) 
First*IPO -1.069*** -1.086 -1.351** -0.860* 
 (0.286) (0.873) (0.564) (0.447) 
Switch 0.491*** -0.815 -0.049 0.277 
 (0.188) (0.623) (0.381) (0.283) 
Switch*IPO -0.588*** -0.138 -0.423 -0.465 
 (0.220) (0.831) (0.494) (0.376) 
Numlender 0.114*** 0.367** 0.176** 0.131** 
 (0.027) (0.158) (0.084) (0.058) 
IPO 3.353** 1.439 6.374** 6.165*** 
 (1.394) (4.649) (2.837) (2.332) 
FT -0.683*** -5.019*** -2.392*** -1.880*** 
 (0.244) (1.291) (0.555) (0.410) 
Constant -7.514 -14.636 -12.967 -8.227 
 (159.820) (326.925) (326.330) (242.200) 
Fixed effects dummies Industry FE, Province FE, Bank Type FE, Time FE 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No 
Monetary policy variables No No No No 
Regional macro variables No No No No 
Other loan contract terms No No No No 
Observations 1,663 215 421 564 
Pseudo R2 0.403 0.553 0.452 0.364 
H0:Sizeconcen+Sizeconcen*IPO=0 0.819*** 1.184 -0.066 0.096 
H0: ACR4+ACR4*IPO=0 7.987*** 13.886 2.665 -1.365 
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Table IA.VII: Alternative samples – Excluding non-commercially viable loans 
This table reports results for samples of loans provided by different types of banks. We exclude progressively loans that are less likely to be issued on 
a commercial basis. The model specification is based on Equation (4) excluding: Maturity, Spread, monetary variables and regional macroeconomic 
variables. Including these variables does not affect our results. Column (1) excludes loans borrowed from state-owned banks (SOCBS). Column (2) 
excludes loans from policy banks (PBs). Column (3) excludes loans from both policy banks and state-owned banks. Column (4) further excludes 
loans borrowed from trust and investment companies (TICs). Column (5) further excludes loans from other financial companies (Other), which leaves 
loans from joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, rural commercial (cooperative) banks and foreign banks remaining. Results for firm 
characteristics and fixed effects dummies are not reported to save space. The equation is estimated with the Probit model. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Excluding 
SOCBs 
Excluding  
PBs 
Excluding 
SOCBs&PBs 
Excluding 
SOCBs&PBs 
&TICs 
Excluding 
SOCBs&PBs 
&TICs&Other 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sizeconcen 1.323*** 0.556*** 0.792** 0.958** 0.957** 
 (0.344) (0.194) (0.368) (0.388) (0.393) 
ACR4 11.231*** 5.047*** 10.203*** 9.115*** 9.108*** 
 (1.972) (1.212) (2.076) (2.173) (2.195) 
IPO*Sizeconcen -1.229*** -0.409** -0.680* -0.722* -0.706* 
 (0.358) (0.203) (0.385) (0.406) (0.412) 
IPO*ACR4 -7.334*** -3.153*** -6.541*** -4.875*** -5.358*** 
 (1.718) (1.022) (1.779) (1.871) (1.881) 
First 0.703*** 0.501*** 0.528** 0.682*** 0.616** 
 (0.227) (0.157) (0.246) (0.257) (0.262) 
IPO*First -0.673*** -0.474*** -0.446* -0.605** -0.550** 
 (0.234) (0.162) (0.254) (0.264) (0.269) 
Switch 0.316* 0.030 0.070 0.077 0.110 
 (0.190) (0.123) (0.207) (0.217) (0.221) 
IPO*Switch -0.444** -0.126 -0.263 -0.277 -0.308 
 (0.200) (0.129) (0.217) (0.227) (0.231) 
Numlender 0.024** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.027** 0.028** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
IPO 4.511*** 1.731*** 3.773*** 2.811** 3.039*** 
 (1.017) (0.604) (1.065) (1.120) (1.127) 
FT -0.520*** -0.565*** -0.440*** -0.477*** -0.476*** 
 (0.070) (0.048) (0.075) (0.083) (0.084) 
Constant -9.580 -0.111 -8.429 -8.433 -6.706 
 (165.908) (0.917) (95.904) (92.578) (80.646) 
Fixed effects dummies Industry, Province, Bank Type, Time 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No No 
Monetary policy variables No No No No No 
Regional macro variables No No No No No 
Other loan contract terms No No No No No 
Observations 4,098 8,273 3,573 3,274 3,132 
Pseudo R2 0.313 0.286 0.317 0.322 0.312 
H0: ACR4+IPO*ACR4=0 3.897*** 1.894** 3.662*** 4.239*** 3.750*** 
H0:Sizeconcen+IPO*Sizeconcen=0 0.094 0.147* 0.112 0.238* 0.251* 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Collateral and the disruption of firms as non-financial 
intermediaries: Evidence from Chinese Property Law 
 
1. Introduction 
Theories and empirical studies highlight the links between enforceability of secured contracts 
and access to external finance (e.g. Calomiris et al., 2017; Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2010; 
Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria, 2012; Vig, 2013), and the availability of collateral 
and debt capacity in the presence of contract incompleteness (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1982; 
Hart and Moore, 1994). Studies find that the lack of sufficient collateral is a key obstacle to 
access to external finance across countries. The problem is aggravated in countries with weak 
collateral laws, because inadequate legal infrastructure excludes important asset types as 
permissible collateral classes. In general, these studies have found better collateral laws could 
promote firms‟ access to bank credit. However, this literature has largely ignored that some 
firms served as non-financial intermediaries by providing trade credit to their customers, 
particularly because of weak collateral law that prohibits some firms‟ access to bank credit. In 
this regard, changing collateral law could affect not only credit transaction between banks 
and firms, but also credit transaction between firms. This link has largely been left out in the 
collateral law and finance literature. In this article, we intend to fill this void.  
Trade credit is widely used by firms to finance their own purchase of inputs (as 
accounts payable), as well as provide financial support to their customers (accounts 
receivable). Previous studies find that trade credit plays crucial roles when bank credit is not 
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available (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1997, Nilsen, 2002, Fisman and Love 2003), and it is 
particularly important in developing countries where legal and financial institutions are less 
developed (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). Linking these literatures, if better legal 
and financial institutions improve access to bank credit, they could also reduce the firms‟ 
reliance on trade credit. In addition, if some firms served as non-financial intermediaries and 
redistribute their obtained bank credit via trade credit, such redistribution should decline 
under better collateral law, given that better collateral law could facilitate more direct 
financing from banks. This is the main hypothesis we take to data.  
To this end, we explore the passage of the Property Law in China in 2006. The 
Property Law allowed a broad class of movable assets as permissible collateral for bank 
credit (see section 2), including in particular accounts receivable, which is registered as firms‟ 
provision of trade credit. Therefore, by allowing accounts receivable to be pledged as 
collateral, the Property Law potentially can affect both trade credit and firms‟ access to bank 
credit.  
The crucial element that differentiates our work from others is that we take into 
account the role of trade credit when discussing the impact of the collateral law. We argue a 
legal reform such as the Property Law, which could plausibly change the access to bank 
credit, should in turn influence the provision or demand of trade credit. In particular, we 
consider firms as receivers or providers of trade credit, and both types of firms make their 
decisions on trade credit depending on the availability of short-term bank credit. Specifically, 
for the receivers of trade credit, bank credit serves as a plausibly less expensive substitute, 
and therefore if more short-term bank credit is available, they might reduce their reliance on 
trade credit and substitute to more bank credit. For suppliers of trade credit, on the one hand, 
having easier access to bank credit may allow them to extend more trade credit. On the other 
hand, if their clients could also access more bank credit directly, the suppliers of trade credit 
may face negative demand shock, resulting less provision of trade credit. Therefore, when 
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accessing the effect of collateral law, it is crucial to take into account the fact that credit 
transactions occur not only between banks and firms, but also among firms.  
As the Property Law reform only pertains to movable assets, it should affect more the 
firms with intensive use of these assets. This policy wrinkle allows for an investigation in a 
difference-in-differences framework in which the effect of the Property Law is evaluated as a 
function of firms‟ pre-reform movable assets, controlling for other firm characteristics, firm 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Specifically, we compare various outcome of interest 
before and after the passage of the Property Law as a function of firms‟ pre-reform position 
of movable assets. The difference-in-differences framework allows us to control observed and 
unobserved factors that could affect equally firms with different level of movable assets. We 
also control industry specific (province specific) time-variant shocks by introducing 
interaction between industries and time (provinces and time). As a result, our specification 
compares firms with different level of moveable assets within the same industry (province).  
The crucial assumption for the difference-in-differences strategy is that treated and 
control group should behave similarly in the absence of the shock, that is, the “parallel trend” 
assumption. To this end, we provide supporting evidence on its validity by investigating 
placebo (non-exist) reforms took place before the actual passage of the Property Law. To 
further mitigate concerns that there might be latent unobserved diverging trends in the 
variable of interest, we also augment our specification with linear treatment trend 
(Treated*Trend). The underlining assumption is that the changes in the outcome of interest 
for treated group would have been the same as that of the control group in the absence of the 
shock. Inclusion of linear treatment trend usually leads to underestimation of treatment effect, 
as part of the effects could be absorbed by the linear trend. Crucial for 
difference-in-difference strategy is that the shock needs to be plausibly exogenous and 
unanticipated. Otherwise, firms may have adjusted their asset mix in anticipation of the 
reform, which could compromise the core of our empirical strategy. Berkowitz, Lin, and Ma 
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(2015) provide one of the first empirical evidences that the passage of the Property Law was 
a complete shock to the stock market. As will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2, 
anticipating the passage of the Property Law could not have been possible. Nevertheless, to 
control the possibility that some firms may have inside information when the Property Law 
was heavily debated in 2006 before its final passage, we remove observation from 2006. We 
further conduct additional robustness test by removing also observations from 2005.   
We investigate the effect of the Property Law using a large sample of listed firms 
during 2001-2011. Focusing on public listed firms could to some extent alleviate an 
identification challenge, that is, to differentiate demand and supply side arguments. 
Specifically, for this sample of large firms that are less likely to be financially constrained, 
their needs to pledge movable assets in order to access bank finance are relatively low. On the 
contrary, for the vast population of unlisted firms, which are smaller and more likely to be 
financially constrained, the Property Law provides the opportunity to expand access to bank 
credit and reduce reliance on trade credit. Hence we speculate for our sample of listed firms, 
the potential increase in the provision of trade credit would be outweighed by the fall in the 
demand for trade credit from the vast population of unlisted firms. Using data from a sample 
of Chinese listed firms during 2001-2011, we find that passage of the Property Law 
significantly changed firms‟ reliance and provision of trade credit, and the relationship 
between bank credit and trade credit.  
First, consistent with substitution theory (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and 
Ellingsen, 2004), we find that firms relied on trade credit financing reduced their usage of 
trade credit after the Property Law, and could substitute almost entirely their financing needs 
with short-term bank credit. In addition, the substitution effect is much stronger for the 
ex-ante financially constrained firms, consistent with the causal explanation that the 
substitution was caused by relaxation of access to bank credit due to the Property Law.  
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Second, our findings suggest that providers of trade credit reduce more their provision 
(accounts receivable) after the Property Law, consistent with the demand side argument that 
better access to bank credit due to the Property Law reduces the importance of trade credit 
financing, and therefore forces the suppliers to reduce their provision of trade credit. These 
findings are in contrast to the supply side argument: suppliers pledge their movable assets to 
obtain more bank credit after the Property Law, and better access to bank credit could allow 
the suppliers to provide more trade credit. This finding is mostly driven by our sample of 
large public traded firms, which are less financially constrained compared to unlisted small 
and medium sized firms, and therefore are less likely to rely on movable assets to access bank 
credit.  
Third, we find the Property Law disrupted a practice called the “redistribution of bank 
credit via trade credit”. Specifically, before the legal reform, firms that borrowed more 
short-term bank credit provided more trade credit, suggesting these firms redistribute bank 
credit to their clients via trade credit. The redistribution was disrupted after the Property Law, 
consistent with our conjecture that better collateral law could reduce firms‟ role as financial 
intermediaries.  
Finally, we document implications for corporate asset structure and debt maturity. Our 
analysis suggests the providers of trade credit shifted away from short-term assets and 
increased their investments in fixed assets. Likewise, consistent with theory that firms match 
asset and debt maturity (e.g. Myers, 1977; Milbradt and Oehmke, 2014), they also increased 
their holdings in long-term bank credit. These findings suggest that when bank credit 
becomes more available, the providers of trade credit could reduce their provision of trade 
credit and consequently redirect more resources for investment. In addition, we do not find 
the providers of trade credit to increase their short-term bank credit after the reform. The 
finding is consistent with our conjecture that after taking into account trade credit, the effect 
of the Property Law on short-term bank credit is muted. On the one hand, the providers of 
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trade credit are able to borrow more short-term debt because they can now pledge their 
movable assets. On the other hand, once their customers can access bank credit more easily 
after the Property Law, their importance as non-financial intermediary decreases, in the sense 
that these firms stopped borrowing short-term debt to finance the provision of trade credit to 
their customers. The aggregate effect on short-term debt therefore becomes insignificant. 
Our findings provide supporting evidence that better access to bank credit due to 
collateral law reform could change provision and usage of trade credit, and in particular, 
disrupt the redistribution of bank credit via trade credit. We further demonstrate these 
findings could not be explained by several alternative theories, other contemporary reforms, 
and these results continue to hold for additional robustness tests. First, we check if global 
financial crisis could drive our results. The global financial crisis may have drained the 
liquidity of banking sector, leaving firms with more outstanding short-term debt particularly 
vulnerable due to the difficulty to roll-over short-term debt, and consequently, they were 
unable to pass on scarce bank credit to their clients via trade credit. To investigate this 
possibility, we re-examine our hypotheses on a short-event window that covers only one year 
before and one year after the Property Law, which excludes the influence of global financial 
crisis. In addition, we also investigate precisely when the disruption of redistribution occurred 
during the post-reform period. We find that the disruption of the redistribution was strongest 
one year after the Property Law, which is before the global financial crisis. This finding 
implies that the global financial crisis is unlikely to be the main reason of our results. Our 
results are also not driven by other contemporary reforms, in particular, our results still hold 
after controlling an adjacent reform that reduced related-party transitions. Related-party 
transactions are usually inter-corporate loans provided by listed firms to their controlling 
shareholders or affiliates. Such transactions could confound our results as the providers of 
trade credit are prone to related party transition. Finally, we verify the robustness of our 
findings through a battery of additional tests, which ensure that our results could not be 
152 
 
attributed to anticipation of the legal reform, changes in firm characteristics other than 
movable assets, specific definitions of trade credit, and alternative samples.  
This article is closely related to the literature that investigates how legal reforms on 
collateral affect corporate financial policies, in particular firms‟ access to bank credit (e.g. 
Campello and Larrain, 2015; Aretz, Campello and Marchica, 2015;  Cerqueiro, Ongena and 
Roszbach, 2015; Love, Martinez Peria and Sandeep, 2016; Calomiris et al., 2017). Our paper 
contributes to this literature by extending the effect of collateral law on trade credit, and the 
inter-play between trade credit and bank credit. Our results highlight the importance to 
analyze alternative sources of finance in order to have a more complete picture of the 
potential effects of collateral law reform.  
Our paper also fits into the trade credit literature. Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga (2013) shows during the credit crunch phase of global financial crisis, 
liquid firms, that is firms with more cash holding, could offer more trade credit to their less 
liquid customers. Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2007) investigate in a cross country 
sample of firms from emerging markets around financial crises, and find firms that are 
financially vulnerable to financial crises extend less trade credit to their customers, a result 
consistent with the “redistribution view” of trade credit. These studies explored the liquidity 
shock caused by financial crisis.  Our paper complements this literature by exploring 
liquidity shock due to better collateral law. In this regard, our work is similar to Shenoy and 
Williams (2017), which explores the exogenous liquidity shocks caused by the U.S. interstate 
bank branching laws. Our paper also contribute to the literature that argues trade credit can 
offer alternative financial sources in developing countries where formal bank credit are scarce, 
and financial institutions are less developed (Fisman and Love 2003; Allen et al., 2005). In 
particular, we complement existing literature focus on trade credit in China (Ge and Qiu, 
2007; Cull et al., 2009). These studies investigate the relationship between trade credit and 
bank credit, while ours explore how such relationship could change when legal institution 
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improves.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
description of the institutional background governing secured transactions in China. Section 3 
presents our hypotheses, identification strategy and data. Section 4 presents the main results. 
Section 5 discusses various alternative explanations and robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. The institutional background 
2.1 The Security Law   
Before the approval of the Property Law by end of 2006, secured financing was governed by 
the 1995 Security Law. This law specifies certain types of existing movable assets which can 
be pledged as collateral. Non-possessory security interests were allowed only for the use of 
equipment and motor vehicles as collateral (under Article 34 of the Security Law). Other 
movable assets such as accounts receivables, future acquired properties, properties that 
cannot be fixed in type, quantity or location, could not serve as permissible collateral. The 
Security Law did not exclude inventory as permissible collateral; however, it could be used 
only as collateral by way of possessory security interests. In practice, the amount of inventory 
had to be fixed at the time of financing and was required to be relocated (or the ownership 
certificate had to be transferred) to creditors. 
Furthermore, a secured interest had to be registered to be enforceable, while no 
centralized registration system existed. In China, numerous registries dealt with different 
types of collateral, and had ultimate discretion in rejecting or accepting the registration of 
secured interests. Moreover, these registries required collateral to be appraised and the 
legality of security agreements to be certified. As a result, creating and registering secured 
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interests was costly, time consuming and subject to uncertainty. Another problem was that the 
Security Law did not provide clear rules on the determination of priority among competing 
claims on the same collateral. Secured lenders might have to compete with other claimants 
for underlying collateral, which in turn increased the cost of credit.  
The limited permissible asset types and prohibitive process in creating and registering 
secured interest impeded secured transactions using movable assets as collateral. As a result, 
secured transactions strongly favored real property as security when lending to enterprises. A 
joint survey by People‟s Bank of China and World Bank Group (2007) shows that less than 7% 
of loans in China were secured purely by movables assets, which were mostly inventories and 
equipment.79  
 
2.2. The Property Law 
On December 29, 2006, the 5th Session of the 10th Standing Committee of the National 
People‟s Congress (NPC) accepted a draft of the Property Law of the People‟s Republic of 
China. The Law was eventually passed on March 16th, 2007 and put into effect on October 1st 
of that year. The Property Law was supplemented by two additional implementation 
measures: the Measures for Chattel Mortgage Registration, issued by the State Administration 
of Industry and Commerce (SAIC); and the Measures for the Registration of Pledged 
Receivables, issued by the People‟s Bank of China. The former governs general movable 
properties while the latter governs receivables. These measures together with the Property 
Law provide detailed guidance on the scope of permissible collateral and registration systems 
for security interests.   
Under the new law, the range of permissible security was greatly expanded, which 
now includes accounts receivable, existing and future production equipment, raw materials, 
                                                             
79 Source: People‟s Bank of China (PBOC)-FIAS-CPDF survey of financial institutions (The “Lender Survey”), p.56.  
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semi-finished goods and inventories. The registration of security interests is also simplified: 
for general movable assets (except accounts receivable), the registration can be done at the 
local office of the SAIC for the county in which the debtor is domiciled, and it requires only 
basic information about the parties, the debt and the underlying security.  
In addition, specific rules and registration systems are created to guide secured 
transactions in accounts receivable, which are arguably one of the most important movable 
assets classes. Account receivables are broadly defined in Chapter 17 of the Property Law as 
“… the right to require payment from debtors arising out of sales of goods, services or 
facilities, including existing and future monetary claims and proceeds, but not including those 
arising from negotiable instruments or other negotiable securities”. The Measure for the 
Registration of Pledged Receivables provides further clarification by listing five types of 
accounts receivables as permissible collateral, including, but not limited to, the following: 1) 
claims from sales; 2) claims from leases; 3) claims from rendering services; 4) rights to 
charge fees from immovable property such as toll roads, bridges, tunnels, ferries, etc.; and 5) 
claims from granting loans or other credit. To facilitate the creation of secured interests in 
accounts receivables, the Credit Reference Centre of the People‟s Bank of China (Centre) is 
created as a centralized registration authority for the pledging of accounts receivables. The 
Centre also sets up a search system to publicize registration information of the pledge of 
accounts receivables, which allows lenders to obtain information about borrowers or other 
registered security interests. Apart from allowing more permissible collateral and establishing 
centralized registration systems, the Property Law also provides clearer references to the 
determination of priorities among competing claims on the same collateral. Specifically, 
priority is determined by the date of registration of security interests.  
As the result of these legal changes, secured transactions against movable assets have 
expanded greatly. During 2008-2010, the number of loans backed by movable assets 
increased by 21% per year, while the value of loans increased by 24% per year. Since the 
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creation of the Credit Reference Centre in 2007, more than 1.7 million receivable-backed 
loans have been recorded by the end of July 2015, or a remarkable annual growth rate of 51%. 
These loans amounted to 57 trillion RMB, among which 30 trillion was given to 220,000 
small and medium-sized enterprises.80  
 
3. Hypotheses, identification strategy and data 
3.1. Literature and hypotheses 
Previous literature have investigated how legal reforms that expanded pledgable asset 
categories could change firms‟ access to bank credit, asset composition, resource allocation, 
and industry composition. Campello and Larrain (2015) investigate the reforms in Eastern 
Europe that permitted the use of movable assets (e.g. machinery and equipments) as collateral, 
and find that such reforms promoted access to external finance, and reallocated assets and 
employments towards firms with more movable assets. Aretz, Campello and Marchica (2015) 
analyze the reform of the Napolenoic Code in France, and find that increased access to 
collateral – by expanding it to hard assets – increased firms‟ debt capacity and prolonged debt 
maturity. Cerqueiro, Ongena and Roszbach (2015) examine legal reform in Sweden that 
reduced the value of collateral (e.g. floating liens). They show that such reform reduced debt 
capacity and shortened debt maturity, and eventually contributed to distortions in corporate 
investment and asset allocation. Love, Martinez Peria and Sandeep (2016) investigate the 
effects of the existence of collateral registries on access to finance across a large number of 
countries. Calomiris et al., (2017) demonstrate that in countries with weak movable collateral 
laws, lending is biased towards loans backed with immovable assets, and resource allocations 
across sectors are distorted towards immovable-based production and investment. In general, 
these studies support the view that the expanded capacity of collateralization and better 
                                                             
80 Source: Independent Evaluation of the IFC Secured Transactions Advisory Project in China (2011) and Credit Reference 
Center of People‟s Bank of China 
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enforceability of secured contracts facilitate firms‟ access to bank credit. However, this 
literature primarily focuses on accessibility to bank credit, while the effects of collateral law 
on alternative financial channels have largely been left out. In particular, some firms that had 
better access to bank credit due to weak collateral law served as non-financial intermediaries 
and redistributed their bank credit to their customers via trade credit. Having better collateral 
law could promote more direct financing from banks for those who relied on trade credit, 
which implies less demand for trade credit, and consequently less redistribution of bank 
credit through firms. These are potentially important effects of collateral law that have largely 
been ignored in previous studies.  
Indeed, firms obtain credit from financial institutions as well as from other firms via 
trade credit. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) provide one of the first theoretical models that 
explain that when banks ration credit, suppliers are often better positioned to provide credit. 
The suppliers extend trade credit because they have an advantage to overcome moral hazard 
and asymmetric information frictions with respect to banks. Moreover, suppliers obtain a 
markup on trade credit over their funding costs, making the extension of trade credit 
profitable from the suppliers‟ perspective. Suppliers may also extend trade credit because 
they have implicit equity stakes in their customers, and therefore willing to help financially 
constrained customers to overcome financial difficulties. From the borrowers‟ perspective, 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that, when confronted with bank lending constraints, firms are 
more inclined to borrow more expensive trade credit provided that investment returns exceed 
the cost of funding. Recent empirical studies have largely confirmed that accessibility to bank 
credit determines the supply and demand of trade credit. Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga (2013) investigates how a negative shock to bank credit caused by the 
global financial crisis affects demand and supply of trade credit. They find that liquidity-rich 
suppliers can extend more trade credit during the financial crisis when external finance is 
difficult to access. This finding supports the view that suppliers serve as liquidity providers 
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(Cuñat, 2007), and trade credit is a substitute to bank credit (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart 
and Ellingsen, 2004). In addition, a few papers investigate firms‟ financing choices with 
respect to legal institutions. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) find that trade credit is 
more prevalent in countries with worse legal institutions. However, these studies usually rely 
on cross-country heterogeneity in legal institutions, which makes it more difficult to control 
country specific factors that could have driven the differences in trade credit. Shenoy and 
Willams (2017) explore an exogenous shock to banking liquidity due to the implementation 
of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in the United States. They provide 
evidence that legal reform which promotes bank competition improve banks‟ liquidity. 
Consequently more bank liquidity allows suppliers to provide more trade credit. Likewise, 
the customers who have access to bank liquidity can rely much less on trade credit. Their 
findings suggest that although trade credit are credit transactions in between firms, the 
accessibility of external bank credit plays a crucial role in firms‟ decisions of trade credit.  
Motivated by these studies, our study tries to answer the following questions: Firstly, 
if collateral law improves access to bank credit, would firms substitute plausibly more 
expensive trade credit with bank credit? Secondly, how does collateral law affect the 
provision of trade credit? Thirdly, how does collateral law change the “redistribution of bank 
credit via trade credit”, a practice where firms with easier access to bank credit redistribute 
their obtained credit to less fortunate firms via trade credit? Lastly, if collateral law changes 
the provision of trade credit, how do firms change their asset and debt compositions 
accordingly?  
The Chinese financial system is particularly suitable for answering these questions. 
First of all, the main source of external financing in China is bank loan, while other funding 
resources such as equity market and corporate bond market represent only very small share of 
overall financing. Before 2007, the annual funds raised from equity and corporate bond 
markets represented less than 5% of GDP, while that from banks represented 90% of GDP. 
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Secondly, the Chinese banking sector is notorious for misallocating credit (Cull and Xu, 
2005). State owned, politically connected, and large firms have preferential access to bank 
credit, while small and medium sized firms have difficulties in accessing bank loans. The 
lack of alternative financing channels implied that many Chinese firms have to rely on trade 
credit to finance their short term financing needs (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005; Ge and Qiu, 
2007; Cull et al., 2009). Indeed, Cull et al., (2009) find for a sample of 100,000 large and 
medium sized Chinese industrial firms, accounts receivables ranges from 18% of total sale 
for private firms, and 36.5% for state owned enterprises. On average these figures are 
relatively higher than the 18.5% for the U.S. Compustat firms (Peterson and Rajan, 1997). Ge 
and Qiu (2007) investigates a smaller sample of survey data and reports that the accounts 
receivables and accounts payables represent 13% and 14% of firm assets, respectively. These 
figures suggest trade credit is important source of financing for Chinese firms. Lastly, as 
argued in the introduction and in section 3.2 in more detail, the passage of the Property Law 
provided an ideal exogenous shock on the quality of legal institution, which bears particularly 
importance on firms‟ choices of external financing.  
We develop our arguments as below. First we look at the usage of trade credit. 
Following previous literature, collateral law that expanded pledgable asset type could 
improve firms‟ access to bank credit. In addition, according to the substitution view of trade 
credit and bank credit, improved access to bank credit reduces demand for trade credit, given 
that the latter is usually a more expensive substitute of bank credit (Biais and Gollier, 1997; 
Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Therefore, if the Property Law expands access to bank credit, 
the usage of trade credit should decrease disproportionally more for those who relied on trade 
credit financing before the reform, and consequently, those firms could substitute more their 
financing needs with short-term bank credit. To further establish the causal relationship 
between accessibility of external financial resources and the substitution between trade credit 
and bank credit, we explore firm heterogeneity in financial constraints. If as argued that the 
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Property Law increases the availability of bank credit, it is expected to affect more financially 
constrained firms, in the sense that these firms should reduce more their reliance on trade 
credit and substitute more to short-term debt. In summary, we derive our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The Property Law should allow trade credit dependent firms to substitute their 
usage of trade credit with more short-term bank credit; and the substitution effect should be 
more pronounced for ex-ante financially constrained firms.   
 
Next we look at the provision of trade credit. The impact of the Property Law on the 
provision of trade credit is determined by a net outcome of supply and demand. On the one 
hand, because the Property Law allows for movable assets to be pledged as collateral, the 
providers of trade credit may have an incentive to extend trade credit, given that the provision 
of trade credit (i.e. accounts receivable, which is a type of movable assets) can now be 
pledged against bank credit. On the other hand, as long as the customers of trade credit 
substitute trade credit with short-term bank credit, the providers of trade credit face a 
negative demand shock, and consequently, they may have to reduce their provision of trade 
credit. The aggregate impact of the Property Law on the provision of trade credit depends on 
both supply and demand side factors. These two forces are negatively correlated, and 
therefore, if we observe a decrease in the equilibrium quantity of trade credit provision, the 
demand side effect must outweigh the positive supply side effect. Without a matching sample 
of supplier and customer of trade credit, it is extremely hard to fully differentiate the demand 
and supply effects. Our sample of listed firms could alleviate this problem to some extent. 
Because these firms are generally large and have less difficulties in accessing external finance 
comparing to smaller unlisted firms, their needs to pledge movable assets in order to access 
bank finance are relatively low. On the contrary, for most unlisted firms, which are smaller 
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and more likely to be financially constrained, the Property Law provides the opportunity to 
expand access to bank credit and reduce their reliance on trade credit. For these firms, 
substituting trade credit with bank credit could be cost saving as bank loans are usually 
cheaper, and banks are specialized in providing loan services. Hence we speculate that for our 
sample of listed firms, the effect of the Property Law on trade credit will predominantly go 
through the demand side: broadened access to finance reduces demand for trade credit, 
causing the suppliers to reduce their provision of trade credit. We proxy firms‟ capacity to 
provide trade credit using their pre-reform median level of movable assets to total asset ratio, 
with higher value indicating more capacity to provide trade credit. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Facing negative demand shock, firms with more pre-reform movable assets 
should reduce disproportionally more the provision of trade credit.  
 
Thirdly we investigate whether the Property Law could disrupt or moderate the 
practice called the “redistribution of bank credit via trade credit”. Previous studies have found 
firms finance their provision of trade credit with short-term bank credit, in the sense that the 
suppliers borrowed short-term bank credit and redistribute it to their clients in the form of 
trade credit (Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Nilsen, 
2002). This practice emerges because the suppliers might have better access to bank credit, 
due to an advantage in overcoming information asymmetries with respect to banks, or the 
presence of credit rationings. The suppliers often are incentivized to provide support to their 
customers because they could obtain a markup on trade credit over their own funding costs 
(Ng et al., 1999; Klapper et al., 2012), or have implicit stakes in the survival of their clients 
(Wilner, 2000; Cuñat, 2007).  
If the Property Law reduces the demand for trade credit, the suppliers‟ incentives to 
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borrow short-term debt to finance the provision of trade credit must decrease, causing the 
disruption (moderation) of redistribution of bank credit via trade credit. On the other hand, as 
the Property Law also allowed the supplier of trade credit to access bank credit more easily, 
these firms could now redistribute more bank credit via trade credit. As argued before, for our 
sample of listed firms, demand should dominate supply. To this end, we first investigate 
whether the provision of trade credit as a function of lagged short-term debt (or pre-reform 
short-term debt) experiences a structural break around the Property Law. Following the 
“redistribution view”, short-term bank credit should be positively related to the provision of 
trade credit before the reform, indicating these firms borrowed bank credit to finance the 
provision of trade credit. After the reform, if the clients of trade credit substitute their demand 
for trade credit with short-term bank loans, the suppliers‟ role as non-financial intermediary 
must decrease, which will lead to a disruption (moderation) of the redistribution. In other 
words, the correlation between lagged short-term debt (pre-reform short-term debt) and 
provision of trade credit should be less pronounced after the reform. Next, to reinforce our 
argument, we explore the pre-reform heterogeneity in movable assets. Specifically, since the 
redistribution of bank credit should mostly be conducted by the providers of trade credit, we 
expect the disruption (moderation) effect should be more pronounced for these firms. To this 
end, we employ the same proxy of suppliers of trade credit as before, that is the firms with 
high pre-reform median movable assets ratio, and investigate if the disruption of the 
redistribution is driven by these firms. We derive our third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The redistribution of bank credit via trade credit should be moderated or 
disrupted by the Property Law; and the moderation or disruption effect should be driven by 
the traditional providers of trade credit.  
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Finally, we investigate other implications of the Property Law, particularly on firms‟ 
asset compositions and debt maturity. If the providers reduce their provision of trade credit 
after the reform, they could shift their asset composition towards other types of short-term 
assets, for instance cash holding, or prolong their asset maturity by investing more in fixed 
assets. Changes in asset composition could subsequently lead to shifts in capital structure. As 
we argue that the Property Law should affect directly firms‟ liability on the short-term end, 
we do not expect to see a direct impact on their long-term leverage. However, if firms match 
their asset and debt maturities, long-term leverage could also change accordingly.  
The impact on short-term leverage is ex-ante ambiguous: On the one hand, firms with 
more movable assets could obtain short-term bank credit more easily after the Property Law, 
suggesting an increase in short-term leverage for these firms. On the other hand, these firms 
also redistributed bank credit via trade credit before reform. If these firms face a negative 
demand shock on trade credit, their incentive to borrow short-term bank credit to finance the 
provision of trade credit must decrease. The aggregate impact on short-term debt should be 
determined by the two opposite forces.  
 
3.2.Identification strategy 
We investigate these hypotheses with a difference-in-differences setting where we compare 
various outcomes of interests before and after the enactment of the Property Law as a 
function of firms‟ pre-reform level of movable assets. The identification hinges on the fact 
that the Property Law pertains to movable assets only, and therefore firms with ex-ante higher 
reliance on movable assets in their operations are more affected by this legal change. The 
advantage of the difference-in-differences approach is that it allows us to control observed 
and unobserved factors that could affect treaded and control firms alike. Like any method, it 
relies on crucially a few assumptions. Firstly, the pre-reform trends for the treated and control 
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group must be similar, i.e. the parallel trend assumption. We provide supporting evidence on 
this assumption by investigating placebo (non-exist) reforms that took place before the actual 
passage of the Property Law. Finding non-zero effects on the outcome of interest would 
suggest violation of parallel trend assumption. To further mitigate concerns that there might 
be latent unobserved diverging trends in the variable of interest, we also augment our 
specification with linear treatment trend. The underlining assumption is that the changes in 
the outcome of interest for treated group would have been the same as that of the control 
group in the absence of the shock. Inclusion of linear treatment trend usually leads to 
underestimation of treatment effect, as part of the effects could be absorbed by the linear 
trend. Second, crucially for the difference-in-differences framework is that external shock 
needs to be plausibly exogenous and unanticipated. If firms could anticipate the legal reform, 
they could have adjusted their asset mix accordingly before the actual reform, and therefore 
compromise the core of our empirical methodology which relies on the pre-reform measure 
of movable assets. We argue it is very unlikely that firms could have anticipated the passage 
of the Property Law beforehand, as well as predicting precisely the content of the Property 
Law. According to Zhang (2008), various versions of the Property Law were discussed before 
the final version, and each version faced strong oppositions from the conservatives and was 
blocked. The Property Law therefore had to be redrafted many times, making it impossible 
for firms to plan their response accordingly, given that the actual content of the Property Law 
was unknown beforehand. In addition, the actual timing of the passage of the law was also 
difficult to predict. As stated in Berkowitz, Lin, and Ma (2015), the enactment of the Property 
Law constitutes an exogenous shock, because the exact timing of the passage of the law was 
a product of complex political decision-making. They provide solid empirical evidence that 
the announcement of the Property Law on December 29, 2006 was unexpected by comparing 
the stock market reaction on the announcement date and the rest of the trading days of 2006. 
Indeed, the Property Law came as quite a surprise: before its final passage, the law was 
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actually withdrawn from the People‟s Congress in March of 2006 due to strong opposition 
from conservatives, which at that time suggested the new law was very unlikely to be 
accepted. On December 24, 2006, the standing committee of People‟s Congress conducted an 
unprecedented seventh reading of the law to discuss its suitability, suggesting that even 5 
days before its approval, it was still uncertain whether or not the law would pass. And finally, 
when the Property Law was approved on Dec 29th, 2006, it shocked the stock market. These 
facts suggest that the passage of the Property Law was exogenous. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that some politically connected firms may have inside information about the potential passage 
of the law, and could have changed their asset mix in advance. To further mitigate such 
anticipation effect, we remove observations from 2006 when the Property Law was approved 
by the National People‟s Congress. Therefore in our main analysis we use observations 
before 2005, which is plausibly immune to any anticipation effect. We conduct further 
robustness test by further removing observations from 2005, and use only information from 
pre-2004.  
We define movable assets as the sum of Inventory and Accounts Receivable. This 
definition captures the main groups of the assets that are allowed to be pledged as collateral 
after the reform. These firms were also more likely (or have more capacity or incentive) to 
provide trade credit. We argue that following the Property Law, these firms are better 
positioned to extend more trade credit using their pledgeable movable assets, or face a large 
negative demand side shock on trade credit and reduce their provisions instead. The movable 
ratio (Movratio) is defined as (Inventoryt+Account Receivablet)/Assett. For each firm we 
calculate its pre-reform median movable ratio (calculated over 2001-2005)81, and interact it 
with a dummy indicating whether the year in question is before or after the passage of the law. 
Firms with higher pre-reform median movable ratio are supposed to be affected more by the 
Property Law. In addition to this continuous measure, we also provide nonparametric results 
                                                             
81 Our main results hold pre-reform movable ratio is defined based on 2005 value instead of median calculated over 
2001-2005. Using median value over pre-reform era avoids the possibility that movable assets could be cyclical in nature.  
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where we divide pre-reform movable ratios into three equal sized bins (bottom 33%, mid 33% 
and top 33%), and interact each size bin  dummy with the post-reform dummy. We expect 
stronger results for firms located in higher bin of pre-reform movable assets distribution. The 
generalized difference-in-differences specification is as follows:82  
 
Yit = αi + γt + βFmovi ∗ Aftert + ρFmovi ∗ Trendt + δX + εit                                           (1) 
 
where i indexes for firm and t for accounting year. Yit represents various outcomes of interest. 
Firm fixed effects αi  control for time-invariant differences in firm behavior, while the time 
fixed effects γt  control for aggregate time-varying shocks. Fmovi is a continuous measure of 
pre-reform movable ratio, with higher value indicating higher percentage of movable assets 
in the firm‟s asset mix.  Since Fmovi is time invariant, the level of Fmovi is subsumed into 
fixed effects. Aftert is a binary variable that takes the value one for the years after the 
Property Law reform (2007-2011), and zero otherwise (2001-2005). Trendt is a linear trend. X 
denotes control variables including: Sizeit-1, Tangibilityit-1, Liquidityit-1, Profitabilityit-1, Saleit-1, 
Ageit-1, Listit, Splitit and Stateit. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, most of these controls enter 
the model with lagged values. 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error term. Following Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan (2004), standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The 
difference-in-differences estimator is β, which measures the effect of the Property Law as a 
function of pre-reform movable assets ratio.  
One potential concern with this specification is that some industry specific shocks 
occurred around the passage of the law, and these industries have higher movable assets ratio. 
To address this issue, the baseline specification is augmented with Industry-Year fixed effects 
                                                             
82 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡  and 𝐹𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑖  do not enter the regression as stand-along variables because they are absorbed by year fixed effects 
and firm fixed effects. 
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to control for time-varying industry specific shocks. Similarly, Province-Year fixed effects are 
included to control for time-varying regional economic shocks. We also conduct tests on 
placebo (non-exist) reforms to validate parallel trend assumption and rule out possibility of 
anticipation effect. Additional robustness tests to rule out confounding factors are discussed 
in section 5.  
 
3.3.Data 
Our primary data source is the WIND Information database. This firm-level annual database 
contains for a sample of listed firms detailed balance sheets, income statements information 
and general information such as industry classification, location, established year, listed year, 
and ownership type. It also provides a detailed breakdown of firms‟ liabilities, including 
information on total debt, long-term debt, and short-term debt. WIND Information also 
provides detailed breakdowns of asset categories, which is crucial for the construction of 
movable assets ratio (discuss shortly).  
Firms from financial industries, with missing values in total assets and with unclear 
industry classification are excluded from the sample. To be qualified in the sample, firms are 
also required to have annual reports both before and after 2006 (the year of the reform). The 
final sample includes firms listed in either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2011. As discussed before, we remove observations from the 
reform year 2006. In total, our database contains more than 12,000 firm-year observations 
from around 1,200 firms, covering firms located in all provinces of mainland China and from 
58 industries.  
We winsorized all continuous variables at 1% and 99%. Table 1 (Panel A) shows 
average movable assets represent 26% of total assets. A decomposition of the movable assets 
shows that inventories represent the lion share of movable assets (17% of total assets), while 
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accounts receivable account for 9% of total assets. Firms‟ usage of trade credit is represented 
as accounts payable, which account for 9% of total assets. Panel B provides the summary 
statistics on the debt side. Total leverage is defined as the ratio of bank credit over lagged 
assets (Debtt/Assett-1), where Debtt is the sum of long-term bank credit (LongDebtt) and 
short-term bank credit (ShortDebtt).83 The average Debtt/Assett-1 is 0.33, with standard 
deviation of 0.22. Total leverage is further decomposed into long-term leverage 
(LongDebtt/Assett-1) and short-term leverage (ShortDebtt/Assett-1). Average long-term 
leverage is 0.13 while that of short-term leverage is 0.21. These figures suggest that the 
majority of corporate debts are in short term.    
Panel C reports summary statistics on the asset side. The mean value of Log(1+Assett) 
is 21.25, which translates to a book value of total assets of 1,693 million RMB. Finally, Panel 
D describes briefly the control variables employed in the analysis. Tangibility is defined as 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (FixedAssett/Assett). Average tangibility is 0.29. 
Liquidity is defined as cash divided by total assets (Casht/Assett). The average liquidity is 
0.16. Profitability is defined as the ratio of net profits over total assets (Netprofitt/Assett). Sale 
is the logarithm of one plus total sale. Age is defined as the logarithm of one plus the number 
of years since incorporation. The average age is 11 years. List is a dummy variable that equals 
one for firm-year observation after firm‟s IPO, and zero otherwise. Split is a dummy variable 
that equals one for firm-year observation after firm‟s completion of the split share reform, 
and zero otherwise. State is a dummy variable that equals one if the controlling shareholder is 
government and zero if the controlling shareholder is a private entity. 69% of the firms in the 
sample are state owned firms. 
 
 
                                                             
83 Following standard accounting standards, short-term debt is debt matures within one year, while long-term debt is debt 
with maturity longer than one year.  
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4. Results 
4.1.Usage of trade credit and substitution to bank credit 
We first investigate whether firms relied more on trade credit could reduce their usage of 
trade credit and substitute to more short-term bank credit. Specifically, we expect to see a 
higher decrease in the usage of trade credit for firms that relied more on such form of 
financing, and a higher increase in their usage of short-term bank credit. We proxy firms‟ 
dependence on trade credit using the pre-reform median level of accounts payable to total 
asset ratio, Fpay, with higher value indicating more dependence on trade credit. We regress 
AP/TA (Accounts Payablet/Total Assett-1) on the interaction term Fpay*After and a set of firm 
controls. The coefficient on the interaction term examines how differently firms change their 
reliance on trade credit as a function of their pre-reform level of accounts payable. A negative 
coefficient would suggest trade credit dependent firms to decrease disproportionally more 
their reliance on trade credit after the reform. Column (1) of Table 2 finds the coefficient on 
Fpay*After to be negative and highly significant. In terms of economic significance, this 
result suggests a one-standard-deviation increase in the pre-reform reliance on trade credit 
reduces the payable ratio by 1.5%, which is economically significant given the average 
accounts payable ratio for our sample is around 10%. In monetary terms, it implies that an 
average firm would reduce the usage of trade credit by around RMB 79 million. Column (2) 
provides nonparametric results in which we sort firms into three equal sized bins based on 
their pre-reform payable ratio, and interact the size bin dummies with After. As expected, the 
results suggest that firms in the third size bin reduced more reliance on trade credit after the 
Property Law.  
One might suspect the observed negative coefficient could be explained by the 
reversal of the usage on trade credit: that is, high dependence of trade credit in the past is 
followed naturally by low usage of trade credit in later periods. If this argument was driving 
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our results, the negative correlation should be observed at any given point of time. To 
investigate this possibility, we repeat our analysis in columns (3) and (4) for several placebo 
reforms that happen in years before the actual reform. Since we use lagged control variables 
and we need at least one year of observation before and after the placebo reforms, we could 
design two placebo reforms occurring in 2003 and 2004, respectively. In addition to test the 
alternative explanation above, the placebo reforms further check whether the parallel trend 
assumption hold, which is crucial for our DID framework. In all these tests, After is an 
indicator variable takes value one for years after the placebo reform, and Fpay is the median 
payable ratio measured before each placebo reform. For none of these placebo reforms do we 
observe statistically significant correlation between pre-reform payable ratio and the usage of 
trade credit. These results rule out the alternative explanation explained above, and provide 
evidence supporting the parallel trend assumption.  
Secondly, we investigate if trade-credit dependent firms could expand their access to 
bank credit after the reform. Given the short-term nature of trade credit, we expect to see 
broadened access to short-term bank credit, but not to long-term. Table 3 provides the results. 
Columns (1)-(3) employ ShortDebtt/Assett-1 as dependent variable. In column (1), the 
coefficient on the Fpay*After is positive and statistically significant at 10%, confirming firms 
that relied more on trade credit before the reform could expand disproportionally more access 
to short-term bank credit after the reform. The estimate suggests that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in pre-reform payable ratio increases short-term leverage by 1.2%. For an average 
firm, it is equivalent to an increase of RMB 66 million in short-term debt. Combining with 
the results in column (1) of Table 2, these estimates suggest these firms could substitute 
almost entirely their usage of trade credit with short-term bank loans. These findings provide 
supporting evidence that the Property Law could allow trade credit dependent firms to shift 
away from plausibly expensive trade credit to bank credit, and validate the presence of a 
negative demand shock of trade credit.  
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Columns (2) and (3) show estimates for two placebo reforms took place in 2003 and 
2004. In both cases, the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and statistically 
insignificant, supporting the parallel trend assumption. More importantly, these estimates rule 
out an important alternative explanation, i.e., firms that had higher level of accounts payable 
in the past needed to borrow more short-term debt in the future. If this argument was driving 
our findings, we would expect to see positive interaction terms at any pre-reform period, 
however, this is not what we found in columns (2) and (3).  
Next we investigate if firms could substitute their usage of trade credit with long-term 
bank credit and total bank credit, using LongDebtt/Assett-1 (column (4)) and Debtt/Assett-1 
(column (5)) as dependent variable, respectively. In both cases, the coefficients on the 
interaction terms Fpay*After are statistically insignificant, suggesting firms could not 
substitute accounts payable, which is short-term in nature, to long-term bank credit.  
These findings provide supporting evidence that after the Property Law, firms 
substitute their usage of trade credit with short-term bank credit. Arguably, access to external 
finance is not the only factor that could change firms‟ usage of trade credit. For instance, the 
usage of trade credit may change because of changes in market power (Wilner, 2000; Fabbri 
and Klapper, 2016), information opacity (Bias and Gollier, 1997), transaction costs (Ferris, 
1981), or relationships between suppliers and customers (Summers and Wilson, 2002). 
Inclusion of firm fixed effects and the interaction term between Treated*Trend could only 
alleviate some of these concerns. To further validate the causal relationship between access to 
finance and the usage of trade credit, we explore cross-sectional variations in firms‟ financial 
constraints. Existing literature provides both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
that financially constrained firms use more trade credit (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Bias 
and Gollier, 1997; Pertersen and Rajan, 1997). Following this line, if the availability of 
external financial recourses is the main reason behind the substitution effect, the reduction in 
the usage of trade credit and the increase in short-term debt should be stronger for the ex-ante 
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financially constrained firms.  
Table 4 shows results for subsamples divided by pre-reform firm size, a standard 
measure for financial constraints. Smaller firms are more financially constrained, and 
therefore if the Property Law promotes access to bank credit, the reduction in the usage of 
trade credit as well as the improvements in the access to short-term debt should be larger. We 
re-estimate for firms that belong to the highest 33% percentile in the pre-reform size 
distribution, and the lowest 33% percentile. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 compare the 
results on the usage of trade credit. The coefficient in column (1) suggests that firms 
belonging to the lowest 33% percentile in pre-reform size distribution experienced the largest 
decrease in the usage of trade credit, while that for the firms in the top 33% percentile in 
column (2) reduced much less. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the payable 
ratio decreases the dependence on trade credit by 1.8% for small firms, while for large firms, 
dependence only decreases by 0.5%. The test on the equality of the interaction terms across 
two subsamples however could not reject the null, although the p-value would be significant 
on conventional level for one-sided test. Likewise, column (3) shows that, the pre-reform 
trade-credit dependent small firms increase their access to short-term bank credit. Compared 
with the coefficient in column (1), small firms could substitute all their demand for trade 
credit with short-term bank credit. For large firms, in column (4), the increase in short-term 
debt is not significant. We test again the equality of the interaction terms across two 
subsamples. The result shows that the p-value would be significant on conventional level for 
one-sided test. 
Although we cannot rule out other factors that could to have changed firms‟  usage 
of trade credit, these results exploring cross-sectional variations in financial constraints could 
further strengthen the causal relationship between access to bank credit and the dependence 
on trade credit.  In addition, since our sample is composed of large public traded companies 
which are less financially constrained compared to small and medium unlisted companies, the 
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substitution effects we find here may underestimate the average substitution effect for the 
entire population of Chinese companies. Nevertheless, even for our sample, these findings 
provide suggestive evidence that the Property Law may have caused a negative demand 
shock on trade credit.  
 
4.2.Provision of trade credit 
This section investigates the provision of trade credit, which is registered as accounts 
receivable. As argued before, the effect of the Property Law on accounts receivable is 
ambiguous:  on the one hand, firms with more pre-reform movable assets may accumulate 
more accounts receivable, because such asset type is pledgable after the Property Law reform.  
Therefore, the extension of trade credit could increase more for firms with more pre-reform 
movable assets. On the other hand, if the Property Law allowed for better access to bank 
credit, the customers of trade credit could shift to potentially less costly bank credit after the 
reform, leaving the providers of trade credit to face less demand. The aggregate impact of the 
Property Law on the provision of trade credit should depend on both demand and supply 
factors. We proxy the suppliers using the pre-reform median level of movable assets ratio, 
Fmov. To recall, Fmov is defined as the median pre-reform movable assets ratio, where 
movable assets are composed of inventory and accounts receivable (which is the provision of 
trade credit). The assumption is that firms provided more trade credit or had more inventories 
in the past were more likely to be suppliers of trade credit, and consequently, should be more 
affected by the legal change.84   
If the demand side effect dominates, we expect firms with higher level of pre-reform 
movable assets to reduce more their provision of trade credit. Table 5 provides results using 
AR/TA (Accounts Receivablet/Total Assett-1) as dependent variable. Column (1) include only 
                                                             
84
 Unreported tests show similar results if the providers are proxied by pre-reform accounts receivable to asset ratio.  
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Fmov*After and Fmov*Trendt. The negative coefficient of -0.063 implies that firms with high 
pre-reform movable assets ratio decreases more their provision of trade credit. The 
economical impact is sizeable: a one-standard-deviation increase in Fmov reduces the 
provision of trade credit (as share of total assets) by 1%. Given the average AR/TA ratio is 
9.7%, a 1% decrease is economically significant. Quantitatively, it is equivalent to reduction 
of RMB 48 million in the supply of trade credit for an average firm. Column (2) adds firm 
control variables to reduce residual variation. The results remain similar. Columns (3) and (4) 
provide nonparametric results in which we sort firms into three equal sized bins s based on 
their pre-reform movable ratio, and interact the size bin dummies with After, for 
specifications with and without firm controls, respectively. In both specifications, the firms 
with more pre-reform movable assets experienced larger drops in the provision of trade credit: 
the reduction in the third size bin is twice as large as the one in the middle size bin.  
These results seem to suggest the demand side effect dominates: the Property Law 
provided more access to bank credit which reduced the importance to of trade credit 
financing, and therefore the provision of trade credit dropped. There could be an alternative 
explanation: accounts receivable may be cyclical in nature, which implies that a high level of 
accounts receivable in the past would naturally be followed by less provision of trade credit. 
To address this possibility, we employ two placebo reforms defined in the same way as in 
Table 2. If the cyclical nature of accounts receivable is driving the results, we should expect 
to see a disproportional decrease in accounts receivable for high movable firms at any given 
point of time. The results in columns (5) and (6) show both interactions are negative, but 
statistically insignificant and economically small (2 to 3 times smaller than column (2)), 
which allows us to disregard the alternative explanation. Moreover, as argued before, the 
placebo tests also provide supporting evidence to the parallel trend assumption.  
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4.3. Redistribution of bank credit via trade credit 
This section tests Hypothesis 3. Following the “redistribution view” of trade credit, firms 
borrow short-term loans from banks, and redistribute this short-term liquidity to their 
customers via trade credit. After the Property Law, because alternative bank credit became 
available, the redistribution of bank credit could be disrupted.  
We employ an approach similar to Cull, Xu, and Zhu (2009) by regressing provision 
of trade credit (AR/TA) on lagged short-term leverage (SDit-1) and its interaction term with the 
post reform dummy (SDit-1*After). A positive coefficient on SDit-1 implies that firms which 
borrowed more short-term debt could redistribute more trade credit before the Property Law, 
and a negative coefficient on the interaction term SDit-1*After would imply a moderation or 
disruption of the redistribution effect after the Property Law.  
Importantly, firms could also fund the provision of trade credit with long-term debt or 
internal resources such as cash holding or retained earnings. Because the exogenous shock of 
the Property Law primarily works through the availability of short-term bank credit, it should 
not have a direct impact on the provisions of trade credit via long-term bank credit or internal 
resources. Finding evidence that the provision of trade credit does not experience structure 
changes as function of long-term bank credit or internal resources would further validate our 
argument that the Property Law mainly provided a shock on the access to short-term bank 
credit. 
Table 6 shows whether the provision of trade credit as function of short-term debt 
(column (1)), or other financial resources (columns (2)-(4)) experienced structural shifts 
around the Property Law. The dependent variable is AR/TA. In column (1), the coefficient on 
SDt-1 is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that in the pre-reform era, firms 
that borrowed more short-term bank credit provided more trade credit (accounts receivable), 
consistent with the view that firms redistribute their bank credit via trade credit. This finding 
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is similar to Cull, Xu, and Zhu (2009) who investigate a large sample of Chinese industrial 
firms for 1998-2003. The redistribution effect however was disrupted after the Property Law 
reform, which is reflected in the negative coefficient on the interaction term SDit-1*After. The 
sum of the two coefficients is 0.017 and statistically indifferent from zero (p-value=0.17). 
This finding suggests that after the Property Law reform, increases in the short-term bank 
credit do not increase the provision of trade credit, consistent with the view that the Property 
Law has disrupted the redistribution channel.  
 Column (2) investigates whether firms could rely on long-term loans to fund their 
provision of trade credit, and if so, whether the pattern experienced structural changes around 
the Property Law reform. The coefficients on LDit-1, LDit-1*After, and their sum are all 
statistically insignificant, indicating that in our sample firms do not finance accounts 
receivable with long-term debt either before or after the reform. Columns (3) and (4) 
investigate if firms fund accounts receivable with internal resources such as cash holding or 
retained earnings. For the pre-reform era, internal resources such as cash holding (column (3)) 
and retained earnings (column (4)) strongly determine the extension of trade credit, as 
suggested by the significant coefficient on FinResourceit-1. However, the interaction term 
After*FinResourceit-1 is insignificant regardless how FinResourceit-1 is proxied, which implies 
that their impact on the provision of trade credit did not experience structural break after the 
Property Law. This evidence further strengthens our argument that the Property Law mainly 
provided exogenous shock on short-term external liquidity, but not on internal resources. but 
as suggested by the insignificant interaction terms, their patterns remain unchanged after the 
Property Law.  
The results above suggest that before the Property Law some short-term debt was 
used to fund the provision of trade credit. Such practice was disrupted by the Property Law. 
To further validate this hypothesis, we introduce a triple interaction term to test whether the 
disruption in the redistribution is larger for the suppliers of trade credit. Table 7 reports results. 
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The dependent variable is AR/TA. Column (1) includes triple interaction terms 
SDit-1*After*Fmov to investigate if firms with more pre-reform movable assets experienced 
more disruption of redistribution after the Property Law reform. The negative coefficient on 
the triple interaction term indicates that firms with higher level of pre-reform moveable assets 
experienced more pronounced disruption of the redistribution of bank credit. For ease of 
interpretation, columns (2) and (3) show results for subsample of firms divided by the level of 
pre-reform movable assets. Specifically, column (2) investigates the relationship between 
lagged short-term bank credit and the provision of trade credit for firms in the lowest 33% 
percentile of pre-reform movable assets, and column (3) inspects for firms located in the 
highest 33% percentile of pre-reform movable assets. In column (2), we find the correlation 
between lagged short-term bank credit and provision of trade credit is insignificant either 
before or after the Property Law, which suggest these firms did not redistribute bank credit 
via trade credit. In contrast, for firms with high level of pre-reform movable assets, column 
(3), lagged short-term bank credit was positively related to provision of trade credit before 
the Property Law, consistent with the idea that these firms borrowed short-term bank credit to 
finance their provision of trade credit. This redistribution was disrupted after the reform, as 
indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term 
SDit-1*After. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the Property Law caused a 
negative demand shock on trade credit, which in turn disrupted the redistribution of bank 
credit via trade credit, particularly for firms with more movable assets.  
Although lagged by one period, short-term bank credit could still be endogenous. We 
investigate the robustness of our results using (only) short-term leverage measured in 2005 
(SD05), one year before the Property Law, to proxy firms‟ access to short-term debt. This is 
similar to an instrumental variables approach in which the identification is that pre-reform 
short-term leverage is not correlated with unobserved with-firm changes in trade credit 
following the Property Law reform (see Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) for a similar 
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application). Columns (4)-(6) re-estimate previous columns using SD05 to proxy firms‟ access 
to short-term leverage and find similar results.  
To conclude, the findings in this section provide supporting evidence that the Property 
Law effectively disrupted the redistribution of bank credit via trade credit. We argue this is 
because the Property Law promoted access to bank financing, and consequently redistributing 
bank credit via trade credit became less important.   
 
4.4. Asset structure and debt maturity 
This section investigates how firms adjust their asset composition after the Property Law. 
Table 8 provide results, using Log(TA), Fixed Asset/Total Asset, and Cash/Total Asset as 
dependent variables, respectively. We first look at changes in total assets. Column (1) uses the 
logarithm of total assets (Log(TA)) as dependent variable. The interaction term on 
Fmov*After is 0.315 and statistically significant at 5%, suggesting that firms with higher 
pre-reform movable assets ratio increase relatively more in total assets. However, the 
magnitude of the coefficient suggests a small economic effect: a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the movable assets ratio (s.d.=0.148) increases the logarithm of total assets by 
around 0.05 (0.315*0.148). Given the median value of Log(TA) is 21.3, this increase in size is 
economically small. Columns (2) and (3) test if the previous findings hold for placebo 
reforms happened in 2003 and 2004. In both cases, we do not find statistically significant 
results and therefore validating the parallel trend assumption.  
Columns (4)-(6) investigate the changes in fixed asset investment (Fixed Asset/Total 
Asset). The coefficient on the interaction term of Fmov*After in column (4) is 0.095 and 
statistically significant. This implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in movable ratio 
increase tangibility by 1.4%, which is equivalent to RMB 68 million for an average firm. This 
result suggests that firms with high pre-reform movable assets shift towards more fixed asset 
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investment. As before, we test for the placebo reforms that took place in 2003 and 2004 to 
check the parallel trend assumption. The insignificant interaction terms in columns (5) and (6) 
provide supporting evidence that the parallel trend assumption hold. Columns (7)-(9) 
investigate if firms change their cash holding after the Property Law, and for two placebo 
reforms defined as before.  None of the columns shows differential changes in cash holding. 
Taken together, these results suggest that firms mostly adjust their asset composition towards 
longer maturity in terms of more fixed asset investments.  
Next we examine the effect of the Property Law on corporate leverage and debt 
maturity. Table 9 presents the results. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
the interaction term Fmov*After in column (1) suggests firms with more pre-reform movable 
assets are able to obtain more bank credit after the reform. The increase is economically 
significant, as a one-standard-deviation increase in movable assets ratio increases total 
leverage by 1.6%, which is equivalent to a RMB 77 million increase in total debt for an 
average firm of our sample. Column (2) examines the impact of the law on long-term 
leverage. The coefficient on Fmov*After indicates that firms with more pre-reform movable 
assets increase disproportionally more long-term leverage after the reform. Quantitatively, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the movable assets ratio implies a 1.4% increase in 
long-term leverage. This figure suggests that the increase in total leverage found in column (1) 
is almost driven entirely by the increase of long-term leverage. Column (3) further confirms 
that short-term leverage did not change depending on the pre-reform level of movable assets 
ratio, given the statistically insignificant and economically small coefficient on Fmov*After.   
Columns (4) to (6) provide nonparametric results in which we sort firms into three 
equal sized bins based on their pre-reform movable ratio, and interact the size bin dummies 
with After. We expect to see larger effects for firms located in the higher size bin of 
pre-reform movable ratio. Columns (4) and (5) show that firms in the third size bin 
experienced 4.2% relative increase in leverage and 3.7% in long-term leverage, comparing to 
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firms with lowest level of movable assets. In column (6), we do not find differential changes 
in short-term debt for all size bins of movable assets.  
The findings on short-term debt is consistent with our conjecture that after taking into 
account trade credit, the effect of the Property Law on short-term bank credit is muted. On 
the one hand, firms with more movable assets may be able to borrow more short-term debt 
because they can now pledge their movable assets. On the other hand, once their customers 
can access bank credit more easily after the Property Law, their importance as non-financial 
intermediary decreases, in the sense that these firms stopped borrowing short-term debt to 
finance the provision of trade credit to their customers. The aggregate effect on short-term 
debt therefore becomes insignificant. 
Combining the findings from Tables 8 and 9, we find that firms adjusted both their 
asset and debt composition following the Property Law. In both cases, the composition shifts 
towards longer end of maturities, that is more fixed asset investment and more long-term 
debt.85 This is in line with the notion that firms match the maturity of assets and liabilities 
(e.g. Myers, 1977; Milbradt and Oehmke, 2014). Our findings also lend some support to 
“credit multiplier” effects (e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 2000; Campello and 
Hackbarth, 2012): higher external finance promotes more investments in fixed assets, which 
in turn could be used as collateral to further increase the debt capacity of these firms. 
One might suspect that movable assets could be positively related to corporate 
leverage for other reasons. For instance, it is possible that firm extended more trade credit in 
the past or had more inventory needed to borrow more to keep the company afloat. If this 
argument is driving our results, it would imply a positive correlation between the movable 
assets ratio and leverage at any given point of time. We therefore repeat our analysis in Table 
10 for two placebo reforms occurred in 2003 and 2004. For none of these placebo reforms do 
                                                             
85 See Gopalan, Mukherjee and Singh (2015) for similar findings. They find that better contract enforcement allows firms to 
better match debt and asset maturity.  
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we observe statistically significant correlation between pre-reform movable ratio and 
corporate leverage (debt maturity). These results rule out the alternative explanation stated 
above, and provide evidence in support of the parallel trend assumption. In unreported tests 
we show that previous results still hold using debt levels instead of leverage as dependent 
variables, confirming our results are not driven by the variations in the denominator (i.e. total 
assets). 
 
5. Robustness  
This section checks the robustness of previous results. For the sake of brevity, we focus on 
the disruption of the redistribution of bank credit. We first show the main findings could not 
be explained by the global financial crisis which hit China since 2008. Secondly, we check if 
other contemporary reform could explain the main finding, specifically the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission‟s (CSRC) regulations on related party transaction and illegal loan 
guarantee (2005-2006) (hereafter denoted as tunneling reform). We also investigate if 
changes in some innate firm characteristics other than movable assets are driving our results. 
We finally repeat other robustness tests relating to alternative definitions and alternative 
samples, which are available upon request.  
 
5.1. Property Law or financial crisis 
The disruption of redistribution could be explained by credit crunch due to the global 
financial crisis: the shortage in bank credit limited firms‟ ability to redistribute bank credit, 
simply because external financial resources were shut down and there was no bank credit to 
redistribute (Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende, 2007). In addition, firms with more outstanding 
short-term debt were particularly vulnerable due to the difficulty to roll-over short-term debt 
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during financial crisis, and consequently, they were unable to pass on scarce bank credit to 
their clients via trade credit. Therefore, these firms shifted away from redistribution of bank 
credit because of liquidity drain and the needs to mitigate their own liquidity risks during 
crisis.  
We argue that if the global financial crisis in 2008 was driving previous results, one 
would expect the disruption of the redistribution to occur predominately during the crisis 
period, but not before the crisis. To this end, we design two empirical strategies: Firstly we 
investigate a short event window: one year before and one year after the Property Law. Since 
the Property Law was formally approved at the end of 2006, firms could not have anticipated 
the financial crisis which hit China two years later. Therefore, this short event window could 
effectively mitigate the possible confounding factors caused by the financial crisis. In 
addition, the short event window could also mitigate confounding factors caused by other 
reforms (policies) that took place in the post-reform period. For instance, the RMB 4 trillion 
stimulus package introduced over 2009-2010 may have differential impacts on firms with 
different level of pre-reform movable assets. By focusing on the short event window, we 
remove this possibility. Our second strategy estimates precisely when the disruption occurred 
during the post-reform period. Specifically, we break down the post-reform periods into the 
pre-crisis year of 2007 (Post1), the crisis year of 2008 (Crisis), the years of stimulus package 
2009-2010 (Post2), and the final year of the sample (Post3). By adding interaction terms 
between each post-reform dummy, access to short-term debt SD, and pre-reform movable 
assets Fmov, we could identify the moment when the disruption occurred. If financial crisis 
was driving our results, the coefficient on interaction term Crisis*SD*Fmov should be 
significantly negative, while that of Post1*SD*Fmovi should not be significant. As before we 
proxy access to short-term bank credit SD with lagged short-term leverage (ShortDebt/TA)t-1 
or short-term leverage measured in year 2005, (ShortDebt/TA)2005. 
Table 11 reports results. First, looking at the results from the short event window 
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(columns (1) and (2)), we find the triple interaction terms in both columns are statistically and 
economically more significant than columns (1) and (4) of Table 7. This result suggests the 
disruption of the redistribution is particularly pronounced one year after the Property Law 
reform, which cannot be due to the financial crisis. In columns (3) and (4), we find the 
coefficients on the interaction terms SD*Post1*Fmov to be statistically significant and 
negative, consistent with previous columns that the first year after the Property Law observed 
the stronger disruption of redistribution. More importantly, the coefficients on 
SD*Crisis*Fmov are statistically insignificant, regardless how we proxy the access to 
short-term debt. This finding invalidates the alternative theory that credit crunch due to 
financial crisis could drive our findings.  
 
5.2 Property Law or anti-related party transaction 
Firms provide another type of inter-corporate loans which are called related party transaction. 
These types of transactions usually occur in between listed firms and their controlling holders 
and affiliates. Unlike trade credit, these transactions are not based on selling or purchasing of 
goods. Instead, as demonstrated in Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010), this type of inter-corporate 
lending is one of the main channels for controlling share holders to “tunnel” corporate 
assets. 86  During 2005 and 2006, the State Council and China Securities Regulatory 
Commission issued several statements to tackle tunneling activities, including joint 
statements by eight ministries threatening to take personal actions against top managers of 
controlling entities if the tunneling problem was not resolved by the end of 2006 (hereafter 
tunneling reform). 87  According to many observers, these strict rules have successfully 
                                                             
86 Tunneling is an activity by which controlling shareholders or managers extract firm values. (see e.g. Johnson, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000; La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa, 2003). 
87 Several failed attempts in regulating tunneling activities took effect in the early 2000s. Eventually, in November 2005, the 
State Council issued a Directive on behalf of CSRC, titled “ On improving the Quality of Listed Companies”, which states 
the top management of controlling shareholders or colluding firms will be personally punished for tunneling activities. In 
November 2006, eight government ministries issued a joint announcement, making it clear that the top management of 
controlling entities would be fired and face disciplinary punishment if tunneling activities remained by December 31, 2006. 
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reduced the tunneling activities (e.g. Jiang, Lee, and Yue, 2010; Li et al., 2015). The 
tunneling reform could confound the previous results because firms with more movable 
assets are also more likely to engage in tunneling activities, as these firms have strong 
incentives to borrow short-term bank credit to lend to their controlling share holders. After 
the effective tunneling reform which prohibited such activities, the redistribution of 
short-term debt was disrupted. In other words, the tunnel reform may offer an alternative 
explanation to our findings.  
We tackle this issue by controlling explicitly for firms‟ tunneling risks. Related party 
transactions are registered under the entry “Other Receivables” (OREC), and according to 
Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010), firms with more other receivables are prone to tunneling risks. We 
therefore use other receivables ratio (Other Receivablet/Assett) measured as the pre-reform 
median to proxy the tunneling risk, denoted as Forec.88 Because the tunneling reform started 
from 2005, we define a dummy variable Tunnel equals zero for the pre-2005 period, and one 
otherwise. We introduce the interaction term SD*Forec*Tunnel together with interaction term 
SD*After*Fmov. If the tunneling reform was causing the disruption of the redistribution, we 
expect the coefficient on SD*Forec*Tunnel to be negative, and that of SD*After*Fmovi to 
lose its significance. Again, we proxy access to short-term debt (SD) with either lagged 
short-term leverage (ShortDebt/TA)t-1 or short-term leverage measured in year 2005, 
(ShortDebt/TA)2005.The results in Table 12 column (1) and (2) show that after controlling the 
tunneling reform, the coefficient on the interaction term SD*After*Fmov is very similar to 
our previous results. This implies that our previous findings are not driven by the tunneling 
reform.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
See Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010) and Li et al. (2015) for more details. 
88 An alternative proxy of tunneling risk is the wedge between control rights and cash flow rights (wedge). See for instance 
Lin et al., (2012). Additional tests are conducted using such proxy and our results remain similar. Data of control rights and 
cash flow rights are collected from China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR). Results are available upon 
request.  
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5.3. Other robustness tests 
In previous sections, we use lagged firm control variables. In this section, we control firm 
characteristics with pre-reform median values. Specifically, we calculate the pre-reform 
median value of each control variable, except Age, List and State, and denote them as FX. For 
Age, List and State, we use (only) the 2005 value, which is one year before the reform. We 
replace all lagged control variables with interaction terms between FX*After, where the 
coefficients on FX*After indicate if firms react to the Property Law differently depending on 
these firms‟ innate features. Table 12 columns (3) and (4) report results using either lagged 
short-term leverage or short-term leverage measured at 2005 as proxy of access to short-term 
debt. The coefficients on the triple interaction terms are very similar as before, suggesting our 
findings could not be driven by changes in firm characteristics other than movable assets.  
Finally, some additional robustness tests are available upon request, including 1) 
Re-estimation after removing observations from 2005. Even though we have removed 
observations from 2006 to control for the possibility that some firms may have anticipated the 
passage of the law in 2006, we go one step further by removing data from 2005. With this 
sample, it is safe to argue that anticipating the reform to take place back in 2004 is impossible 
for any firm. 2) Re-define the pre-reform movable ratio. Instead of using pre-reform median 
movable ratio, we explore if the results still hold using only the movable ratio measured in 
2005. 3) Redefine trade credit using the definition of Petersen and Rajan (1997). Specifically, 
instead of scaling with total assets, we scale accounts receivable with net sale, and accounts 
payable with cost of goods sold. 4) Re-estimation over alternative samples: a) sample of 
firms that have been listed throughout the entire sample period, to alleviate the concern that 
differential reputational improvements due to listing or accessibility to capital markets might 
drive the results;89 b) a sample of firms that never changed their ownership type throughout 
                                                             
89 All firms in the sample are eventually listed at stock exchanges, but their annual reports started to be published several 
years before the actual listings.  
186 
 
the sample period, which removes possible confounding effects due to privatization. Our 
main results hold for all these tests.  
 
6. Conclusions 
By allowing movable assets to be pledged as collateral, the Chinese Property Law may have 
extended access to bank credit for vast population of small and medium firms. This 
exogenous shock in short-term bank liquidity reduced the demand for trade credit, a possibly 
more expensive substitute to bank credit. As a result, the providers of trade credit reduced 
their provision of trade credit. More importantly, the Property Law disrupted a practice in 
which firms borrow bank credit to finance their provision of trade credit. Therefore, even 
though the Property Law could also allow the providers of trade credit to access short-term 
bank credit more easily, the aggregate effect on short-term borrowing was muted. Instead, we 
find the providers of trade credit started to accumulate more fixed asset investment, which in 
turn led to more borrowing in long-term debt. Our findings highlight the importance of taking 
into account other financing channels when investigating the effect of collateral law. Our 
study also has important policy implications: by removing collateral constraint, legal reform 
could re-direct funding flows back to the banking sector, which to some extent could 
facilitate a better implementation of monetary policy.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for selected variables. Sample period is 2001 to 2011, excluding 
observations from the reform year 2006. The sample contains firms listed in either Shanghai Stock Exchange or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Data is obtained from Wind Information. Movratiot is defined as 
(Inventoryt+Account Receivablet)/Assett. AR/TA is the accounts receivable scaled by total assets. AP/TA is 
accounts payable scaled by total assets. OREC/TA is other receivable scaled by total assets. Tangibilityt is the 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets (FixedAssett/Assett). Liquidityt is cash divided by total assets (Casht/Assett). 
Profitabilityt is the ratio of net profits over total assets (Netprofitt/Assett). Salet is the logarithm of one plus total 
sale. Aget is defined as the logarithm of one plus the number of years since incorporation. Listt is a dummy 
variable equals one for firm-year observation after firm‟s IPO, and zero otherwise. Splitt is a dummy variable 
equals one for firm-year observation after firm‟s completion of the split share reform, and zero otherwise. Statet 
is a dummy variable equals one if the controlling shareholder is government and zero if the controlling 
shareholder is private entity.  
 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Ste.Dev. Min Max 
Panel A:Movable assets and trade credit 
Movratiot 12445 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.76 
AR/TA 12518 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.37 
AP/TA 12630 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.36 
Inventoryt/Assett 12570 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.75 
OREC/TA 12692 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.38 
Panel B:Debt 
Debtt/Assett-1 6884 0.33 0.22 0.02 1.44 
LongDebtt/Assett-1 7239 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.85 
ShortDebtt/Assett-1 10218 0.21 0.16 0.00 0.88 
Panel C:Assets  
Log(1+Assett) 12720 21.25 1.17 18.42 24.70 
FixedAssett/Assett-1 11415 0.32 0.22 0.00 1.07 
Panel D: Controls 
Tangibilityt 12680 0.29 0.19 0.00 0.79 
Liquidityt 12707 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.56 
Profitabilityt 12717 0.03 0.08 -0.41 0.22 
Salet 12701 20.56 1.50 15.94 24.50 
Aget 12720 2.48 0.48 0.00 4.12 
Listt 12720 0.96 0.20 0 1 
Splitt 12720 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Statet 12720 0.69 0.46 0 1 
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Table 2: Usage of trade credit 
 
This table report results on the usage of trade credit. The dependent variable is Accounts Payablet/Total Assetst-1 
(AP/TA). In column (1), Fpayi is the median payable ratio measured over 2001-2005. Aftert is a dummy variable 
that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. The observations from the reform year 2006 are 
excluded from the sample. In column (2), DFpay_mid and DFpay_high are indicator variables that take value one if the 
pre-reform median payable ratio belongs to the middle and top tertile, and zero otherwise. Columns (3) and (4) 
report results for placebo reforms take place in 2003 and 2004, respectively. In the placebo regression, After is 
an indicator variable that takes value one for years after the placebo reform, and Fpayi is the median movable 
ratio measured over years before the placebo reform. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var AP/TA 
   Placebo 2003 Placebo 2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fpayi*After -0.155***  -0.037 -0.076 
 (0.060)  (0.059) (0.061) 
DFpay_midi*After  -0.008   
  (0.006)   
DFpay_highi*After  -0.012*   
  (0.007)   
Log(TAt-1) -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Tangibilityt-1 -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Liquidityt-1 -0.027** -0.032*** -0.026* -0.026* 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Profitabilityt-1 0.024 0.021 0.034* 0.035* 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
Salet-1 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.008** 0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Aget-1 0.010 0.014* 0.004 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Listt -0.001 -0.003 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Splitt 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008* 0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Statet 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Fpay*Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,343 11,343 5,052 5,052 
R-squared 0.229 0.212 0.215 0.216 
Number of firms 1,271 1,271 1,269 1269 
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Table 3: Substitution between bank credit and trade credit 
This table estimates the substitution between trade credit and bank credit. The dependent variable is 
ShortDebt/TA, LongDebt/TA, and Debt/TA, respectively. In column (1), Fpayi is the median payable ratio 
measured over 2001-2005. Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero 
otherwise. Columns (2) and (3) report results for two placebo reforms took place in 2003 and 2004, respectively. 
In both of these columns, After is an indicator variable that takes value one for years after the placebo reform, 
and Fpayi is the median movable ratio measured over years before the placebo reform. The sample ends by 
year-end of 2005 for these columns. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep.Var ShortDebt/TA LongDebt/TA Debt/TA 
  Placebo 2003 Placebo 2004   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fpayi*After 0.203* -0.025 -0.073 0.010 -0.041 
 (0.110) (0.099) (0.090) (0.132) (0.255) 
Log(TAt-1) -0.042*** -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.032*** -0.102*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.013) 
Tangibilityt-1 -0.007 -0.024 -0.023 -0.068*** -0.098*** 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.029) (0.022) (0.036) 
Liquidityt-1 -0.034 -0.049 -0.048 -0.059** -0.053 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.046) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.121*** -0.067* -0.066* 0.076** -0.069 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.061) 
Salet-1 0.012** 0.007 0.007 -0.020*** -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
Aget-1 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.061** 0.035* 0.132*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.032) 
Listt 0.008 0.010 0.015 -0.071*** -0.041* 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) 
Splitt 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.027*** 0.036** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) 
Statet -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) 
Fpay*Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,202 4,678 4,684 7,226 6,875 
R-squared 0.206 0.162 0.160 0.192 0.217 
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Number of firms 1,261 1,242 1,244 1,159 1,144 
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Table 4:  Financial constraints and substitution between bank credit and trade credit  
This table estimates the substitution between trade credit and bank credit for samples of small and large firms. 
Small firms are the ones with lowest 33% percentile of pre-reform total assets, while large firms are the ones 
with highest 33% percentile of pre-reform total assets. The dependent variable is AP/TA in columns (1) and (2), 
and ShortDebt/TA in columns (3) and (4). Fpayi is the median payable ratio measured over 2001-2005. Aftert is a 
dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. The observations from the reform 
year 2006 are excluded from the sample. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep.Var AP/TA ShortDebt/TA 
 Small Large Small Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fpayi*After -0.298** -0.094 0.305* 0.010 
 (0.123) (0.097) (0.175) (0.120) 
F (p-value) 1.72 (0.19) 2.26 (0.13) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fpay*Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,759 3,786 3,256 3,505 
R-squared 0.362 0.364 0.334 0.338 
Number of firms 423 424 420 420 
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Table 5: Provision of trade credit 
This table report results on the provision of trade credit. The dependent variable is Accounts Receivablet/Total 
Assetst-1 (AR/TA). In columns (1)-(2), Fmovi is the median movable ratio measured over 2001-2005. Aftert is a 
dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. The observations from the reform 
year 2006 are excluded from the sample. In columns (3)-(4), DFmov_mid and DFmov_high are indicator variables that 
take value one if the pre-reform median movable ratio belongs to the middle and top tertile, and zero otherwise. 
Aftert is defined the same way as in columns (1)-(2). Columns (5) and (6) report results for placebo reforms took 
place in 2003 and 2004, respectively. The sample ends by year-end of 2005 for these two columns. In these 
placebo regressions, After is an indicator variable that takes value one for years after the placebo reform, and 
Fmovi is the median movable ratio measured over years before the each placebo reform. Standard errors 
clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Dep.Var AR/TA 
     Placebo 
2003 
Placebo 
2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fmovi*After -0.063*** -0.057***   -0.022 -0.030 
 (0.020) (0.019)   (0.015) (0.020) 
DFmov_midi*After   -0.011* -0.010*   
   (0.006) (0.005)   
DFmov_highi*After   -0.023*** -0.022***   
   (0.007) (0.007)   
Log(TAt-1)  -0.039***  -0.040*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Tangibilityt-1  -0.033***  -0.037*** -0.034** -0.038*** 
  (0.010)  (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Liquidityt-1  -0.039***  -0.043*** -0.053*** -0.060*** 
  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
Profitabilityt-1  0.060***  0.061*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
Salet-1  0.021***  0.022*** 0.007** 0.008** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Aget-1  0.006  0.006 0.002 0.001 
  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
Listt  -0.003  -0.002 0.023*** 0.022*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Splitt  0.005  0.005 0.004 0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Statet  -0.004  -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
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Firm controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Fmovi*Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,229 11,207 11,229 11,207 5,013 5,015 
R-squared 0.159 0.217 0.156 0.217 0.270 0.266 
Number of firms 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,263 1,264 
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Table 6: Redistribution of bank credit via trade credit 
This table report results on the redistribution of bank credit via trade credit. The dependent variable is Accounts 
Receivablet/Total Assetst-1 (AR/TA). Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero 
otherwise. The observations from the reform year 2006 are excluded from the sample. The lagged financial 
resource variables that are interacted with After dummy include: ShortDebt/TA (column (1)), LongDebt/TA 
(column (2)), Cash/TA (column (3)) and Retained Earnings/TA (column (4)), all lagged by one year. Standard 
errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var AR/TA 
FinResourceit-1= SD/TA LD/TA Cash/TA RetainEearning/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FinResourceit-1 0.047*** -0.027 -0.062*** 0.038*** 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.009) 
After*FinResourceit-1 -0.030* 0.028 0.025 -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.016) (0.009) 
Log(TAt-1) -0.042*** -0.034*** -0.042*** -0.047*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Tangibilityt-1 -0.047*** -0.041*** -0.048*** -0.044*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Liquidityt-1 -0.043*** -0.053***  -0.048*** 
 (0.012) (0.013)  (0.011) 
Profitabilityt-1 0.071*** 0.044*** 0.060***  
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)  
Salet-1 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Aget-1 0.007 0.020* 0.007 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Listt -0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Splitt 0.002 -0.000 0.004 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Statet -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
FinResource+After*FinResource 0.017 0.001 -0.037*** 0.029*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.007) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 10,204 7,152 11,235 11,222 
R-squared 0.207 0.231 0.197 0.206 
Number of firms 1,262 1,164 1,271 1,271 
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Table 7: Redistribution of bank credit and movable assets 
 
This table report results on redistribution of bank credit and movable assets. The dependent variable is Accounts 
Receivablet/Total Assetst-1 (AR/TA). Columns (1)-(3) use lagged short-term bank credit scaled by total asset, and 
columns (4)-(6) use short-term bank credit to total asset ratio measured at 2005. In column (1) and (4), Fmovi is 
the median movable ratio measured over 2001-2005. Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 
2007-2011, and zero otherwise. The observations from the reform year 2006 are excluded from the sample. 
Columns (2) and (5) estimate for a sample of firms that locate in the lowest 33% tertile of pre-reform movable 
assets, while columns (3) and (6) estimate for firms with the highest 33% tertile of pre-reform movable assets.  
Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep.Var AR/TA 
 SD=(ShortDebt/TA)it-1 SD=(ShortDebt/TA)i2005 
 All firms Low 
Movable 
High 
Movable 
All firms Low 
Movable 
High 
Movable 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SD 0.044* -0.012 0.059**    
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.028)    
SD*After 0.024 0.035 -0.074** 0.021 0.027 -0.096*** 
 (0.033) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.023) (0.027) 
SD*After*Fmovi -0.196*   -0.196*   
 (0.114)   (0.117)   
SD*Fmovi -0.012      
 (0.094)      
Fmovi*After -0.015   -0.020   
 (0.031)   (0.031)   
H0: SD+After*SD=0  0.023 -0.015    
  (0.018) (0.022)    
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treated*Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,179 3,229 3,440 10,315 3,276 3,514 
R-squared 0.232 0.383 0.401 0.231 0.354 0.399 
Number of firms 1,257 416 420 1,163 371 395 
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Table 8: Asset structure 
 
This table estimates the effect on asset structure. The dependent variables Log(TA), FixedAssett/Assett-1 
(FA/TA), and Casht/Assett-1 (CA/TA). For each dependent variable, we report results for the actual reform and 
two placebo reforms take place in 2003 and 2004. For actual reform, After is a dummy variable that equals one 
for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise; Fmovi is the median movable ratio measured over 2001-2005. In 
these placebo regressions, After is an indicator variable that takes value one for years after the placebo reform, 
and Fmovi is the median movable ratio measured over years before the each placebo reform. Standard errors 
clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Dep.Var LogTA LogTA LogTA FA/TA FA/TA FA/TA CA/TA CA/TA CA/TA 
 Actual 
Reform 
Placebo 
2003 
Placebo 
2004 
Actual 
Reform 
Placebo 
2003 
Placebo 
2004 
Actual 
Reform 
Placebo 
2003 
Placebo 
2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Fmovi*After 0.315** -0.105 0.009 0.095** -0.021 0.032 -0.015 0.103 0.028 
 (0.146) (0.064) (0.067) (0.047) (0.030) (0.037) (0.112) (0.091) (0.108) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treated*Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,376 5,046 5,048 11,358 5,045 5,047 11,375 5,046 5,048 
R-squared 0.581 0.519 0.518 0.203 0.149 0.146 0.179 0.267 0.264 
Number of firm 1,266 1,263 1,264 1,266 1,263 1,264 1,266 1,263 1,264 
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Table 9: Debt structure 
 
This table estimates the effect on debt maturity. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), 
LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. After is a dummy variable that equals 
one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. Fmovi is the median movable ratio measured over 2001-2005. 
DFmov_mid and DFmov_high are indicator variables that take value one if the pre-reform median movable ratio 
belongs to the middle and top tertile, and zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep.Var DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fmovi*After 0.110* 0.088** -0.006    
 (0.060) (0.039) (0.048)    
DFmov_midi*After    -0.002 0.001 -0.013 
    (0.019) (0.011) (0.019) 
DFmov_highi *After    0.042* 0.037*** -0.009 
    (0.022) (0.014) (0.016) 
Log(TAt-1) -0.102*** -0.030*** -0.045*** -0.103*** -0.031*** -0.046*** 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) 
Tangibilityt-1 -0.098*** -0.076*** -0.002 -0.097*** -0.075*** -0.002 
 (0.036) (0.024) (0.021) (0.036) (0.023) (0.020) 
Liquidityt-1 -0.051 -0.067** -0.032 -0.049 -0.066** -0.033 
 (0.046) (0.029) (0.025) (0.046) (0.029) (0.025) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.063 0.086** -0.133*** -0.069 0.082** -0.134*** 
 (0.061) (0.038) (0.034) (0.061) (0.038) (0.034) 
Salet-1 -0.006 -0.022*** 0.012** -0.006 -0.022*** 0.012** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
Aget-1 0.131*** 0.039* 0.056*** 0.131*** 0.040* 0.055*** 
 (0.032) (0.021) (0.019) (0.032) (0.021) (0.020) 
Listt -0.043* -0.074*** 0.010 -0.044* -0.075*** 0.009 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.011) (0.024) (0.016) (0.011) 
Splitt 0.034** 0.026*** 0.006 0.034** 0.027*** 0.006 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) 
Statet -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) 
Treated*Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,853 7,202 10,162 6,853 7,202 10,162 
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R-squared 0.216 0.197 0.157 0.217 0.199 0.158 
Number of firms 1,140 1,155 1,256 1,140 1,155 1,256 
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Table 10: Placebo reforms 
 
This table report results on debt maturity for placebo reforms that took place in 2003 (columns (1)-(3)) and 2004 
columns (4)-(6)). The sample ends by year-end of 2005. The dependent variables are Debtt/Assett-1 (DT/TA), 
LongDebtt/Assett-1 (LD/TA), and ShortDebtt/Assett-1 (SD/TA), respectively. In these placebo regressions, After is 
an indicator variable that takes value one for years after the placebo reform, and Fmovi is the median movable 
ratio measured over years before the each placebo reform. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep.Var DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA DT/TA LD/TA SD/TA 
 Placebo 
2003 
Placebo 
2003 
Placebo 
2003 
Placebo 
2004 
Placebo 
2004 
Placebo 
2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fmovi*After -0.033 -0.002 -0.019 0.035 0.049 0.010 
 (0.056) (0.035) (0.044) (0.052) (0.032) (0.040) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treated*Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,067 3,171 4,658 3,069 3,173 4,660 
R-squared 0.247 0.173 0.158 0.247 0.175 0.158 
Number of firms 1,003 1,020 1,236 1,004 1,021 1,237 
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Table 11: Property Law or global financial crisis? 
 
This table tests if the disruption of redistribution is driven by global financial crisis. Columns (1) and (2) 
estimate for short event window covering one year before the Property Law and one year after. Columns (3) and 
(4) breakdown the post-reform period into sub-periods:  pre-crisis year of 2007 (Post1), the crisis year of 2008 
(Crisis), the years of stimulus package 2009-2010 (Post2), and the final year of the sample 2011(Post3). The 
dependent variable in this table is Accounts Receivablet/Total Assetst-1 (AR/TA). To proxy short-term bank credit, 
columns (1) and (3) use lagged short-term bank credit scaled by total asset, and columns (2) and (4) use 
short-term bank credit to total asset ratio measured at 2005. Fmovi is the median movable ratio measured over 
2001-2005. Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, and zero otherwise. The 
observations from the reform year 2006 are excluded from the sample. Standard errors clustered at firm level are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep.Var. AR/TA 
SD= (ShortDebt/TA)it-1 (ShortDebt/TA)i2005 (ShortDebt/TA)it-1 (ShortDebt/TA)i2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SD -0.023  0.043*  
 (0.056)  (0.026)  
After*SD 0.080 0.072   
 (0.052) (0.045)   
After*Fmovi 0.076* 0.068*   
 (0.041) (0.035)   
After*SD*Fmovi -0.515*** -0.487***   
 (0.167) (0.145)   
Post1*SD   0.051 0.061 
   (0.050) (0.047) 
Post1* Fmovi   0.078** 0.079** 
   (0.039) (0.038) 
Post1* SD*Fmovi   -0.434*** -0.456*** 
   (0.163) (0.154) 
Crisis* SD   -0.000 0.022 
   (0.037) (0.046) 
Crisis* Fmovi   -0.021 0.007 
   (0.040) (0.041) 
Crisis* SD*Fmovi   -0.092 -0.207 
   (0.125) (0.154) 
Post2* SD   0.032 0.009 
   (0.033) (0.031) 
Post2* Fmovi   0.047 0.046 
   (0.042) (0.046) 
Post2* SD*Fmovi   -0.143 -0.079 
   (0.126) (0.126) 
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Post3* SD   0.008 0.001 
   (0.037) (0.034) 
Post3* Fmovi   0.099* 0.113** 
   (0.052) (0.057) 
Post3* SD*Fmovi   -0.085 -0.125 
   (0.132) (0.137) 
SD*Fmovi 0.174  -0.022  
 (0.236)  (0.092)  
Treated*Trend No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2,301 2,300 10,179 10,315 
R-squared 0.168 0.168 0.237 0.235 
Number of firms 1,193 1,157 1,257 1,163 
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Table 12: Other robustness  
 
This table tests the disruption of redistribution after controlling the tunneling reform (columns (1) and (2)), and 
controlling initial firm conditions (columns (3) and (4)). The dependent variable in this table is Accounts 
Receivablet/Total Assetst-1 (AR/TA). Columns (1) and (3) use lagged short-term bank credit scaled by total asset, 
and columns (2) and (4) use short-term bank credit to total asset ratio measured at 2005. Fmovi is the median 
movable ratio measured over 2001-2005. Aftert is a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2007-2011, 
and zero otherwise. The observations from the reform year 2006 are excluded from the sample. Fmoreci is the 
pre-reform median other receivable to asset ratio (Other Receivable/Asset). Tunnelt is a dummy equals one for 
years after the tunneling reform in 2005, and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4), the initial controls are 
measured as pre-reform median value of each firm control variable used in Table 2, except Age, List and State. 
For Age, List and State, we use (only) value measured in 2005. Standard errors clustered at firm level are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * implies significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep.Var. AR/TA 
SD= (ShortDebt/TA)it-1 (ShortDebt/TA)i2005 (ShortDebt/TA)it-1 (ShortDebt/TA)i2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SD 0.079***  0.027  
 (0.024)  (0.025)  
SD*After 0.048 0.048 0.032 0.030 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
SD*After*Fmovi -0.188* -0.196* -0.191* -0.201* 
 (0.108) (0.111) (0.116) (0.121) 
SD*Fmovi -0.031  -0.007  
 (0.086)  (0.090)  
After*Fmovi -0.015 -0.019 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) 
SD*Tunnel -0.050** -0.054***   
 (0.021) (0.020)   
SD* Tunnel*Fmoreci 0.273 0.290   
 (0.243) (0.190)   
SD*Fmoreci -0.353    
 (0.229)    
Tunnel*Fmoreci -0.046 -0.044   
 (0.077) (0.060)   
Firm controls Yes Yes - - 
Initial controls*After - - Yes Yes 
Treated*Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 10,179 10,315 10,187 10,331 
R-squared 0.234 0.233 0.191 0.182 
Number of firms 1,257 1,163 1,257 1,163 
 
 
 
